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This thesis deals with command (amr) in Islamic 
jurisprudence. In the introduction the significance 
of amr is explained and the background of the science 
of usül al-fiqh, in which the discussions of amr took 
place, is described. This includes a survey of the 
classical writings on usUl al-fiqh. Chapter I deals 
with the definition of amr. The Muslim scholars have 
divided amr into three main classes - wu üb, mandüb 
and istihbäb. The amr which is absolutely binding is 
the command of God while the recommended and the 
preferred commandments are from the Prophet and Muslim 
scholars. This includes, also, a definition and 
discussion of the status of the person issuing the 
command and whether that status alters the effect of 
the commandment. The discussion then examines the 
linguistic interpretations of amr, in particular whether 
amr originally meant command or not. This has great 
importance for the nature of commandment in Islamic 
law. The form of amr, i. e. whether the imperative is 
a real commandment, is next discussed. This involves 
a discussion of the nature and intention of the person 
issuing the command. The second chapter deals with 
the importance of amr in Islamic law and the different 
levels of amr according to whether the amr is from 
God, the Prophet or those with authority. In chapter 
III the main concern is the nature of restricted and 
iv 
unrestricted amr and whether they require repetition 
of the action without repetition of the amr. This 
also involves the amount of time allowed in carrying 
out the amr. Chapter IV examines the conditions of 
what is ordered and shows how different theological 
and theoretical considerations effect the carrying 
out of an amr in the branches (furU6) of Islamic law. 
The conclusion summarises the various discussions. 
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Islam regards it as the duty of man to obey the 
commandments of God. It is believed that man is in 
need of divine guidance and also under an obligation 
to obey God for the blessing that He has bestowed upon 
man. Man can only show his gratitude for that kindness 
by following God's commandments. God makes His command- 
ments and prohibitions, as well as His recommendations, 
known to man through the Prophet (and before him other 
prophets). Although the Prophet is no longer here and 
there is no longer anyone with direct contact with God, 
the revelations received by the Prophet still have 
validity. However, in order to accept what God has 
commanded, a man must be able to differentiate between' 
what is a real command. To do this man must understand 
the meaning of each apparent commandment as it has been 
revealed. It is in this that the significance of the 
term amr lies. And because of this importance of amr 
Muslim scholars always regard amr as the main reason 
why God created man (i. e. in order to obey His command). 
Therefore amr apart from its theological significance 
can also be regarded as the main cornerstone upon which 
Islamic law is built, since every action of man is 
regarded as being commanded in one way or the other 
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and he will be rewarded if his actions are performed 
according to legal requirements of Islam and he will 
be punished if these requirements are not properly 
observed. 
This study is principally concerned with 
investigating the legal aspect of amr. Thus it will 
examine the definition given to it by the usülis and 
the legal implications of their disagreements on what 
is involved in amr. Considerable attention will be 
paid to linguistic interpretations of amr. Amr has 
been divided by the usülis into restricted (al-amr al- 
mu'allaq) and unrestricted (al-amr al-mutlaq). Both 
of them will be discussed in detail though most of 
the time will be spent on the latter one because of 
the controversy which always surrounded unrestricted 
use of words in any language. 
This study will concentrate on the period between 
the second and seventh centuries of Islam. - 
khe period 
which is known as asr al-tadwin with regard to Islamic 
studies in general and the formative period of Islamic 
law in particular. Since the expansion of usül al-fiqh 
took place throughout this period, any work of usül al- 
fiqh written within that period will be regarded as a 
primary source. But preference will be given to those 
of the second and third centuries as they belong to 
the most important formative period. 
Amr is chosen for this research because it 
represents the heart of us31 al-fiqh. Any discussion 
-3 - 
of it will certainly expose one to every aspect of 
Islamic law, though it will not go into details of 
furü' al-figh. 
-ý- 
Definition of Usu1 al-Fiqh 
'Ilm usül al-fiqh or 'ilm al-diräya as it has 
often been called was developed as early as the second 
century of Islam but the scholars of that time did not 
give any specific definition to it. It remained with- 
out any proper definition for some time though its 
actual subject matter seemed to be well established. 
Only in the third and fourth century when definition 
became more necessary did some late scholars try to 
give a clearer definition in order to distinguish it 
from other Islamic sciences. Even al-Shäfi'3 who, 
many people have described as the originator of this 
science did not give it the title "usül al-fiqh". It 
was sometime after him that the term usül al-fiqh 
became known as denoting the science of the principles 
of Islamic Law. 
Since 'then, usul al-fiqh has been given many 
different definitions, some of which are only recognised 
by orientalists while others seem to be popular among 
Arab Muslim scholars. 
As for the orientalists, they simply defined it as 
the science of the principles underlying the branches of 
Islamic law. 
l This definition is purely technical 'and 
1. E. I. (old edition), vol. 40 p. 1054. 
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does not reflect the literal meaning of the expression, 
nor take into account that the words usül and al-fiqh 
are two separate nouns with separate literary and 
technical meanings. As a result it has not enjoyed 
much recognition among Muslim scholars. Therefore 
most of them appear to prefer a definition which will 
reflect both aspects of the expression. 
The word usUl is the plural form of asl. In the 
singular it can be used as a technical term meaning 
"source". For example there is the usage hädhä asl 
when source or text is meant. In fact asl has a variety 
of technical meanings. Thus asl is used for evidence 
(da131); for root or origin; for preference 
(al-räjih); 
principle. (al-gä"idal). The latter meaning is the one 
which later becomes part of the technical expression 
us31 al-fiqh, thus usUl al-fiqh or usül al-had1th are 
synonymous with gawA'id al-fiqh and gawa6id al-had ith. 
2 
40 
Al-figh literally means knowledge and understanding 
(al-"ilm wa-al-faham). 
3 Technically it has been confined 
to the knowledge of Islamic law. 
4 
Abü Han! fa Nu'män b. 
Thhbit (d. 150 A. H. ) has been reported to have defined 
1. '-Ali al-Tahanäw3, Dictionary of Technical Terms, 
vol. 1, p. 28; E. I. shorter edition, p. 611. 
Also see Badrän, IIsül al-Figh, pp. 21-23. 
2. E. I., pp. 611-612. 
3. 'All al-Tah7näw3, Dictionary of Technical Terms, 
vol. 1, p. 28; also Badrän, Us il al-Figh, pp. 21-23; 
al-Ghazäl3, Mustasfa, . vol. 1, p. 
4. 
Al-Ghazäl3, Mustasfa, vol. 1, p. 5. 
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it as ma'rifat al-nafs mä lahä wa-mä 'alayhä (the 
knowledge of the rights and duties of soul). 
1 
However, the usülls prefer another definition of 
their own which will reflect both literary and technical 
meanings. So they first of all defined asl on its own 
as "what another thing is built upon" (ma yubtani 'alayhi 
ghayruhu) then they combined this definition directly 
to al-figh and defined it as follows: "What al-figh 
is built upon and depends on" (mä yubtanä al-figh alayhi 
wa-yustanid ilayhi). This definition' which seems to 
have become popular among the usülis back in the third 
or fourth century. In fact Ab Husayn al-Basra 
(d. 436 A. H. ) mentioned it in his book Kitäb al-Mu'tamad 
fi Usül al-Figh. 
2 Most usülis regard this definition 
as the most comprehensive one because according to them 
it is the only definition that could make it include 
every aspect of the science, such as amr, giyäs, ijt ihAd, 
istihsin and other aspects of usül al-fiqh. However, 
some of them, while not discarding this definition, 
consider other definitions which are more straight- 
forward, like the one used by the orientalists. 
Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Tahänäwi the author of the 
Dictionary of Technical Terms defined it as "the science 
of the principles which leads to the law by way of 
1. 'Al! al-Tahänäw3, Dictionary of Technical Terms, 
vol. 1, p. 30, 
2. Abü al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb al-Mu"tamad, vol. 1. 
pp. 9-10; also see AbU Zahra, Us31 al-Figh, pp. 5-6. 
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investigation" (al-'ilm bi-al-gawä'id allati yatawassal 
biha i1ä al-fiqh 'a1ä wajh al-tahglq). This one seems 
to be more straightforward and those who put it forward 
call it "a popular definition" (al-ta'rif al-lagab). 
l 
There are many other definitions but they seem to 
be more awkward than those already mentioned and involve 
some prolixity. These are also mentioned by al-Tahänäw3 
as well as others. 
2 
The different definitions may stem from the different 
linguistic backgrounds among the usülls themselves. It 
also seems that their different understanding of the 
objectives of usül al-fiqh could also be considered as 
another reason. There appears to be some differences 
among them about the objectives of usül al-figh. 
1. 'All al-Tah-anäw3, Dictionary of Technical Terms, 
vol. 1, p. 28; al-Quräfl, al-TangTh ß(-As k\ P' 
(This definition was given by`Tähä 'Abd al-Rawf A 
Said, the editor of the book, not by al-Qurä. f3. ) 
2. For example they defined it as majmü' turuq al-fiqh 
'ala sabll al-ijmäl wa-kayfiyyat al-istdiläl bihä 
wa-kayfiyyat al-mustanid ilayh7a. It is also 
defined as adillat al-fiqh wujhät dalälatha 'ala 
al-ahkäm al-sharc-jyya wa kayfiyyat Mal al-mustadill 
min jihat al-ijmäl. See 'A13 al-Tahänäwl, 
Dictionary of Technical Terms, vol. 1, p. 28. 
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The Objective of Usül al-Figh 
The main objective of usul al-fiqh has been 
described by Noel Coulson as to teach an understanding 
(al-figh) of the shari'a and its primary task therefore 
was to formulate the principles or sources (usil) from 
which such an understanding might be achieved. 
l Thus 
the objectives of usül al-fiqh might be explained as 
(i) to realise the implementation of the rules of the 
furu' al-figh by a thorough investigation of the 
views on them and the evidence for them. 
(ii) to examine the foundation upon which the rules of 
shari'a are based. 
(iii) to develop the ability to derive the law through 
such processes as ijtihad and giyäs. 
(iv) to be aware of and to understand earlier uses of 
i tihad by earlier mujtahid! n and to be able to 
compare their views and to make a judgement between 
them through examining their arguments. 
2 
During the time of the Prophet there wasn't much 
need for personal discretion and reasoning as the 
Qur'än was still-being revealed sporadically to meet 
occurrences and Muslims were still in very small 
Islamic territory. If there was no Qur'änic injunction 
1. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions, p. 3. 
2. Badran, Usül al-Figh al-Islam3, p. 22. 
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the Prophet himself decided the situation according to 
his own judgement, though a revelation sometimes came 
later to either confirm it or correct it. In addition 
to that the Prophet was always within easy reach because 
of the size of the Islamic area. When the Prophet died 
there were no means of getting direct access to divine 
revelation. Muslims were left with the Qur'an and the 
limited practice or the sunna of the Prophet which did 
not cover new occurrences in the expanding Islamic world, 
full of different people of different cultures and 
traditions. Muslim lawyers found themselves in need 
of existing Qur'ä. nic injunctions and Traditions of the 
Prophet, to meet this challenge of expansion. Thus the 
first usül al-fiqh began to evolve, at this stage in a 
rather ad hoc development in order to form a guideline 
to make it easier for those who had to find appropriate 
laws to fit the situation. 
I 
Thus men of law were forced to use their judgement 
(ra'y) in trying to meet the new situation. Gradually 
this use of ra'y (ijtihäd al-ra'y) became more clearly 
defined and more systematic. An example of the 
systematisation of ra'y is i äs, or analogy. This 
was done by drawing a parallel between something which 
the Qur'an or Tradition had specifically mentioned and 
something else which had not been mentioned by them, 
if there was similarity and the same reason ('ilia) 
1. Badrän, Us31 al-Fiqh al-Islam!, p. 5. 
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between them. 
1 For example, an usüli knows that every 
muskir (alcohol) was forbidden but all the muskir he 
knew in his area were made of grape juice. When he 
travelled to another part of the world he, found muskir 
again but made of other substances. He would regard 
it as forbidden because the prohibition of muskir from 
grapes was not because it was made of grapes but because 
of the intoxication element in it. The formulation of 
the rules involved in this kind of systematic use of 
reason is one of the activities of usül al-fiqh. 
Another example involving Traditions occurred when 
men of law found an injunction based on a Tradition 
from. the Prophet but they were not sure whether or not 
this Tradition was authentic. It could be an isolated 
Tradition (a Tradition reported by one man or very few 
people) or it may not have been authentic for-some 
other reasons. Then they checked the Qur'an to find 
if there was another Qur'änic verse in, support of that 
issue or they looked to see whether the content of the_ 
Tradition had been reported in many different ways which 
could make it likely to be true. If so, they could take 
it into account and decide upon it. This process of 
verification is another aspect of usül al-fiqh. 
Another example deals with the linguistic aspect 
1. E. I. (old edition) vol. II, pp. 1051-52. For 
more information about i äs and how to 
practise it see Ibn Qudäma, al-Rawda, p. 145. 
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of usül. UsUlls knew that the command of God was an 
obligation ( wäjib). At the same time they knew 
that many statements have come in the form of the 
imperative but that does not necessarily mean 
obligation. They tried to find out whether there 
was any context which they might use to establish 
whether or not obligation was intended. This exercise 
is another kind of activity of usül al-fiqh and only 
usül! s can undertake it. All these activities were 
aimed at realising the objectives of usül al-figh., 
The Beginning and Early Development of Usul al-Fiqh 
It has already been mentioned that usül al-fiqh 
began to evolve among Muslims on an ad hoc basis to 
meet newly emerging problems of law not'specifically 
mentioned in the Qur"5. n. 
1 Thus it could be described 
as developing in 'a somewhat haphazard manner. Principles 
of usül al-fiqh were developed at first in a crude form. 
Then with the expansion of learning and the introduction 
of systematic thinking, they began to be developed in a 
more rigorous and intellectually systematic manner. 
From the early days of Islam the two principles 
for legal judgement were the Qur'ä. n and the sunna 
(i. e. the legal decision) of the Prophet. The latter 
1. See above p. 9. 
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could come in the form of an order or in the form of 
judgement to an incident and also in some other ways. 
When the Prophet was alive he was the only lawyer and 
judge whomeverybody referred to whenever they needed a 
legal decision. After the death of the Prophet, 'the 
Companions faced the formidable task of establishing 
an Islamic legal system which could deal with the* 
growing demand of the Islamic state to take new legal 
decisions which had previously been taken by the 
Prophet. This institution seems to have been based 
on the leadership of the head of'state at first. 
An example of such developments can even be given 
from the Prophet's own life. It was his personal 
discretion about what to do with slaves'after the 
battle of Badr. It was mentioned by Tabari in both 
his Tarikh and Tafsir1 that the Prophet asked' his 
Companions about their opinions. Abü Bakr2 (d. 13 A. H. ) 
advised him to take ransom for them while 'Umar 
(d. 23 A. H. ) suggested that they should be killed 
because they had waged war against him. He accepted 
the opinion of Abu Bakr. Although he was proved wrong 
later when the Qur'änic injunction revealed "It is not 
fitting for an Apostle that he should have prisoners` 
1. Tabar3, Tafsir al-Tabarl, vol. 10, pp. 42-44. Also 
see Tabari, Tarikh, vol. 1, pp. 474-75- 
2. Various names have been given to Abü Bakr. The 
most reliable of them seems to be "Abd Allah b. 
Uthm n. He was the first caliph after the Prophet. 
See Ibn Hajar, Tagrlb, vol. 1, p. 432. 
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of war until he bath subdued the land. 'Ye look' for 
the temporal goods of this world, but God looketh to 
the Hereafter and God is exalted in might, wise. " 
1ý 
Many usülis regard this as personal discretion by 
the Prophet. 
2 He had exercised his personal discretion 
on many occasions like that. 
Another example was the establishment of consensus 
(i mä') and the use of reason in the form of i äs by 
the Companions immediately after the death of the 
Prophet. For example Malik reported from Thawrl b. 
Zayd (d. 135 A. H. ) that 'Umar sought advice about a 
drunk man and 'Ali b. Abi Torlib (d. 40 A. H. ) said: 
"Our view is that he, should be given eighty lashes 
because whenever he became drunk he became intoxicated 
and whenever he became intoxicated he made false 
allegations and the penalty for false allegations is 
eighty lashes. 
3 
In another version mentioned by Ibn 
Qudama, 'Umar sought advice of people about the penalty 
for alcohol (khamr) and 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Awf told him 
to make it the lowest of the penalties. Then 'Umar gave 
eighty lashes (to the person involved) and wrote to 
Khälid b. Walid (d. 21 or 22 A. H. ) and Abü Ubayda (d. 18 A. H. ) 
in Sham (to make it the official penalty for drunkenness). 
Ibn Qud ma mentioned later that it was reported that 'Ali 
1. Qur' än, 8/67. 
2. Badrä. n, Usü1 al-Fiqh al-Islami, pp. 5-6. 
3. Mä1ik, Muwatta, p. 606. 
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b. Abi Tälib drew the same analogy we mentioned in 
Mälik's version of the meeting. 
1 This Tradition 
combines both ijmä` as well as i äs because it was 
a clear application of the law for false allegations 
to the drunkenness by analogy. At the same time there 
was no report of any opposition among the Companions to 
it. Since then it has been the penalty for alcohol, 
except for one unpopular Tradition which maintained 
that AbU Bakr preferred forty lashes. 
2 
All these examples reveal the primitive processes 
of us fl al-fight which must have started from the early 
days of"Islamic law and grew slowly with the law during 
the period of the Companions and continued till the 
time of their successors. Then they also expanded it 
as 
further by establishing such doctrines 1 istihsän? 
(preference or approval)3 which was designed to take 
1. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 8, p. 307. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Istihsän has been variously defined though these 
definitions appear to give the same meaning. The 
first one .= 'is attributed to the early Hanafite 
scholar al-Sarakhs3 (d. 483 A. H. ) who defined it 
as: "Abandoning analogy (gi yRs) and taking what 
is more appropriate for the people. " Tark al-giyas 
wa-al-akhdh bi-mä awfaa al-näs. 
It is also defined as "searching for easier 
solution of the law in what the general public 
and the individual are tested. " Talab al-suhül 
f3 al-ahkäm fimä yubtalä fihi al-'. mma wa-al-khassa. 
Or "Taking what is permissible and searching 
for what has ease in it. " Al-akhdh bi al-samäha wa 
ibtighal mä fihi al-raha. See al-Shaybän3, ," 
Kitä. b al-Asl, vol. 3, p. 48. 
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into account the public interest 
the Qur'an, Tradition, consensus 
applicable. All these processes 
systematic basis until the seconi 
century. 
By the middle of the second 
on the issue in whichl 
and i äs were not 
were without any 
3 half of the second 
century legal schools 
seem to have started gaining some independence and taking 
their own shape. The schools whose origin could be 
traced back to the generation of the Companions were 
those who had originally laid down examples in exercising 
ra'y (judgement). For example the School of Mecca which 
was originally established by 'Abd Allah b. Abbas (d. 69 
A. H. ) survived through 'Atä. ' b. Abi Rabäh (d. 114 or 117 
A. H. ), Tawus b. Kays. n (d. 101 or 106 A. H. ) and Mujähid 
b. Jabr (d. 102 or 103 A. H. ). The School of Küfa which 
was established by `Abd Allah b. Mas'üd survived through 
IbrähIm Nakha' T (d. 95 or 96 A. H. ), Abüi Hanifa and others. 
Said b. Musayyib (d. 93 or 94 A. H. ), al-Zuhrl (d. 124 
A. H. ) and Malik inherited the School of Medina from 'Abd 
Allah b. 'Amr b. al-'As (d. 77 A. H. ) and 'Abd Allah b. 
'Umar (d. 73 A. H. ). Al-Hasan al-Basra (d. 110/728) took 
charge of the School of Basra. 
2 
However, as time went on the Schools of Küfa and 
Medina took control and exerted their influences on 
others. Abü Hanifa became one of the leading scholars 
of the School of K-ufa and later exerted his influence 
1. Abi Zahra, UpUl al-Fiqh, pp. 8-9. 
2. Ibn Qayyinm al-Jawziyya, -Ll 1äm al-Muwaq ' in, vol. 1, 
pp. 24-27; also see Coulson, A History of Islamic 
Law, PP. 38-41. 
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throughout Iraq. He based his own doctrine on they' 
Qur'än and the sunna as well as the opinions of the 
Companions. He accepted whatever they agreed upon 
and selected from whatever they disagreed on as long 
as they did not contradict the Qur'an and theksunna 
l 
of the Prophet. At the same time he gave himself the 
ability to interpret them. He'also accepted ra, y but 
preferred a weak or isolated sunna2 to ra, y. He was 
well known to be in favour of istihsän. 
3 
1. Abü Zahra, Usül al-Figh, pp. 9-10. 
2. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 11äm, vol., -l, P-'32- 
3. One strong evidence which can be cited in support 
of Abü Hanifa as-in favour of istihsän is the fact 0 -0 
that. some of his pupils who recorded his doctrine 
and practice actually transmitted well analysed 
details of Abü Hanhfa's practice of istihsän. 0 -0 For example, al-Shaybäni devoted several chapters 
to istihsän in his book Kitäb al-Asl which he 
wrote on the authorities of Abü Han! fa and Abü 
Yüsuf. Al-Shaybänh has said in the beginning of 
the book that whatever he mentioned in the book 
without mentioning the disagreement of either Abi 
HanIfa or Abü Yüsuf represents agreement of all 
of us. That indicates that Abü Hanhfa had paved 
the way for some activities of usül al-figh before 
Sh7afi'3 came to expand that effort. 
Moreover, all the issues touched in the book 
were based on mere discretion of Abü Hanifa because 
there wasn't any direct evidence from the Qur'.. n 
or the sunna in support of them. The chapters of 
istihs. n in the book are eight all together. 
See al-Shaybäni, Kitäb al-Asl, vol. 3, pp. 48-166. 
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During that time Malik b. Anas (d. 179 A. H. ) had 
also established his own doctrine in Medina. Egypt 
and other schools in the area also gradually fell 
under his doctrine. In addition to taking the Qur'än 
and the sunna as main sources, he also accepted the 
validity of i mä" (agreement of the scholars of a 
particular generation or locality) and ra'y even 
preferring ra'y to an isolated sunna of the Prophet 
He regarded the practice of ahl al-Madina as legal 
evidence as well as their consensus. Malik has been 
reported to have rejected a well authenticated Tradition 
in favour of the practice of-ahl al-Madina. 
1 
For 
example, in the, case of a bowl which a dog has licked, 
every other school washes it seven times before they 
use it for ablution because the Prophet said, "If a 
dog licks a bowl of any one of you, he should wash it'' 
seven times. " (In another version one of them with-soil. ) 
They all maintained that the Tradition is a well 
authenticated one. 
2 But Mälik according to al-Mudawwana 
held the view that one can use it to perform ablution 
even without washing it. He seemed to regard the dog 
as the same as any other animal. 
3 
1. Malik, al-Mudawwana, vol. 1, p. 5. 
2. Shäfi'i, al-Umm, vol. 1, pp. 9-10; also see 
Ibn Qudäina, al-Mughn3, vol. 1, pp. 52-53 
3. Malik, al-Mudawwana, vol. 1, p. 5. 
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All these examples are further indications that 
some kind of exercise of personal discretion had started 
in the early days of the Companions and continued to 
gain strength till the middle of the second century. 
By the middle of the second century the expansion of 
Muslim territory to non-Arab countries had brought many 
different cultures and sciences into Muslim society. 
Among such sciences was Greek philosophy and logic 
which came into Muslim society first through the 
conversion of Christians and others into Islam during 
the Umayyad period. However, Greek science did not 
gain official recognition during the Umayyad period but 
during the early period of the Abbäsid, it won government 
recognition when early Abbäsid caliphs encouraged the 
translation of Greek works into Arabic language. 
l That 
coincided with the establishment of a school of theology 
at Basra by a group who later became known as Mu'tazila. 
Their first three leaders were Wäjil b. 'Atä' (d. around 200 A. H. 
'Amr b. Ubayd (d. around ) and Dirär b. 'Amr2 (d. 196 200 A. H. 
ASH). This school was engaged in a method of using a 
specially adopted philosophy which is termed as`ilm 
al-kaläm to defend some aspect of Islamic beliefs 
against attacks of zanädiga of all types. 
3 
., 
1. E. T. (New edition), vol. III, p. 1143. Also see 
Walzer, Greek into Arabic, pp. 6-7. 
2. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, pp. 59-60. 
3. Ibid. 
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However the arrival of Greek philosophy among 
Muslim scholars was a turning point for both the usülis 
and the theologians. Some of them found it useful in 
defending their point of view, not only against their 
Muslim opponents but also in making their preaching 
more acceptable to non-Muslims. However, after the 
adoption of Greek philosophy and logic into Islamic 
science this combination of Greek science with Islamic 
thought was named 'ilm al- kaläm. The translators, 
according to Richard Walzer, included some Christians 
like Nestorian, Abfl Bishr Matta (d. 198 ), Jacobite 
Christian, Yahya b. 'Ad! (d. 198. ) and some other s 'a. 
who were converted to Islam. 
I 
By the second half of 
the second century 'ilm al-kaläm had become influential 
and many scholars had studied it. Among its distinguished 
pupils was Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi'3 (d. 204 A. H. ). 
Apart from his knowledge of 'iim al-kal m he attended 
the law school of Medina which followed M. lik b. Anas. 
He-also attended the school of Kfifa which followed Abü 
Hanifa as well as the school of Mecca which was originally 
established by 'Abd Allah b. Abbas. 
2 
Shäfi'i took 
advantage of his knowledge of the main schools of his 
time. He noticed that those schools had different 
"r 
principles and opinions and used his good knowledge of 
1. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 6. 
2. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, p. 53. 
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'ilm al-kaläm, Arabic, the Qur'an and the sunna of 
the Prophet to organise and compile these different 
principles and at last deducted a single science which 
a scholar of law could go through whenever he wished to 
learn about the principles of law. He analysed the 
principles of individual schools. He separated and 
distinguished between the authority of the Qur'ä. n and 
the authority of the sunna. of the Prophet. 
' Shäfi'3 
wrote many books in that connection. Among the books 
which still remain prime references until the present 
day areal-Risäla, - Kitäb Jam' al-'Ilm and Kitäb Ibtäl 
al-Istihsän. 
2 
His achievement in this undertaking 
.m has gained ithe 
title of the founder of Islamic 
jurisprudence (usül al-fiqh). 
Shäfi"3 was regarded as the founder of usül. al-fiqh 
because he is the first scholar who successfully 
accomplished this analysis in a well organised fashion. 
This is the view of the majority of scholars and 
1. Abü Zahra, UpUl al-Fiqh, p. 11. 
2. All these books have been published. The first 
one, al-RisAla, is available in both Arabic and 
English, translated by Mäjid al-Kadhür3. The 
latter two were printed together with Kitäb al-Umm 
which was written also by Shäfi'I. See Kitäb al- 
Umm, Egyptian edition 1961, -vol. 7, pp. 271-286, 
(Kitäb J'am' al-'Ilm) and pp. 294-304 (Kitäb Ibtäl 
al-Istihsän). 
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historians. However, there are other schools of thought 
which hold the view that usül al-fiqh was organised and 
recorded earlier than Shafi'i's time, though some of 
them admit that the work of their group has not survived. 
For example, the Shiites maintained that not Shäfi'i 
but Muhammad al-Bägir b. 'Ali Zayn al-'AbidTn (d. 114 A. H. ) 
and his son Ja'far al-SMdiq (d. 140 A. H. ) were the first 
persons to establish usül al-fiqh. It is also maintained 
that both Muhammad al-Bägir and his son dictated their 
usül al-fiqh to their scholars and those scholars later 
recorded it and organised it according to the present 
structure. 
l 
Also the Hanafite school of law maintained that the 
first person who first wrote a systematic usül al-fiqh 
was Abi Yüsuf Ya'qüb b. Ibrahim (d. 182 A. H. ) a pupil 
of Abü Hanifa. According to Abü Zahra who quoted 
Ibn Nadim, Abü Yüsuf included usül in his more general 
work on al-figh2 and this certainly seems to be the case. 
It would appear that it was not systematically presented 
and some Hanafite scholars have admitted that none of 
such works have survived. 
Although neither Abü Hanifa nor Abü YUsuf 
presented any separate book on usül al-fiqh, their 
influence on the subject cannot be over-exaggerated 
1. Badrän, Usül al-Figh al-Islami, p. 14. Also see 
Abü Zahra, Usül al-Fiqh, pp. 11,12. 
2. Abu Zahra, UpUl al-Fiqh, p. 17. 
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because Abü Hanrfa was well known for istihsän1 (which 
is one way of deducting law by reasoning and by abandon- 
ing the analogy for material consideration or hidden 
analogy as the Hanafites themselves prefer to call it) 
and various other forms of ra, y. 
As for the Shi'ite's claim about Abü Ja'far and 
his son, it is difficult to deny it or confirm it in 
the absence of reliable information. What is possible, 
to say is the fact that there is no evidence to associate 
Abü Ja'far or his son with the present structure of 
usül al-fiqh because there is no book which one can 
attribute to any of them-in that respect. Those who 
attributed usUl al-fiqh to AbU Hanifa or Abü Yüsuf or 
Shäfi"3 have succeeded in putting forward some evidence 
at least to support their claims. Even usülls among 
the Shi'ites like al-Murtadä and others failed to 
indicate in their works anything which could have 
helped to establish that Abü Ja'far had laid down the 
foundation for usül al-figh. Instead they all followed 
the pattern which is known as that of the m utakallimin. 
Usu1 al-Figh after Shäfi'i 
Us31 al-fiqh was not affected by the death of 
Shäfi'3 in 204 A. H. In fact his death marked the 
1. E. I. 
2. S Q_e 
(shorter), pp. 184-185. 
O&WQ. p. 1y 
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beginning of an era of expansion of the subject or 
what one could describe as the formative period. His 
efforts were enthusiastically followed by many scholars 
of his time. His arguments, although they provided the 
beginnings of a systematic approach, were not entirely 
accepted by other schools. 
l 
For example the Hanafites 
favour istihsän as we have already mentioned. 
z 
They 
also favour 'urf (customary practice)3 while 
Mälikites continued to maintain the principle of i mä', 
ijmä. ' ahl al-Medina as well as istisläh or al-Maslaha 
al-Mursala 
4 (having regard for the public interest) 
all of which they inherited from the Medina school of 
law. Shäfi'i rejected istihsän, ijmal ah1 al-Medina 
as well as istisläh. In fact he tried to prove their 
invalidity in his book Kitä. b Ibtäl al-Istihsän. 
5 
Us lis after Shafi"3 seem to be divided into two 
sys tems, one of them is usually identified as following 
the main principles of Shäfi"i and this group is called 
in usfli literature the mutakallimin. They based their 
1. E. I. (shorter edition, p. 614. 
2. See above, pp. 15-17. 
3. Abü Zahra, Usül al-Figh, p. 13. 
4. Abü Zahra, Usül al-Fiqh, p. 10; E. I. (shorter 
edition, p. 614. 
5. See above, p. 20. 
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method on the principle of logical investigation and 
put more emphasis on what corresponds with that. It 
is not necessary that it must conform with the opinion 
of their predecessors. This system of the m utakallimin 
is adopted by all schools which publicly approved the 
use of reasoning (ra, y) in deducting legal solutions. 
Further explanation is required here about the 
systematic approach introduced by Shäfi'i and the 
mutakallimin who were regarded as speculative thinkers 
in us31 al-fiqh and were associated with the Shäfi'ites. 
It would appear that the description of these mutakallimin 
as Shäfi'ites contradicted the well known view of Shäfi'3 
as somebody who, although approving of systematic 
reasoning, rejected the use of discretion in the legal 
process. The only speculative process (i tihäd) which 
Shäfi'3 acknowledged was the use of giyäs, i. e. the 
drawing of a legal deduction by the method of analogy 
from the Qur'än and the sunna of the Prophet. 
1 At the 
same time he stressed the primacy of legal decisions 
taken from Tradition over any result of systematic 
reasoning. In his actual reasoning, however, both 
aspects are interwoven; he shows himself to be influenced 
by Tradition and systematic reasoning at the same time. 
2 
However, the Shafi'ites after him seem to have extended 
1. Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, pp. 45-46. 
2. Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
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the systematic approach of Shäfi'i beyond the limit 
he had set it. They became involved in disciplines 
of the logic and philosophy which were based on 
speculation and applied these in detail to usül al- 
figh. l 
It is noticeable that Mu'tazila thinkers of the 
calibre of al-Qädi 'Abd al-Jabbär (d. 415 A. H. ) and 
Abü al-Husayn al-Basra (d. 436 A. H. ) both regarded 
themselves as Shäfi'ites. Thus theologians of such 
quality and calibre, hence the use of the term mutakallim'In, 
had developed the Shäfi'ite system in a way that Shäfi'i 
himself might not have approved. Theologians with 
Ash'arite tendencies like Imin al-Haramayn (d. 478 A. H. ) 
and al-GhazAl3 (d. 505 A. H. ) were also Shäfi'ites in 
terms of figh and continued the speculative tendencies 
in Shäfi'ite usül al-fiqh which have become identified 
with the mutakallimTn. Such scholars as these in usül 
, 
4P 
al-fiqh show a tendency towards the use of logic to 
form the rules for the furl! ', rather than taking the 
evidence from the fur3' to endeavour to create a 
systematic framework. 
Paradoxically the Hanafites who, in the earlier 
times had been in the forefront of speculation with 
regard to the law, e. g. the use of ra, y, istihsän and 
'urf, seem to have become the representativesof Tradition. 
1. Badrän, Usül al-Fiqh al-Islam3, p. 15. Also see 
Aba Zahra, Usül al-Fiqh, pp. 15-16. 
-26- 
They place special emphasis on the details of furl' in 
order to deduce the usül. 
Indeed, the Hanafite system which is the second 
one is based on a method of defining a principle and 
supporting it with evidence from the Qur'an or the 
Tradition of the Prophet - in other words the furü'. 
It does not rely heavily on logical deduction while it 
takes the opinions of their predecessors into account. 
Their objective is only to extend usül al-fiqh in terms 
of an argument from furu' al-figh. 
l 
Another one which has been referred to as the 
third system did not come into being until around the 
sixth to seventh century of Islam. It appears to be 
nothing more than a compromise between the two systems 
because it did not produce any new ideas other than 
how both existing systems could be applied together. 
It is known as the system of later scholars, t arigat 
al-muta'akhkhirin. 
2 
The period from the third century till the seventh 
century can be regarded as the golden era of usül al-fiqh 
because of the enormous work done on the subject during 
that period. It was then that the subject received full 
attention from Muslim scholars and many books were 
written. Most of the expansion made on the subject 
1. Muhammad al-Khudar Bik, Usü1 al-Fiqh, p. 8. 
2. Ibid., p. 12, 
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in terms of systematic reasoning came out at that 
period. It was in the seventh century when many 
scholars felt that most aspects of the law which 
needed explanation had been fully explained that 
some of them advocated closing the door of ijtihäd 
(exercising systematic reasoning to deduct the rules 
of law). In fact 'i tihäd continued but the most of 
the works done after that period seem to be mere 
explanations of the existing ideas. 
It will be useful to mention here some of the 
leading scholars who worked on usül from the-period 
of Shäfi'i till the end of the seventh century. 
There is no doubt that many separate works were 
done during the first five decades after the death of 
Shäfi63, particularly by his immediate scholars who 
received their education from him, but it seems-that 
most of these works'have not survived, except from the 
Hanafite system where some works of Shäfi'i's 
contemporaries have survived, like AbU al-Hasan Ubayd 
Allah b. Hasan al-Karkh1 who was a leading Hanafite 
scholar in Iraq until he died in 340 A. H. according 
01- 
to Ibn Nad! m. He wrote al-Usül allat3`alayhM Madär`. N 
al-Furü'. 
Also following the Hanafite system until the end 
of the seventh century were: 
Abü Bakr b. Ahmad al-Räzi who is well known'as 
Jassäs(d. 370 A. H. ) He wrote Kitäb al-Fusül. 
Qgd! Abü Zayd Ubayd b. 'Umar al- Dabüs3 (d. 430 A. H. ). 
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He wrote Taq-in al-Adillah, the best of the works written 
by the earliest writers on the Hanafite system according 
to N. P. Aghnides. 
l He completed the elaboration of the 
law of giyäs. He also wrote Ta'sis al-Nazar f3 al-Usül. 
Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Sarakhsi (d. 483 A. H. ). He 
wrote on usül al-fiqh a book known as Usül al-Sarakhsi. 
The book is based on work of Jassäs. 
Fakhr al-Isl. m 'Ali b. Muhammad al-Bazdaw3 (d. 483 
A. H. ). He and Sarakhs3 were considered as revivers of 
Hanafite jurisprudence in the fifth century. He also 
wrote a book known as UsUl al=Bazdawi. It seems that 
expansion of the Hanafite system of jurisprudence did 
not go beyond the middle or end of the fifth century 
as all books written after that period were mere 
explanations based on the existing works. In fact, 
most of the Hanafite scholars who have written from the 
sixth century onwards seem to have realised the unavoid- 
able necessity of using systematic reasoning by means 
of 'ilm al-kaläm, therefore they based their works on 
a compromise between their system and that of Shäfi'I. 
Among the first Hanafite scholax5 to write in that way 
was Muzfir al-Din b. 'All al-S! -,, r-, t1 (d., 694 A. H. ). He 
wrote Bad! ' al-Nizäm which was based on Us31 al-Bazdawi 
and al Ihkam f3 rUs31 of 
Amid! (d. 631 A. H. ). 
Abü al-Barakät "Abd Allah b. Ahmad al-Nasafi 
(d. 710 A. H. ), the Hanafite, wrote Manär al-Anwär f-l 
UgUl al-Fiqh, an esteemed compendium, the most used 
of the author's work. Numerous commentaries were written 
1. Aghnides, Muhammadan Theories of Finance, p. 148. 
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on it-by many scholars, among them were Muhammad b. 
Ibräh! m, better known as Ibn al-Halab3 (d. 971 A. H. ); 
'Abd al-Latif b. 'Abd al-'Aziz b. al-Malak (d. around 
830 A. H. ). Their commentaries have been printed in a 
single volume together with another work of Yahyä al- 
Rahäwl under the same title: Sharh al-Manär wa Hawäshihi 
min ' Ilm al-Us31. 
The mutakallim! n,.. although principally associated 
with Shafi"ite scholars, extended their influence over 
most scholars of the Nälikite, Hanbalite, Zahirite and 
Shiite schools of law..,, 
Among their number are: 
Abi Bakr Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah (d. 375 A. H. ). ýHe 
was a Mälikite in terms of the school of law, but he,, 
adopted the mutakallimin system in terms of jurisprudence. 
He was a leading Mälikite scholar of his time in. Iraq. 
He wrote an explanatory book on Malik's doctrine and 
Kitäb al-Usül. 
Muhammad b. al-Tayyib al-Bägitlän3 (d. 403 A. H. ). 
He was a theologian and usUll. He wrote many books on 
usUl al-fiqh. Among them were al-Taghr! b and al-Irshäd. 
He was an Ash'arite theologian and had been a student 
of Abi Bakr Muhammad. 
Qad3 `Abd al-Jabbär b. Ahmad, b. "Abd al-Jabbär 
(d. 415 A. H. ). He was also a leading Mu"tazilite 
theologian and usü13. He wrote Kitäb al-"Umda on 
usül al-fiqh which was later explained by Abü al-Husayn 
al-Basri. As already noted he was a Shäfi'ite. 
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Qäd3 'Abd al-Wahhäb b. 'All b. Nasr (d. 422 A. H. ). 
He was a distinguished Mälikite scholar of his time. 
Many well-known scholars were educated by-him. Among 
them were Qaai Abi Bakr al-Bägilän3 (though he died 
earlier than him) and"AbU Ishäq al-Shiräz3 who were 
Shäfi"ites. He wrote Kitäb al-Ifada f3 UpUl al-Figh. 
Al-Murta0a 'Alain al-Hudä (d. 432 A. H. ). He was a 
Shiite but adopted the mutakallimin system in usül al- 
fiqh. He wrote al-DhariEA-a ill Usül al-Shari' a. The 
book was published in Iran in 1346 A. H. He was a 
student of Qaai 'Abd al-Jabbär the theologian. 
Abi al-Husayn al-Basra Muhammad b. 'Al! b. al-Tayyib 
(d. 436 A. H. . He was a Mu"tazilite theologian and a 
Shafi'ite. He was also ,a student of Q7ad3 4Abd al-Jabbär. 
He wrote Kitäb al-Mu"tamad fl Usül al-Figh. ýTheýbook. 
is based on Kitäb al-"Umda of Q7adI `Abd al-Jabbär. -It' 
was published in Damascus in 1964. It is. a typical-, 
example of the mutakallimin system. It put more emphasis 
on logical conclusion and drew most of its examples 
from logical conclusions. 
'All b. Atunad b. Hazm (d. 456 A. H. ). He was a 
leading Zähirite scholar. The school which based its_, 
existence on the doctrine of the mere outward meaning 
of the Qur'än and the sunna of the Prophet. Although- 
he has consistently rejected the use of systematic 
reasoning as well as discretionary reasoning (ra, y) 
which include analogy in accordance with the main 
principle of his school, his arguments were not entirely 
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free of them. He used "ilm al-kaläm freely to defend 
his doctrine. That is why many scholars classified his 
work with those of the mutakallimin. He wrote many 
books on usül al-fiqh, the most well-known of them is 
al-Ihkäm fi Usül al-Ahkäm and-al-Muhallä which is based 
on defining the rules of usül together with furU6. Both 
books have been published several times and are regarded 
as important references of law among all schools. 
l 
Imäm Ibrahim b. "Ali b. Yfusuf al-Shiräzl. 
He was a leading Shäfi"ite scholar and jurist. He 
wrote al-Tabsira f3 Usul al-Figh. The book was reprinted 
recently. He was a close friend of Imam al-Haramayn. 
He held a long debate with him on the doctrine of 
compulsion ( abr) in the marriage of a virgin (bikr). 
He was born in 393 A. H. at Fayrazbäd and died in 476 A. H. 
Imäm al-Haramayn 'AbdIN Malik b. "Abd Allah b. Y-usuf 
(d. 4+78 A. H. ). He was a Shafi"ite but closely identified 
himself with Ash"arite theology. In terms of usa]., the 
Ash'arites adopted the doctrine of holding back 
(tawagguf) on everything they could not find clear 
evidence for. He wrote many books on usUl al-fiqh, 
among them is al-Burhan fI Usül al-Figh. It was later 
commented upon by al-Mäzir3 and al-Anbarl both of whom 
are Mälikites and attacked the author particularly for 
1. For more details about the Zähirites see IbnNad! m, 
Kitä. b al-Fihrist (Arabic version), pp. 216-217. 
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his 'sympathy with the Ash"arites. Another book of Imam 
al-Haramayn is al-Waragat. It is a rather small book 
which seems useful only for beginners. He also wrote 
Kitäb al-Tuhfa. 
Abü Hamid Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Ghazäll (d. 505 - 
A. H. ). He is an important theologian who belonged to 
the Shäfi'ite school of law. He wrote al-Musta§fä min 
'Ilm al-Usül. His book was ranked third after al- . 
Mu'tamad of AbU al-; Iusayn al-Baýr3 and al-Burhan of 
Imam al-Haramayn. It was written from the dogmatic 
mutakallimin standpoint, namely, in a purely speculative 
way without much reference to the application of the 
principles in'-the field'of figh. 
Immen Muhammad b. 'Ali b. 'Umar al-Mäziri. '`He` was 
a Mälikite scholar (d. 536 A. H. )"who followed the'' 
mutakallimin in usUl al-fiqh. The most popular book 
attributed to him was his commentary on al-Burhä. n°of 
Imam al-Haramayn whom he had long debated with. 
Qadl Abd al-Haqq b. Abi Bakr. He is well-known as 
Ibn 'Attiyya (d. 546 A. H. ) He was a Mälikite'scholar 
who followed the mutakallimin in usül al-figh. - He was 
reported to have written many books, none of which 
seems to have been published, but some do survive in ' 
manuscript. 
Fakhr al-Din Muhammad b. 'Umar al-Räzi (d. 606 A. ii. 
He was an Ash'arite theologian and a Shäfi'ite. He 
wrote al-Mahsül, a condensation of some early books 
like al-Mu'tamad, al-Burhän and al-Mustasfä. The book 
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has just been published recently in Saudi Arabia with 
commentary by Dr. Tähä Jäbir al-4U1wäni who edited it. 
'Abd A11äh b. Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Qudäma. He 
was a Hanbalite scholar who adopted the mutakallimin 
system in us fl al-fiqh. He always reflects the doctrine 
of Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241 A. H. the founder of the 
Hanbalite school of law on every point of the furü'. He 
wrote many books on usül al-fiqh. Among them were 
al-Rawdat al-Nazir and al-Mughn3 which are based on 
defining usüll principle together with the furf". Both 
books have been published. 
Abü al-Hasan "Ali b. Abi 'All b. Muhammad al-Ämid3. 
He was Hanbalite and then changed to Shäfi'ite. He first 
settled in Baghdad and moved to Sham and Egypt where he 
was accused of corrupt ideas (fasäd al-'itigäd) and of 
being a member of the philosophers. Then he left for 
Sham'again where he died in 631 A. H. He wrote many 
books on usnl among them were al-Ihkam fI Usül a1 -Ahkäm 
and Muntahä al-UsUl. Both have been published. 
Jamal al-D3n Uthman b. 'Umar, better known as 
Ibn al-Häjib (d. 646 A. H. ). He was a Mälikite scholar 
who adopted the mutakallimin system. He wrote a book 
called Mukhtasar `\ oMuntahä al-Usfl. The book is an 
abridgement of Ahkäm of al-Imid3. It has been published 
in Cairo in 1973. The book is printed with two other 
books of al-Taftaz zill (d. 791 A. H. ) and al-Sharif al- 
Jarjä. n3 (d. 816 A. H. ). 
Shihab al-Din Ahmad b. Idris al-QuräfI (d. 684 A. H. ). 
He was a Mälikite scholar who adopted the mutakallimin 
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system. He wrote TangTh al-Fusil f Ikhtisär al-Mahsül 
f! al-Usül. The book was published in Egypt in 1973. 
Qäd3 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar al-Baydaw3 (d. 685 A. H. ), 
a Shäfi'ite who wrote Minhäj a1U) s31 i11ä 'Ilm al -Usül. 
Täj al-Din 'Abd al-Wahhäb b. al-Subki (d. 771 A. H. ), 
a Shafi"ite who wrote Jam' al-Jawämi", a compendium of 
great reputation. The book reflects Minhaj and Mukhtasar 
of Ibn al-Häjib. 
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!lVA DTLlD 
THE DEFINITION OF AMR 
This chapter will consider various definitions 
given to amr and examine linguistic interpretationS 
put forward by each group. As a result of different 
definitions, amr has been divided into obligatory 
(al-wujüb)", less obligatory or recommended (al-mandüb 
permissible (al-ibäha) and optional (al-takhayyur). It 
will also consider arguments surrounding each one of 
these and when unrestricted amr should be considered as 
obligatory. 
Disputes arose among scholars of usnl about the 
problem of defining amr. The definition, whose earliest 
exponent seems to be al-Bägilän3 (d. 403), is followed 
by Imäm al-Haramayn (d. 478) with a slight addition and 
by al-Ghazäli (d. 505). It is that amr is "words which 
require the obedience of the commanded person (ma'mfr) 
to perform the commanded action (ma'mur bihi). "1 This 
doctrine is also attributed by Fakhr al-Din al-Räzi 
(d. 606) in general to the mutakallimin. 
2 
He says that 
the mutakallimin hold the view that amr is a form (of 
1. Imäm al-Haramayn, al-Burhan, vol. 1, p. 203; also 
see al-Ghazäl3, al-Mustasfä, vol. 1, p. 411. 
2. Al-Qurafi, Sharh Tangih al-Fusül, p. 137. 
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words) made up by their meaning. This also seems to be 
the view of the Malik-1 usüli al-Quräf3.1 
In opposition to this definition is the view that 
amr can only be defined as amr when the rank of the 
person ordering is higher than the person ordered. This 
view is followed in some form or other by the Mu'tazila 
- including Abü al-Husayn al-Basra (d. 436 A. H. ), 
2 
the 
Shiite al-MurtadA (d. 436 A. H. )3 and the Hanbali school 
represented. by Ibn Qudäma (d. 620 A. H. ). 
4 
It is also 
the view of ! midi (d. 631 A. H. ). 
5 
In putting forward the first definition a great 
deal of emphasis is laid on the grammatical form of the 
amr - i. e. the amr is in the imperative. Thus according 
to al-Ghazäli an amr can be addressed"by an inferior 
person to a superior person even though the degree of 
obedience may be affected by the position of the person. 
6 
In fact al-GhazAll seems to be laying greater emphasis 
on the content of the amr and less emphasis on the rank 
of the person giving the amr. This may be explained by 
an obscure reference to rank by al-Murtad'a where he says 
that some people maintained that the ordered action 
1. Al-Quräfi, Sharh Tanqih al-Fusül, p. 137. 
2. Abn al-Husayn al-Basri. Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 49. 
3. Murtadä, - al-Dhariýp , vol. 1, p. 35. 
4. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat N zir, p. 98. 
5. Al-Xmidi, Ihkam f UsUl al-Ahkam, vol. 2, p. 11. 
6. Al-Ghazäl3, al-Mustasf , vol. 1, pp. 
411-12. 
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(ma'mür-bihi) was of 'a higher rank than the person 
ordered (ma'mür) or the person ordering 
(amr) by virtue 
of the doctrine of God's threat for obedience to His 
commandment. Such a doctrine would imply that the 
person doing the ordering was ordering according to 
God's instructions in revelation and therefore the 
order should be obeyed. 
1 
Such a statement is not made by al-Ghazäl3 or Imam 
al-Haramayn"but it is perhaps implicit in their under- 
standing of their definition. However, in actual 
practice they concentrate on the form of the word. 
They argue that since the form of the amr is the 
imperative - it is an amr whoever issues it. The 
validity of this amr is another matter. Al-Ghazäll 
suggests that it could be argued that a son might order 
his father, or a servant his master, even though 
obedience would not be required of the latter two. 
Al-Ghazä, l3 maintains that the amr does not require the 
obedience of the ordered person to perform the ordered 
action. 
2 There is indeed a great deal Of validity in 
this criticism. However, while it brings out the 
philological niceties of definition it does not take 
our understanding of the problem much further. 
Ibn Qudäma's definition of amr does bring out his 
own view of the elements involved in amr. He defined 
1. Murtadä, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 35. 
2. Al-Ghazäli, al-Mustasfä, vol. 1, p. 411. 
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it as "demand for action by word. (gawl) from a 
position of superiority. 
1 Clearly this definition 
seems to be insisting on the special quality. of the 
mir (the commander) and thus he makes a demand from 
the junior to senior invalid because it will not fall 
within this condition. Ibn Qudäma then referred to 
the first definition put forward by al-BAgilän3 and 
others. He said that amr has been defined as a word 
which requires a commanded person (ma'mur) to perform 
the commanded action (ma'mür bihi). He declared it 
as invalid (f sid) on the grounds that it connected 
ma'mfr with ma'mür bihi which according to him' was not 
acceptable. 
2 
Within the rank of those usülis who favour the 
definition of amr as an action only possible when the 
person ordering is higher than the person ordered. 
, 'ere is some dispute about the use and meaning of 
terms. This dispute concerns 'uluw and isti'la'. 
Abü al-Husayn al-Basra maintains that the person 
ordered must be higher in 'uluw than the person 
ordered. 
3 The meaning of "uluw in this context has 
been defined as rank or nobility. On the other hand 
1. Ibn Qµdäma, al-Rawdat al-Näzir, p. 98. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Abü al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 49. 
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there are others, in particular the Mäturdites, 
1 
who 
reject the idea of higher in rank 'uluw and prefer 
isti'lä' which means having the physical power to 
enforce your order to be obeyed. This is a view which 
Ibn Qudima, al-Amidi and the Hanbal3 usulis followed. 
2 
However, the two words are by no means clearly defined 
and there is some confusion among scholars concerning 
them. Yet despite that there seems to be underlying 
theological and political problems. The authority of 
the Abbasid-caliphs could be regarded as requiring 
obedience to the caliph's order by virtue of their 
superior rank and nobility ("uluw). It was not always 
la. Ansar3 Abd al-'Ali Muhammad b<ot-Nizäm, Fawatih 
ar-Rahamüt, vol. 1, p. 371, (printed with al- 
Mustasfg). 
b. Al-Mäturdites are followers of AbU Mansur al- 
Mätur-ld-3 the theologian (d. 332 A. H. ) According 
to Ahmad Amin he lived at the same time with Abü 
al-Hasan al-Ash'arl (d. 330 A. H. ) and therefore 
they agreed on many issues of theological concern 
and disagreed on many others, like al-gadä' and al- 
adar. The Mäturdites tend to be mainly Hanafites 
while most of the Ash"arites tend to be Shäfi'ites. 
See Ahmad Amin, Zuhr al-Islam, vol. 4, -pp. 91-95. 
2. Al-Amid!, al-Ihkam, vol. 2, p. 11; also see 
Shingiti, Mudhkkarat, p. 187. 
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the case though that some of these caliphs possessed 
the isti"lä' that physical power to demand that their 
orders be obeyed. 
In insisting on superiority or power for an amr 
to be really an amr, these usülis are escaping from 
the mere verbal form of the imperative. They describe 
an imperative addressed to an equal as request for 
which they use the Arabic term iltimäs. On the other 
hand, an imperative addressed to one who is superior to 
the person making it is regarded as a petition for which 
they use the Arabic term istidä'. 
In this discussion of the status of the person 
issuing the amr the mutakallim! n seem divided between 
the ustlls, who are close to Ash"arite and Maturidite 





scholars. There does not seem to be a 
on this subject. ' Perhaps this is an 
their school's reluctance to engage-In 
peculation in usül al-fiqh. 
Argument about the Nature of Amr Based on its original 
Meaning (al-Qawl al-Makhsüs) 
Another major problem with regard to amr concerned 
whether the word amr originally meant "a matter" or 
"a thing" or it meant an "order". Those usülis who 
maintain the former view refer to amr being a thing 
(shay') or "a noun" (ism) or a special word (gawl makhsüs); 
while the supporters of the latter view refer to amr 
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being an activity (fill). 
This argument about the original nature of amr 
presents difficult problems of interpretation. If amr 
occurred originally in the sense of order, that is 
meaning an activity (fill), it would imply that every 
order was obligatory in normal usage. 
1 However,, if 
amr occurred originally in the sense of "thing" ( awl 
al-makhsüs, ism or shay'), then its use to mean "order" 
would be metaphorical. In the latter case, there would 
be considerable doubt about the obligatory nature of the 
word. 
It seems that there was general agreement among 
usülis that the word had an original meaning of "thing" 
that it was originally ism or gawl makhsüs. 
2 
However, 
there was considerable disagreement as to whether amr 
could also have originally referred to an activity fi"l 
and thus have also meant "order" alongside meaning 
"thing". In the latter. argument it was suggested that 
amr had a common meaning (mushtarak) and thus the 
meaning was considered to be derived from two independent 
sources within the same word. This latter view avoided 
the metaphorical interpretation of amr to mean an order 
or activity (fi'1) and thus preserved the obligatory 
nature of amr. 




This view seems to have been put forward by some 
early Shafi'ite mutakallimTn. 
1 They maintained that 
amr, as well as being a matter ( sha'n, gawl makhsüs) 
also has the real basic meaning of activity (fill). 
According to Abi al-Husayn al-Basri they argued that 
for this reason all the activities (af'äl) of the 
Prophet were obligatory for Muslims because they came 
under the Qur'änic injunction2 ... "Let those who 
oppose his amr be warned. "3 This view also seems to 
have been adopted by later Hanafite scholars of usül 
al-fiqh. In fact, the Hanafite al-Nasafi (d. 710 A. H. ) 
gives more detailed definition of this group's views 
with regard to amr and fi"l. He says: They hold-the 
view that the activity (fill) of the Prophet, which is 
not careless, nor natural like eating and sleeping, 'nor 
specific to him like praying during the night, is'obligatory 
(for Muslims to follow). According to them amr is 
designated as an activity (fi'1) because of God's words: 
4 
Mä amru Fir 6 awna bi-rashidin 
5 
The command of Pharoah was not 
rightly guided. (Q/11/97 
1. A1-Nasafi, Manär, p. 114. 
2. Q/2V63. 
3. AbU al-Husayn al-Basr!, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 45. 
4. Al-Nasafi, Manär, p. 114. 
5. Ibid., p. 115. 
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They argue that the amr which is described by 
guidance (rushd) must refer to an activity and thus 
in this passage in the Qur'an amr is understood as 
an activity. 
This view of the mutakallim! n is also held by the 
Shi'ite scholar al-Murtadä. He like them, in seeking 
to demonstrate that amr could be both an object (i. e. 
gawl makhsus etc. ) and an activity (fill), forgets 
that the argument was actually concerned with the meaning 
of amr as a command and whether that meaning was original 
to the word or applied to it metaphorically - and that 
the reason for this discussion was to ascertain the 
obligatory nature of amr. He forgets all this and 
resorts to a discussion in which it is not all clear, 
in some of the examples he gives to support his argument 
for amr as an activity, whether amr has any meaning of 
command at all. 
Thus he interprets the standard examples given by 
other writers as examples of irr as gawl makhsus as 
examples of amr as activity. He says that in: 
Amr fulän mustagim 
The affair: of so and so is straightforward 
"It is clear that amr refers to tarä'iq (manner of 
behaviour) and thus is an activity (fi41). "1 Other 
1. A1-Murtadä, al-Dharicq-., vol. 1, p. 27. 
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authorities including Abi al-Husayn al-Basra interpret 
this example as the basic example of amr meaning "affair" 
(sha'n) and thus being a noun. Al-Murtada's next 
example is equally remote from the meaning of amr as 
command: 
Hädhä amr 'azim 
This is a great affair. 
However, he again seems to interpret this as being 
an activity (fill) and thus a verbal usage. 
2 
As for 
Abü al-Husayn, he maintains that there is no idea of 
fill in this example. 
Al-Murtadä then gives the example: 
Ra3. aytu min fulän amran ah7alän33 
I saw on the part of so and so a matter 
which terrified me. 
He interprets this to mean unquestionably an activity. 
This example does seem to imply some kind of activity 
and is one which Abü al-Husayn fails to interpret. In 
fact, he ignores it. This is also true of later writers 
of usül. The nearest example given by a later usüllscholar 
who is in favour of amr being originally qawl 
makhsüs is that which al-Quräf3 also gives for the 
1. Abü al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 45. 
2. Al-Murtadä, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 27. 
3. Ibid. 
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supporters of the view that amr is common for Bawl 
makhsus and activity (fill). 
Kunna f-3 amrin 'azimin idha kunna fl 
al-salätil 
We are in the midst of a great matter 
when we are in prayer. 
Again he does not take the proper. example given but 
interprets it through a different example which he 
attributes to Abi al-Husayn al-Basra: 
I' tin! bi-atnrin mä2 
He came to me for something. 
This example, he says Abü al-Husayn al-Basra has 
described as being used as gawl makhsüs for a thing. 
However the two examples are not the same and the 
argument is not really convincing. It is. true to say 
that Abi al-Husayn does present tarä'iq (manner of 
behaviour) as being covered by the general definition 
he gives for amr but he excludes tarä'iq from being 
understood in the sense of activity (fill). This 
exclusion is perhaps a little unsatisfactory, particularly 
as in two places he does seem to acknowledge that the 
plural of activity (af"äl) does seem somehow to come 
within his definition of amr as gawl makhsüs, while 
resolutely resisting the verbal aspect of the word 
of' ä1. 
1. A1-Quräfi, Sharh Tanqih al-FusUl, p. 126. 
2. Ibid. 
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A1-Murtadä then tries to support his argument 
by quoting the verse: 
Li-amrin mä yasüdu män yasüdu- 
y 
Because of a matter which dominates 
who it dominates. 
Al-Murtadä interprets amr in this verse to be an 
activity (fi'1). Al-Quräfi rejects this interpretation 
by saying that amr is here a sifa that is a characteristic 
and hence according to him it is al-gawl al-makhsus. 
2 
Al-Murtadä next tries to gain support for his view 
by citing verses from the Qur'an 11/46: "At length 
behold! there came our command (amr), And fountains of 
the earth gushed forth" and Qur'an 11/73: "They said: 
Dost thou wonder at God's decree? The grace of God and 
His blessings on you. " According to al-Murtadä the 
word amr in the first verse means command and in the 
second means decree and both refer originally to activity 
because they refer to the activity of God. 
3 
Those of the early mutakallimin who supported the 
view that the word amr refers originally to activity 
(fill) as well as to al-gawl al-makhsus used to support 
this new argument based on the differentiation of 
plurals. Those who held this view that amr refers to 
1. Al-Murtadä, op. cit., vol. 1, p.. 27. 
2. Al-Quräf1, op. cit., pp. 126-7. 
3. A1-Murtada, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 28. 
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activity maintain that it is pluralised as umür and 
that amr which means al-gawl al-makhsus will be 
pluralised as awämir. They argue that the differ- 
entiation of plural also indicates different meanings 
in the singular. 
1 This has been rejected by Abt al- 
Husayn al-Basri and Yahya al-Rahäwi. Abü al-Husayn al- 
Basra maintains that it has been reported from the 
linguistic scholars (ahl al-lugha) that amr is never 
pluralised as awä. mir neither as al-gawl al-makhsus nor 
as activity2 (fi'l), though he agreed that both umür 
and awämir are separate words and each one of them can 
be used as an alternative for the other. He gave an 
example that if someone says amruhu mustagim or 
umuruhu mustagima it will give the same meaning. 
3 
As for al-Rahawi, he rejects the view that amr is 
originally common to both activity and al-gawl al-makhsus 
because that according to him contradicts the rule of 
language, as he maintains that a single word cannot 
have more than one meaning in the original root. He 
also rejects the view that amr originally signified 
activity and al-gawl al-makhsus was a metaphor. In 
fact this view does not appear to be maintained by any 
scholar. Then he declares himself in favour of the view 
that is accepted by the bulk of scholars with the exception 
1. Al-Nasafi, Sharh, p. 119. 




of those Shäfi'ites mentioned earlier and the Shiite 
scholar al-riurtadä. Thus al-Rahäwi's view was that 
amr originally referred to al-gawl al-makhsus and 
then referred to activity through metaphor. 
l 
It seems that Abü al-Husayn al-Basra and other 
opponents of those Shäfi'ites are mainly worried about 
the growing tendency of using language as a principal 
factor for determining religious matters without taking 
understanding seriously into account,. which may lead to 
confusion. That concern also has been expressed by 
al-Ghazäli in his comment on the Traditions used as 
counter opposition to the Qur'2. nic and Tradition 
evidences given by those Shäfi'ites: Q/11/97: M_ ru 
fir"awn bi-rashid. Also the Tradition that the Prophet 
combined four prayers together in the day of Khandaq. 
2 
They interpret amr in the verse as referring to activity 
and consequently they based the performances of the 
Prophet on the day of Khandaq on that rule. Their 
opponents have no choice but to quote to them another 
Tradition in which the Prophet himself made it clear to 
the Companions that they should not follow his activities 
without genuine reasons or evidence. The Tradition 
which opponents of these Shäfi"ites regard as specifically 
referring to the Prophet are: 
1. Al-Rahäwi, Sharh al-Manär, p. 119. 
2. Al-Nasafi, op. cit., p. 115. 
-49- 
1. The Tradition that the Prophet took off his shoes 
while he was praying with his Companions and the 
Companions followed him. Later he asked them why 
they took off their shoes. They replied that they 
saw him take off his shoes. He told them that he 
was informed that there was dirt in both his shoes. 
l 
2. The Tradition that the Prophet fasted for two, or_. 
three days without breaking his fast and when the., 
Companions wanted to do the same, he forbade them. 
He said: "None of you is like me. My God feeds 
me, and gives me drink. "2 
Opponents of those Shäfi'ites regard these 
Traditions as clear indications that all activity 
of the Prophet should not be regarded as obligatory. 
However, al-Rahawi quoted al-Ghazäl3 as saying that 
"Since they did not follow him (the Prophet) in all 
his activity, how could they take certain occurrences 
of his activities as evidence and refuse to take other 
occurrences as evidence. "3 
1. Ibid., p. 116. 
2. Ibid., p. 116; 
p. 59. 
also see Shäfi'3, al-Umm, vol. 8, 
3. Al-Nasaf, Sharh, p. 116. 
-5 0- 
Interpretation of the Requirement to Fulfil the Amr 
According to usülIs amr may be generally divided 
into three different kinds. These kinds are al-wujüb, 
al-nudba and al-istihbäb. In their definition of these 
three terms there are some differences and not all 
usülis regard them in exactly the same way. However, 
it is clear that the first category, al-wujüb, involves 
an obligation on the person ordered to fulfil the order 
that has been given. The other two, al-nudba and 
al-istihbäb, are much closer in meaning but the jurists 
tend to differentiate them by regarding an amr which 
involves nudba as an order which is urged to be performed, 
whereas the amr istihbäb is an order whose performance 
is recommended. Thus the distinction between the last 
two is a subtle linguistic distinction depending on 
the difference in meaning between "urging an action" 
and "recommending an action". 
Usülis have given a definition of amr al-wujüb as 
having a threat of punishment to those who abandon it. 
l 
That is the most popular of all definitions. There 
are, however, an-other definition which goes further 
than the threat of punishment for those who abandon an 
amr al-wujüb and which maintains the necessity of 
punishment for those who abandon an amr al-wujnb. A 
1. Shinq! ti, Mudhakkarat Usül al-Figh, pp. 9-10. 
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third, view is that the necessity of punishment of 
those who abandon an amr al-wujub is required by 
revealed law. 
1 
The first is the opinion of the 
majority of usülis and the second and the third are, - 
the opinions of two factions of the Mu6tazila. 
2 
The 
difference between these definitions is that those who 
hold the first, believe that 
everyone who has abandoned an 
punishment for that as he may 
him, while those who followed 
definitions believe that such 
3 
punishment. 
it is not necessary that 
obligation must undergo 
repent and God may forgive 
the second and the third 
a person must undergo 
"The urged" al-amr al-mandfb is the kind of order 
whose performance may involve reward but whose abandon- 
ment is not punishable. It is explained by some as 
"what men have been ordered to do but not in an emphatic 
way. " It is also called al-sunna al-mu'akkada. 
4 
Ibn Qudama has reported that a group of usülls, 
whom he did not name, had rejected the validity of 
al-amr al-mandfb as something ordered (ma'mur bihi). 
They maintained that this was because God had said, 
"Let those beware who withstand the Apostles order 
1. Ibn Qudtta, al-Rawdat, pp. 20-21; also see 
Shay-bat al-Hamd, Imtä' al-'Uqül, p. 8. 
2. AhmAAmin, Zuhr al-Islam, vol. 4, p. 81. - 
3. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 81. 
4. Shing1t3, Mudhakkarat Usül al-Fight p. 16. 
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lest some trial befall them. "1 They argue that al-amr 
al-mandub does not involve a person in following the 
injunction to beware. They also interpret the statement 
by the Prophet: "If I was not afraid of imposing hard- 
ship on my community, I would have ordered them to use 
the siwak (a piece of wood for cleaning teeth) 
2 
at every 
time of prayer, " to mean that he has recommended them 
to use the siwäk because he knew that the order (amr) 
did not include the idea of urging (al-mandüb). According 
to them order (amr) requires an obligation concerning 
which there is no choice whereas there is a choice with 
regard to al-mandüb and those who abandon al-mandüb are. 
not called sinners. In reply to that, Ibn Qudama maintained 
that men are able to say that amr is requesting istd'ä' 
and demanding talab and al-mandüb (urging) involves both 
requesting and demanding. Therefore it includes a real 
order (amr). In support of that he cited the Qur'än: 
la. Qur' in, 2 4/63. 
b. Ibn Qudäma may well mean the Hanafite, Mälikites and 
some Shäfi'ites because they are the people who have 
openly maintained that al-mandüb is not part of al- 
amr al-wujüb in the sense that it did not involve 
threat of punishment for who abandoned it. But they 
all agree that al-mandüb is a request for action' 
like al-wujüb. See amir Bädishäh, Taisir al-Tär1r, 
I' 
vol. 2, p. 223. 
2. San'än3, Subul Salam, vol. 1, p. 4. 
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"God commands justice, the doing of good and liberality 
to kith and kin. "1 He also referred to the Qur'än: 
"Enjoining what is right"2 which he interpreted to be 
among the things which are urged (al-mandüb) because it 
is a common view among jurists that amr is of two kinds: 
amr iyjäbi, an order which must be fulfilled and an 
amr istihbäb an order which is recommended, and performing 
3 the latter is an act of obedience. This latter view 
had been put earlier by Qäd3 al-Bägilän3 and was also 
followed by Imam al-Haramayn. 
4 
The dispute concentrates on the status of commands 
whose fulfilment is obligatory and those whose obligation 
is not absolute. It emphasises the problem of the use 
of amr in such contexts. This problem is compounded by 
the imperative form. It can be seen that the task of 
usülis is a very real and important function in interpret- 
ing the requirements of religion. When the law is 
contained in the text, 'the lawyers, i. e. the usflls, 
must interpret its meaning within its textual context. 
The result may appear at first sight to be abstruse and 
pedantic but its significance for the practice of 
religion is extremely important. The threefold division 
of amr is in itself an attempt to alleviate the require- 
ments enjoined on the faithful. However, the emphasis 
1. Qur'än, 16/90. 
2. Qur' än, 3/104. 
3. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-N zir, pp. 20-21. 
4. Imäm al-Haramayn, al-Burhan, vol. 1, p. 249. 
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on al-mand3b as an order whose fulfilment will be 
rewarded does in fact tend to press home the 
psychological need to carry it out. ' The more'liberal 
element is endeavouring to weaken this requirement. ` 
It will be noticed that in the conflict concerning 
al-amr al-mand-ub, the amr al-istihbäb has been lost 
sight of. It must'be regarded as practically the 
same as al-amr al-mand-ub. In fact, in Ibn Qudäma's 
division of amr iyjäb3 and amr istihbäb, he himself 
loses sight of any distinction between the mand-ub and 
istihbäb. 
The Form of the Order and the Intention of the Order 
Sighat al-amr and irädat al-amr are two separate 
terms with regard to the definition of al-amr but both 
are interrelated and any investigation of one of them 
cannot be concluded without involving the other. 
There are divisions among us313s on whether or not 
there is a special form (sigha) for ordering. Some 
usal1s like Mu'tazilal refused to accept that there 
was any special form (sIgha) for amr. They are of the 
opinion that any form by which a person could show his 
listeners that he was commanding him is the form of amr. 
Further, the Mu'tazila maintained that God could 
not speak. He only commanded by His will (iräda). 
1. Shaybat al-Hamd, Imtä' al-'Aqül, p. 122. 
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Therefore they interpreted kaläm Allah as a meaning 
which subsisted in the soul not as the product of 
voice which could consist of letters and sound. 
I 
For 
this reason the Mu'tazila divided amr into two kinds: 
nafs3 and lafzi. 
2 
This is based on their division 
of speech (kalin). They defined al-amr al-nafsi as 
meaning an order which subsisted in the soul and 
al-amr al-lafz3 as a word that gives indication of 
3 
al-amr al-nafsi, e. g. form of imperative and so on. 
Among evidence they used in support of that view is 
a verse by the poet al-Akhtal who said: 
"Indeed speech is in the mind. The 
tongue was made only as indication 
to the mind. "4 
The Mu'tazila also used two verses from the 
Qur'an to support their view of kaläm as subsisting 
in the soul: Q/58/8 "And they say to themselves why 
does not God punish us for our word" and Q/7/205 "And 
do thou (0 reader! ) bring thy Lord to remembrance in 
thy (very) soul with humility and in reverence. " A 
similar view of kaltem was also advocated by the 
theologian Ibn Kulläb and the school which followed him. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibn Qudamä, Rawdat al-Nazir, p. 98. 
3. Shingit1, Mudhäkarat al-Usül, p. 188. 
4. Al-QurAf , Sharh Tanqih al-Fusül, p. 126. 
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ea. ýt 
This group *=°h 
%held the view that there was no 
special form for amr and they would only accept the 
validity of amr with iräda, i. e. the one who commanded 
really intended that the commanded action (ma'mur bihi) 
be performed. For according to them, the form of the 
imperative which their opponents regard as the sole 
symbol of amr could in fact imply threatening without 
the context of iräda. Similarly it may not carry 
authority if it was used by someone who is'sleeping 
or a forgetful person. 
1 According to the Mu'tazila, 
God cannot command something unless He wished it and 
did not abhor it because commanding something without 
iräda is senseless and that quality is not suitable for 
God. 
2 
A' Shi" ite scholar, al-Murtadä., also favours iräda 
as the main condition of amr but it is not clear whether 
or not his opinion represents the view of the whole 
Shiite al-Imämiyya to which he belonged. However, 
al-Murtadä put forward some suggestions about the 
reason why he thought that a genuine amr must depend 
on iräda. He maintained that since amr may be derived 
out of what is not amr an.,: ' amr itself at some times may 
not be a genuine one. So if that be the case there is 
no other way of identifying amr from what is not amr 
1. Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 50. 
2. Al-Murtadä, al-DharicU,:, vol. 1, p. 50. 
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other than that ämir wanting the ma'mür bihi. He 
said that that is exactly what we meant by iräda. 
l 
Another reason was confusion would normally 
arise between two items made of the same thing, like 
two black items. He said that as one can claim 
similarity of both items he can claim the same 
similarity of any other thing of the same quality. 
He argued that the claim is necessary because if 
someone heard someone else saying qum (stand up) 
aiming at commanding him, the person who heard it 
may not be able to differentiate if the man uses the 
same form again for another purpose, e. g. to give 
permission (ibäha) or to threaten (tahdid), and so 
on. 
2 
He maintained that that was due to the strong 
similarity between them. 
Al-Murtadä further gave some suggestions about 
reason why he believes that the same form used for 
amr could be used for something else: 
1. The Arabic words according to him are only 
established by linguists and that establishment, 
was according to their choice. Therefore there 
was no obligation. So it is possible that they 
did not establish a special form for commanding 
(amr). But he said that if that happened then 
1. Al-Murtadä., al-Dhari.. p;., vol. 1, pp. 41-4+2. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 42. 
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it could mean that the form if'al may not be a 
form of command' (amr). 
2. If amr depends on al-ma'mur bihi (commanded 
action) but without the intention of the ämir 
then there is the possibility of one of us saying 
to someone else "if'al" and really intending to 
command him but his statement will not be regarded 
as command. Or he did not want action from him 
and what he had said will be regarded as command. 
3. If the form of amr is different from what is not 
amr there would have to be a certain way for any 
able person to distinguish between what is amr 
and what is not amr, e. g. threaten (tahdid), to 
give permission (ibäha) and so on. But according 
to him there is no way to that2 other than irada. 
4. That could mean that we have to divide people 
into two groups: those whom we can command in 
every circumstance and those whom we cannot. Thus 
the superior will be separated from others because 
a certain superiority is not confined to certain 
periods and certain places. And a form of 
imperative used by someone who says "stand up" 
for example is the same as every word that bears 
this form. 
3 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 42-43. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 43. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 44. 
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Al-Murtada further maintained that what indicates 
the validity of amr depending on iräda is the fact that 
it is not appropriate-for the mir (God) to command 
except for something which he approves of, and that, He 
cannot order someone to do something in the past. He 
argues that if the iräda had not had any effect on the 
validity of amr through the latter's dependence on the 
occurrence of iräda, then that kind of order would not 
have become binding. 
z. 
That view was echoed by a 
Mu'tazilite scholar, Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, who 
compares amr to al-khabar. He said that a report-or 
statement; »'(khabar) requires iräda to make it become 
khabar. That kind of khabar is possible to be about 
past or present. He maintained that that indicates 
that amr is different from khabar in the sense of 
iräda. He went on that order (amr) was originally- 
established to prove that the commander (ämir) wished 
the ma'mur bihi (commanded action) and for that reason 
they maintained that the amr, as an amr only indicated 
the position of the .. mir not the status of the commanded 
action because he may order bad or good as well as what 
is obligatory and what is not obligatory. But if the 
command is from God it will always be for good because 
it is not appropriate for God to order anything except 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 49. 
2. Ibid., p. 50. 
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what has a quality of obligation. or recommendation 
which is additional to its goodness. 
l 
According to al-Murtada's view there is. no 
difference if someone says: "I want you to do" and 
if he uses form of the imperative namely ifa'l because 
everything depends on irä. da. He also maintained that 
the obvious rule is that they regard the form of 
imperative as a command only if the commander--( mir) 
QS4 
is above the commanded person and request if the 
commander (ämir) is lesslhcn the commanded person. 
And they made al-rutba (position) as a gap between 
them. He concluded that there is no disagreement that 
the request always represents a statement of someone 
who says that "I want you to do" etc. because they did, 
not separate between request and amr except by al-rutba 
(position) otherwise there is no difference between 
both in the sense of meaning. 
2 
Representing the Mu'tazila, Abü al-Husayn-al-Basr! 
put forward three conditions in which amr could-be 
accepted. One of them refers to the word amr itself 
while two others refer to the commander (ä. mir) of the 
order. The first was that the order should be in the 
form of the imperative or request for action, e. g. ifa'1. 
1. Abn al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb al-Mu"tamad, vol. 1, 
P. 53. 
2. Ibid., P. 56. 
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The two other conditions were that the commander should 
be in a higher position ('ulw) and then his purpose in 
using the form of the imperative must be that he wanted 
the action to be performed. 
1 
However, his inclusion of 
the form of the imperative in the conditions of amr 
seems to diverge from the original principles of the 
Mu'tazila which put less emphasis on the form of amr. 
Abü al-Husayn al-Basra laid special emphasis on the 
third condition. He reported that some Jurists have 
maintained that amr was regarded as amr because of its 
form. He said that this seemed to indicate that they 
were saying that the validity of amr rested on the form. 
He also quoted another group whom he described as 
ashabuna al-Baghdädiyyün as saying that amr was regarded 
as amr because of amr itself. He suggested that discussion 
on that point could be in two ways: One of them was to 
presume that there was a special rule for the form of 
amr and because of it it would become'a valid amr. He 
maintained that that was through iräda. The second way 
was to assume there was no special rule for the form of 
amr at all. Thus we would have to take account of the 
logical aspect of it, namely that the form of amr in 
itself is the amr or the form needs a certain condition, 
namely iräda. Abü al-Husayn al-Basra maintained that a 
distinction was needed to be made here because many 
people might mix the two together. He then declared that 
1. Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
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the opinion which says that there is a special rule for 
the form of amr was invalid. He said that the only 
understandable special thing about the form of amr 
(imperative form) was that it was addressed from a high 
position, otherwise it would only be a demand (al-talab) 
and nothing more. 
1 He further suggested that the form 
of amr is either sufficient as a symbol of talab (demand) 
without adding or leaving any other condition or it is 
not sufficient. He said that if the form is sufficient 
to be regarded as a symbol of talab whenever it was 
found, then a threat also could be regarded as al-talab 
because it uses the same form. The same thing would 
apply to words spoken by a sleeping or forgetful person 
if the form of. imperative, e. g. ifa'l, was used because 
their statements Are also without iräda. He further 
stressed that if it was necessary to add any condition 
to the form then that condition would either refer to 
the commanded person (ma'mür) or the commanded things 
(ma'mür bihi) or the command itself (amr) or the form 
(slgha). If that happened it would not refer to the 
ma'mür, nor to the ma'mur bihi, because all of those 
are possible with regard to threat. 
2 
On the other hand, the majority of scholars are of 
the opinion that there are special forms for commanding. 
While these forms vary the most popular of them are., 
1. Ibid., p. 50. 
2. Ibid., p. 50. 
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1. Form of imperative, e. g. if'al. 
2. Fill al-Mudäri' al-Magrün bi-lam al-amr 
(The use of the jussive after lam to express a 
command or exhortation) e. g. thumma liyagdi 
aM'1 
ýýAI chum. Q/22/29. 
3. Ism fi'1 al-amr (The use of 'a1ä to express 
obligation) e. g. 'alaykum anfusukun. Q/5/105. 
4. Al-Masdar al-nä'ib 'an fill al-amr 
(The use of the verbal noun in the place of the 
imperative) e. g. fadarb al-rigäb. Q/47/4. 
From the point of view of the majority these forms are 
the acceptable forms of order. In fact these are the 
ones most frequently used in the Qur'än and the Tradition. 
However, the other usülis among them always advocate 
that there is a special form for amr and that God speaks 
with a voice that produces letters and sounds and that 
there is a difference between al-kaläm al-nafs3, which 
they say is iräda, and al-kaläm al-lafzi. 
l They support 
their view with verses from the Qur'an, Traditions from 
the Prophet and their claim of the consensus of the 
people of language. 
Ibn Qudnna has suggested that what is in one's mind 
cannot be called kalam unless it has been spoken. 
2 
He 
differentiates between al-kalam al-nafsi and the spoken 
1. Shingit3, Mudhakarat al-Usü1, pp. 188-189. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Nazir, p. 98. 
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word. He also cited Q/19/10-11, "(Zakariyä) said: '0! 
My Lord give me a sign. ' The sign, was the answer, Shall 
be,. that thou, shalt speak to no man. for three nights, 
although thou art not. dumb. So Zakariyä came"out. to 
his people from his chamber. He told them by signs to 
celebrate God's praises in the morning and in the 
evening. " Ibn Qudama also cited Q/19/26: "I have- - 
vowed a fast to (God) most gracious and this day will I 
enter into no talk with any human being. " Ibn. Qudäma , 
explained that God did not regard the sign, in other 
words the meaning subsisting in the soul, as kaläm. =, 
According to Ibn Qudäma these verses indicate that kaläm 
by voice is different from al-kaläm al-nafs3. Thereforel 
there should be no connection between them. -He, further 
maintained that amr can occur without the one,,, whois 
commanding really wanting it to happen. 
2 A similar view 
was expressed by another Hanbali scholar, Ibn Taymiyya 
(d. 728 A. H. /1328 A. D. ). Ibn Taymiyya tried to justify 
the view that kaläm is different from iräda by. using an 
argument based on what he held to be ordinary Arab 
understanding. He maintained that God only 
revealed the Qur'än in the language. of the Arabs and 
those Arabs only distinguish the truth or. untruth of a 
statement in terms of meaning and expression, which, - 
in turn indicates meaning. He concluded that because 
of this reason God has never caused anyone to believe 
His Prophet merely through their own knowledge and belief 
which only exists in their hearts until (those people) 
1. Ibid., p. 98. 
2. Ibid., p. 100. 
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will confirm that by their tongue. He also maintained 
that Arabs do not say for example somebody believed a 
certain man or denied him as a liar if he only knew in 
his. heart (i. e. intuitively) that he was telling the 
truth or a lie'and would not mention that. Similarly 
the Arabs do not say a man commanded. someone or forbade 
him if that man only made a demand in his heart without 
any-word or sign or any other context. 
1 
Ibn Taymiyya cited a Tradition in which the Prophet 
said: "Indeed any kind of human talk (kalämm) is not 
proper in our prayer" and another Tradition in which 
he said: "God can innovate whatever He wishes and 
indeed among what he innovated was that you should not 
talk during the prayer. "2 Ibn Taymiyya maintained that 
all Muslim scholars-'agreed that-if somebody deliberately 
talked during the prayer his prayer would become invalid. 
At the'same time they all agreed that if one thinks of 
something during the prayer without speaking about it, 
that will not invalidate one's prayer. The prayer will 
only become invalid by talking about it. He concluded 
that that shows agreement of all Muslims that what occurs 
in the mind is not3 kalam. Ibn Taymiyya goes further by 
citing more Traditions in which the-Prophet himself 
differentiated between hadith al-nafs and spoken kaläm 
when he said: "Indeed God has pardoned my community , ýýb"l1 
1. Ibn Taymiyya, Maimu" al-Fatawa, vol. 7, p. 132. 
2. Ibid., p. 132. 
3. Ibid., PP- 132 -133 . 
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what occurs in its mind as long as it did not speak it 
out or act on it. " He said that God has differentiated 
between hadith al-nafs and kaläm *and that kalten is only 
what is spoken1 by tongue and that is what they call 
kaläm in the Arabic language in which He had revealed 
the Qur'an. He went on that kaläm was never a point of 
dispute among Companions as well as those who followed 
them. According to Ibn Taymiyya, it has always been 
held that kaläm is the most distinctive quality of a' 
human being. To that end he cited Q/51/23, "Then by the 
Lord of the heaven and earth this is the very truth as 
much as the fact that ye can speak. "z 
In his reaction to Q/58/8 Ibn Tayiniyya argued that 
if God intended that they said with-'their tongue then 
there is no point of evidence in the first verse. He 
maintained that that is the opinion of al-Mufassirin 
because the reason why the verse was revealed was that 
pagans used to say to the Prophet "Sim 'alayka" instead 
of saying al-Saläm 'alayka and they intended by that to 
rebuke him. When they departed from his place they 
said to each other, "If he is a true Prophet he could 
have understood what we meant and punished us or told 
God to punish us. " Ibn Taymiyya suggested that 
Anfusahum in the verse could be meaning among themselves 
like saying to each other. And if we presume that they 
1. 'Ibid., p. 133. 
2. Ibid., P. 134+. 
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said it in their minds then the statement is restricted 
by Anfusahum like saying "What she thought in her mind. " 
But they intended kalam by, tongue and that is why they 
used the word1 gawl. As to the verse -?, put forward 
by Mu'tazila and those who regard kal m as meaning 
subsisting in the soul, Ibn Taymiyya maintained that 
some people do not agree that the verse was by Akhtal 
because they couldn't find it in his work. He reported 
that statement fromýMuhammad b. al-Khashshäb while others 
maintained that Akhtal used the word al-bayän instead of 
kaläm. 
However, Ibn Taymiyya then drew a parallel between 
this verse from Akhtal and an isolated Tradition reported 
by one person. He said that if someone gave evidence 
based on a Tradition transmitted by one'man'and reported 
by-both al-Bukhäri and Muslim which most Muslims regard 
as the most authentic, people would still say that this 
Tradition is an isolated one. They may use it because it 
will be among the kind which the scholars'have agreed to 
believe and accept. On the other hand, this verse from 
Akhtal was not confirmed by any authentic transmission 
from Akhtal and therefore the Arabs did not accept it. 
He questioned whether it could possibly be used as 
evidence for any linguistic dispute let alone the 
definition of kaläm and qawl. Then he maintained that 
the argument about kaläm and gawl and their similarity 
1. Ibid., pp. 13k-135. 
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could not be settled by a statement from 
according to him,, this is a matter whose 
past and present generation of ahl al-lu, 
they knew the meaning of head, hand and 
In spite of all the disapproval Ibn 
a poet because, 
meaning the, 
gha knew as 
Leg. 1 
Taymiyya has 
shown against Akhtal's verse he believes that Akhtal 
did not intend by the verse to define the meaning of 
kalä. m. He said that itrshould be known that Akhtal did 
not mention this verse to define. the meaning of kalam 
nor has any other poet intended that-at all. He said 
that what Akhtal actually meant was that the-origin of 
kalam"is in the mind (i. e. -meaning) , as if Akhtal was 
2 
saying --'-. --, 
., 
if someone says anything with tongue which 
is not in his mind, do not trust him. 
In another attempt to substantiate the claim that 
kalä. m is different from hadith al-nafs and that-. command 
(amr) does depend on the spoken form of"amr rather than 
the meaning or iräda, Muhammad al-Amin further tells us 
that linguists (ahl al-lisän) agreed that kalam consists 
of noun, verb and letters and the jurists also agreed 
that if someone vows that he will not speak then his 
oath will be broken only by speech which is made up of 
voice and letters not by speech-in-the sou13 (hadith al- 
nafs). He also maintained that whenever the word kalam 
1. Ibid., p. 138. 
2. Ibid., p. 139. 
3. Shingiti, Mudhakarat al-UsUl, p. 189. 
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is used to mean what is in the mind it should always be 
accompanied by what will make it clear, 
' 
e. g. fi"anfushum 
(in their mind) as it is in the Qur'än 58/8, "And they 
say to themselves, 'Why does-not God punish'us for our 
words. '" He suggested that if that word (kaläm) had not 
been restricted by the word anfush um it would have meant 
kaläm by tongue. Muhammad al-Aminrgave more examples 
to substantiate that view that those mentioned forms are 
the original farms of command (amr). He said that if 
for example a man says to his slave "give me water" 
that will be regarded as an order and the slave-will be 
regarded as obedient by complying with it. He concluded 
that the fact that the form can be used as a metaphor 
for another meaning must not cause confusion. 
2 
As to whether God-can speak or not, Ibn Taymiyya 
maintained that there were many authentic Traditions 
from the Prophet that God does speak with a voice and- 
that He called Adam with His voice and He spoke to rlüsä 
withýHis voice. Ibn Taymiyya also maintained that that is 
the doctrine of ahl al-sunna and that the Qur'an is-the 
word of God. 
3 
The opponents of the Mu"tazila also divided iräda 
into two kinds: al-iräda al-shar"iyya al-diniyya and 
al-iräda al-kawniyya al-gadariyya. They agree that amr 
1. Ibid., p. 189. 
2. Ibid., p. 189. 
3. Ibn Taymiyya, Ma mu', -vol. 3, pp. 
40l-402. 
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al-shar'iyya always had to be accompanied by al-iräda 
al-shar'iyya al-d! niyya. But they refused to agree with 
the Mu'tazilites that al-iräda al-kawniyya al-gadariyya 
also must accompany amr (order or command). They 
maintained that one can command his servant without 
really wanting the action, which one had commandihim 
to do, to take place with the aim of testing whether he 
would show obedience or not. 
1 They also insisted that- 
form (s! gha) of amr is the sole symbol of commanding 
because it was established for command. They gave an 
example that if someone vows that he will fulfil a 
certain promise tomorrow if God wishes and he could not 
fulfil it, it is not necessary for him because if God 
had wished it would have happened and become binding 
and his oath would have been broken by not fulfilling 
it. 2 However, they admitted that the form (s3 ha) if 
used by a forgetful or a sleeping person, would not carry 
authority and it will not be. considered as amr but they 
refused to relate it to iräda. They argued that if 
3 
iräda had been of any importance to amr it would have 
been mentioned by Arabs who established the language. 
Al-Quräf3 maintained that iräda is a hidden meaning 
1. Shingiti, Nudhäkarat al-Usül, p. 190; also see 
Shybat al-Hamd, Imta' al-'Uqül, p. 124. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Nazir, p. 100. 
3. Shybat al-Hamd, Imta' al-'Uqül, p. 124. 
4. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Nazir, p. 100. 
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which one can realise only through a spoken action. 
Thus if the form depended on iräda it would lead to 
a contradictory situation. 
1 
Al-Quräf3 is in favour 
of amr without iräda. He further went on that those 
forms of amr, even if it consists of a single letter, 
will still be the symbol of command. 
2 
Among other arguments made in support of amr not 
needing iräda was the view that if amr could be regarded 
as amr only if the mir had wished the action then it 
would not have been possible to use amr as evidence of 
iräda because nobody could have known it to be amr before 
they knew about the iräda. The example is given that 
God commanded ahl al-Janna by His word, e. g. kulü 
washrabü (eat and drink). There is no indication that 
He wanted actual eating from them. God commanded 
Ibrahim to sacrifice his son (Ismäiil) yet He did not 
actually want the sacrifice to take place. 
3 However, 
the form of amr which He used was described as amr, even 
though the mir did not want the action. 
4 
These arguments have been vigorously rejected by 
Mu"tazila. They rejected the view that amr was a 
symbol of iräda. Instead they maintained that it was 
1. A1-Quräf3, Sharh Tangih, p. 138. 
2. Ibid., p. 139. 
" 
3. Shybat al-Hamd, Imta" al-'Uqül, p. 124. 
4. Ibid. 
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used in the sense that the form of imperative was 
according to Mu'tazila the form originally established 
for iräda. As to the reason why iräda was not made a 
condition by the Arabs, Abü al-Husayn al-Basra suggested 
that it was possible that they did not make iräda a 
condition because it was common in the same way as they 
had not made omission of a context in order to establish 
a condition of amr. 
1 He said that at least opponents 
also agree that amr is a demand for action and the 
opinion which suggested later that demand for action 
cannot exist without irada was a detail worked out of 
that point agreed upon and it was an additional 
explanation to the point because that is the logical 
understandable meaning of demand, and there is no 
necessary connection between the science of logic and 
the common uses of language (other than implicit 
meanings). 
2 
On the question of whether one could 
command one's servant and at the same time hate the 
action one commanded him to do, Abü al-Husayn rejected 
that view. He said that it was only a guess (muwahham) 
by the servant that he was demanding action from him 
and commanding him. 
3 In the case of ahl al-Janna he 
1. Abi al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu"tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 54. 
2. Ibid., p. 54. 
3. Ibid., p. 55. 
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replied that our people (Mu'tazila) say that God wished 
what He commanded them because He has created extra 
happiness for them. 
l 
He later suggested another 
possibility. He-said that it was possible that God 
did not intend command as it is-the case in Q/23/108 
"He will say 'be ye driven into it (with ignominy) and 
speak ye not to me. ' He said 'be ye driven' here is 
not2 command. " 
The whole discussion of the form of amr and 
whether it requires iräda'reflects the theological 
positions of the disputants. The Mu'tazila who 
maintained that God did not speak could not accept 
the mere word as an expression of command. Otherwise 
they would have been forced to withdraw their views 
on the speech of God. They used the argument of iräda 
in order to minimise the literalist argument in favour 
of the form of amr being the criterion by which an amr 
was decided. Their use of the iräda argument seems to 
have forced their opponents to allow some scope for it 
in their definition of amr. 
The Requirement to Fulfil the Unrestricted Amr (al-Amr 
al-Mutlaq) 
The controversy on the significance of amr is extended 
to the discussion of an amr which is not restricted to any 
1. Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
2. Ibid., p. 56. 
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context. This is called al-amr al-mutlaq. It seems 
that there is no disagreement that amr as a signification 
form of the imperative could be interpreted to mean many 
things (e. g. al-wujüb, al-nudba, al-ibäha (permissible) 
al-takhayyur (optional) and many other things as long 
as there is a context to prove that). However, the 
scholars of usll disagree over how to specify amr as 
an imperative without there being a context (al-amr 
al-mutlaq). It has been suggested that it indicates 
al-wujib only. 
1 
Another opinion said that it can only 
be known when one could get clear evidence of the 
context, while another simply regards al-amr al-mutlaq 
as meaning al-nudba. 
2 
Finally there was the opinion 
that'it-is common between al-wujüb, al-nudba, al-ibäha 
and al-takhayyur. 
3 
Many arguments were put forward to justify the 
different opinions. Some scholars of usül distinguish 
between amr and the form of imperative if it came from 
God or the Prophet and if it was used in general speech 
other than that of God and His Prophet. Also many of 
them lay great emphasis on the meaning of the word and 
its implication rather than its obvious form as it has 
been briefly mentioned in the definition of amr. Their 
particular reason for this was that they maintained that 
1. Ämidi, al-Ihkäm, vol. 2, p. 14. 
2. Imidi, ibid; see also al-Murtadä, al-Dhari(cl, 
vol. 1, p. 51- 
3- Al-Nasaf3, Manar, p. 120. 
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amr could actually be found in many forms and was'not 
limited to the imperative. 
l 
Another reason also arose out of their disagreement 
over whether al-mandilb involved obligation or not. 
2 
The first view which maintains that al-amr al-mutlaq 
should be regarded as al-wujüb is attributed to early 
scholars of usül as well as jurists including Mälik, 
3 
al-Shäfi"3,4 Ahmad b. Hanbal and it was later followed 
by AbU al-Husayn al-Basri, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Qudama, 
5 
al- e& 
Nasäfi, also including some of al-mutakallimin. 
Since the argument,, over whether or not amr should 
be interpreted as requiring obligation is later than 
the period of Abü Hanifa and Malik the inclusion of 
their names among pro-obligatory (al-wujüb) is based 
on their general practice. As for Shäfi'3 he devoted a 
considerable portion of his al-Risäla to the command of 
God (amr Allah), command of the Prophet (amr al-Rasiil) 
and command of the people of authority (amr ulü al-amr) 
all of which he interpreted as binding. His stand on 
1. A1-Ghazäli, al-Mustasfa, vol. 1, pp. 411-12. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Näzir, p. 21. 
3. Al-Quräfi, Sharh Tangih al-Fusitl, p. 127. 
4. midi, op. cit., p. 14. 
5. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Näzir, p. 100. 
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those points, lt'-. clear evidence which can be taken as 
indicating that-he interpreted amr in general as 
meaning obligation (al-wujüb). 
l 
In putting forward details about this view Ibn 
Qudäma cited Q/77/48, Q/33/37: 
"And when it is said to them 'prostrate 
yourselves, ' they do not so. " 
"It is not fitting for a believer, man 
or woman, when a matter has been decided 
by God and His apostle to have any option 
about their decision. " 
Ibn Qud. ma suggested that God could not rebuke people 
unless amr required obligation. According to him, man 
only deserves rebuke by abandoning obligation. Therefore 
the direct order must be interpreted as obligation. This 
view can be seen clearly reflected by his definition of 
amr al-wujüb. 
2 
In another attempt to prove this view 
as the most authentic, he quoted a Tradition which he 
himself admitted was not very helpful to his own view 
but nevertheless he tried to interpret it to conform 
to his view. 
The Tradition that the Prophet ordered his Companions 
to convert their hajj into 'umra and they refused and the 
Prophet became annoyed. He then went to his wife 'A'isha 
who said that God will annoy whoever annoys you. He 
1. Shäfi'i, al-Risäla, pp. 112-121. 
2. Ibn Qudäina, Rawdat al-Nazir, pp. 100-101. 
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said "Why should I not be annoyed as I am giving the 
order and I am not being followed. "1 Ibn Qudäma is 
quite aware that this Tradition is not suitable as the 
Tradition clearly shows that the order is obligatory 
because of other considerations, i. e. it is obligatory 
in terms of its context. Nevertheless he tries to 
generalise the usage of the word so that he can rely on 
the meaning rather than the form. Therefore he said 
that if someone argues that this Tradition is useful 
only with regard to an amr which is obligatory by virtue 
of its context, we reply that we used it because the 
Prophet explained the reason for his anger as the 
refusal by the Companions to comply with his order. 
2 
Ibn Qudäma suggested that that indicates that if his 
order is not obligatory-, he could not have been annoyed 
because they refused. 
3 
In another effort to gain support for this opinion 
Ibn Qudäma cited more Traditions. One of these Traditions 
is the Tradition of Barara bint Wäshik, who was freed 
while still married to a slave husband whom she hated. 
The Prophet told her that she could go back to him, her 
husband, but she asked the Prophet whether he was 
ordering her. The Prophet replied, "I am only a mediator. " 
Then she declared that she was no longer in need of her 
1. Ibid., p. 101. 




1 Ibn Qud na interpreted this Tradition as 
further evidence for obligation. To him and other 
scholars who have used this Tradition, Barara cannot 
afford to ignore the order of the Prophet because she 
differentiated between order and what is not order, 
and she was also aware that an order must be regarded 
as obligatory. 
2 That is what she was trying to confirm. 
Ibn Qudäma later quoted the consensus of the Companions 
as another example. He maintains that the Companions 
agreed that it is obligatory to follow God and His 
Commandments without questioning the Prophet about how 
and what he meant by his orders. As they agreed to 
take tax from al-Mäjus in accordance with the order of 
the Prophet: "Treat them as you treat the people of 
the Book" (ahl al-Kitäb). 
3 
Thus Ibn Qudäma's account about the obligatory 
nature of every amr without it being in any context 
(al-amr al-mutlaq) is the same as the view put forward 
by a Zähirite scholar Muhammad 4A13 ibn Hazm (d. 456 A. H. ) 
in his work al-Ihkam f3 Usül al-Ahkam. However Ibn Hazm's 
view is a matter of principle rather than interpretation. 
1. Ibid. 
2. - Ibid.; also see al-Murtadä, al-Dhariyya, vol. 
1 
p. 38. 
3a. Ibn Qudäma, op. cit., p. 101. 
b. Ahl al-Kitäb: That is the name given by the 
Qur'än to both Jews and Christians. 
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The Zähirites are well known for their own doctrine of 
interpreting every verse of the Qur'än and the sunna 
according to outward meaning (zähir) of it. 
The major resistance to the interpretation of al-amr 
al-mutlaq being wujUb came from ahl al-waqf or the group 
known as al-wä. gifiyya, those who maintained that it is 
not known whether al-amr al-mutlaq is originally for 
obligation (al-wujnb) or recommended action (al-nudba) 
because it is frequently used for both of them as well 
as for other things. Therefore, according-to them one 
should withhold judgement (tawagqaf) until one gets clear 
evidence. This view has been put forward by the early 
Ash'arite scholar Abü al-Hasan al-Ash'ari "All, b.. Ismäil 
(d. 323 A. H. ). 
l 
And it is-also the view of Qädi Abü 
Bakr al-Baqilani, al-Ghazäll2 . and al-t midi. 
3 
' -The Shi" ite 
school of law as represented by al-Murtadä put forward 
another opinion, which is similar to this opinion of 
al-wägifiyya but with some modifications. They'ýsay that 
al-amr al-mutlaq is common (mushtarak) between al-wujüb, 
al-nudba and threat (tahdid). They also maintained 
that it was originally for one of those things but it 
is not known which one is intended. 
4 
However, the Shiites 
according to al-Murtadä limit their tawagguf to e4I 
1. Imam al-Haramayn, al-Burhän, vol. 1, *p. 102. 
2. Al-Ghazäli, al-Mustasfä, vol. 1, p. 425. 
3. Amid3, al-Ihkam f3 Usul al-Ahkam, vol.. 2, p. 14. 
4. Al-Murtäd , al-Dhari C, vol. 1, pp. 53-54. 
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interpretation \u maintain the principle that orders 
of God (awäznir Allah) and His Prophet must be interpreted 
as obligatory (Va jib) as do the Shafi'ite School of Law. 
But this opinion did not represent all Shiite schools; 
it is only the view of the Imämiyya ithnä 'ashariyya 
and a few others. 
1 
Another opinion which is also attributed to Shäfi'i 
says that al-amr al-mutlaq should be interpreted as 
al-nudba because that is the minimum requirement of 
al-amr and by interpreting it as al-nudba one has acted 
in a moderate way, because it cannot be stated certainly 
that it is actually obligation or prohibition or any 
other thing, otherwise one could be accused of neglecting 
an important affair. This view is held by. Abü Hi shim 
'Abd al-Saläm b. Muhammad b. 'Abd al- WahhAb-al-Jubbä'3 (d. 321 
A. H. ), 
2 
the majority of Mu'tazila and some of the : 
mutakallimin. 
3 
Finally the opinion that al-amr al-mutlaq should be 
interpreted as al-iräda was also attributed to Abü Häshim4 
or al-talab5 (request) according to Imäm al-Haramayn. 
Abi Häshim maintains that if someone says if"al they 
are only indicating their wish for it (iräda). This 
1. Al-Murtadä, al-Dhari5g-., vol. 1, p. 55. 
2. Amid!, al-Ihkam fi Usül al-Ahkam, vol. 2, p. 14. 
3. Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
P. 57. 
4. Ibid., PP. 56-7. 
5. Imäm al-Haramayn, al-Burhän, vol. 1, p. 222. 
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view is clearly reflected by the Mu"tazilite doctrine, 
which makes iräda as one of the conditions in which -, 
al-amr could be accepted as al-amr. -1 
Ibn Hazm maintains that al-amr al-mutlaq should be 
interpreted as obligation (al-wäjib) unless there is. 
specification. He made no secret of his opposition to 
any interpretation other than obligation (al-wujnb) for 
al-amr al-mutlaq. He reported that a group of Hanafites 
and Mälikites along with some Shäfi'ites maintained that 
every order (amr) in the Qur'an and the Tradition should 
be regarded with tawagquf with regard'. to its obligatory 
nature, until one received evidence for that: 
l Other 
groups of the same Schools and the rest of the Zähirites 
say that every amr should be interpreted as obligation 
(al-wujüb) until there is evidence indicating that it 
is al-mandüb. Ibn Hazm maintains that this latter view 
is the only view which does not require an alternative. 
2 
He rejected the view that al-amr al-mutlaq should be 
regarded as either obligation (al-wujüb) or al-nudba 
when the context is not known. He gave an example to 
support his view that everything has its name which 
distinguishes it from another meaning and makes it 
understandable and also makes listeners realise what 
the speaker meant. He suggested that if that did not 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam fi Usül al-Ahkam, vol. 3, p. 259. 
2. Ibid., p. 259. 
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happen, understanding would not have been possible, and 
God's speech to us would be an invalid thing. He cited 
Qur'än 4/4: "He sent not an Apostle except (to teach) 
in the language of his people, in order to make clear 
to them. " He concluded that if every meaning did not 
have a specific name then there would not have been 
anything called explanation (al-bayan). 
1 Ibn Hazm 
differentiates between obligatory in terms of belief 
and obligatory in terms of practice. He maintained 
that one must regard every order of the Prophet as 
obligatory even-though one was not capable of doing 
it. He cited Q/2/220: "If God had wished He could 
have put you into difficulties. He is indeed powerful, 
wise. " He says that God has removed difficulty from 
us and been merciful to us but has told us through the 
tongue of His Prophet, -that what the Prophet orders is 
an obligation which one must fulfil to the best of one's 
ability. 
2 
As to whether al-amr al-mutlag could mean obligation 
(al-wäjib) together with al-nudba, Ibn Hazm rejects this 
view. He suggested that it is impossible and not sensible 
for a single word to mean two different things at the 
same time. 
3 
It appears that Ibn Hazm regarded there 
being little or no difference between those who interpreted 
1. Ibid., p. 260. 
2. Ibid., pp. 272-3. 
3. Ibid., p. 263. 
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al-amr al-mutlaq as al-mandüb and between the Ash'arites 
who said that the meaning of al-amr al-mutlaq is unknown, 
because he sees both views as too far from what he regards 
as the correct opinion. He concentrates most of his 
argument on ahl al-waqf. He accuses them of ignorance 
and lack of proper investigation. He suggested that if 
those who said that one should defer judgement were 
asked about what they would do if-they were confronted 
with orders of God (awämir Allah) without context, and 
there was no evidence indicating that it was an obligation 
(al-wujüb), they would have three options: 
1. They could wait for ever. Then they would have 
abandoned the Commandments of God and His Prophet 
and could be regarded as abandoning the religion. 
2. They could interpret it as al-nudba. Then they 
would have combined two things together: 
(a) They said something without evidence; 
(b) Permission for disobedience of God and His 
Prophet without evidence. 
3. They would interpret it as obligation (al-wujüb) 
which is our opinion, then they would have abandoned 
their doctrine. 
1 
In his reference to those who held the view that 
al-amr al-mutlaq should be interpreted as al-mandüb. 
1. Ibn Hazm, op. cit., p. 280. 
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Ibn Hazm maintains that al-mandüb is only a 'choice 
al-takhayyur), e. g. "if you wish, do it" and'"if you 
wish, you may not. " He suggested that does not exist 
in the case of al-amr al-mutlaq. " He added that there' 
are authentic evidences that there is no choice with 
regard to all orders which belong to God (awämir Allah) 
and His Prophet. He concluded that if it is clear that 
there is no choice, then the interpretation of it as 
obligatory became necessary because choice is applicable 
to al-mandflb only. 
l This view has earlier been supported 
by the Mu"tazilite Abü al-Husayn al-Basri who also 
maintained that the evidence that al-amr al-mutlaq is 
originally for obligation is that it requires the person 
ordered to perform the action without choice. 
2 He cited 
Q/20/93: "From following me didst thou then disobey my 
order? " He said that one can be regarded as an offender 
against the commander (al-ämir) only by doing what he 
forbids and when God imposes something on us or obliges 
us to do it and we refuse, we become offenders. But 'if 
he recommends it'to us and says, "The best for you is 
to do it, but you may not do it, " then we would'not be 
regarded as offenders. 
3 He cited another'verse Q/24/5L+: 
"Obey God and Obey the Apostle. " He said that all 
Muslims agree that these usages are not metaphor. He 
argues that if al-amr al-mutlaq did not indicate 
1. Ibn Hazm, op. cit., p. 275. 
2. Abü al-Husayn al-Bas ri, Kitäb al-Mu"tamad, vol. 1, 40 
p. 58. 
3. Ibid., p. 60. 
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obligation, but only al-mandnb (recommendation) or 
iräda (the wish for it to be done), then the use of 
it for obligation would be in terms of-wishing the 
action and hating (kariha) abandoning it. This would 
be to use it in a way which-had not been established 
because the meaning of to use the amr for obligation 
implies that the abandoning of it is hated. 
1 
Thus for 
Abü al-Husayn the use of iräda as a means of limiting 
the obligatory nature of al-amr al-mutlaq is not 
possible because iräda of something implies the opposite, 
i. e. karh of abandoning it. This second implies the 
obligatory nature of iräda so that the argument against 
him is according to him linguistically invalid. He 
gave an example that if a servant refused to do what 
his master ordered him, the people among ahl 
lugha 
A 
would identify the reason why he deserved blame for 
his refusal to do what his master had ordered him to 
do. This according to him indicates the reason why 
he deserved blame as being that he has abandoned what 
was obligatory (al-wajib) 
2 
In these discussions of the views of Ibn Qudäma, 
Ibn Hazm and Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, there has been 
some evidence for the Shafi"ite efforts to establish 
the unquestionable interpretation of al-amr al-mutlaq 
1. Ibid., p. 65. 
2. Ibid. 
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as equal to al-amr al-mugayyad (i. e. an amr which is 
restricted in meaning by the context, but it seems 
that they did not take into account the early principle 
of dividing amr into different categories. 
1 
This 
attitude has given opponents of their view the opportunity 
of rejecting it. It can be recalled that usülis have 
divided al-amr into al-wä. jib and al-mandüb and others 
have even included al-mubäha. Some of them defined 
al-amral-wäß ib as that which had a threat of punishment 
for those who abandoned the performance of it2 while 
others defined it as what requires the abandoner of 
it to be punished, or that which requires through the 
revealed law, the abandoner of it to be punished. 
3 The 
Mu'tazila are of the latter opinion and they always 
hold the view that God will not forgive those who 
abandoned an obligationk (al-wäjib). Therefore to 
abandon an obligation is more or less like a capital 
crime to them and they will not accept the requirement 
to perform it without certain evidence or specification 
that amr is obligatory (al-wäjib) and must not be 
abandoned. The Ash"arites are particularly insistent 
that the only way they can be sure that it is an 
obligation is that it will have an additional quality 
1. A1-wäjib, al-mandib and al-mtbahah. See Shaybat 
al-Hamd Imta", al-Uqül, pp. 8-12. 
2. Shinglti, Mudhäkarrat al-Usül al-Fiqh, p. 9. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Amin, Zuhr al-Islam, vol. 4, p. 81. 
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which will make-its obligatory nature clear. 
The Ash'arites produced no fresh evidence but. 
rather based their argument on logical 
They rejected all evidence put forward 
group on the grounds that it was based 
pretations without proof. They argue 
to prove that al-amr al-mutlaq must be 
interpretations. 
by the Shäfi"ite 
on mere inter- 
that if one is 
interpreted as 
obligatory one would either have to prove that by logic 
or by revelation. They maintained that there is no 
scope for logic in the affairs of language. On the 
other hand, revelation had to be either a well transmitted 
report (mutäwatir)l or an isolated one (ähäd). 
2 They 
rejected validit; 
ähäd reports had 
according to the 
al-amr al-mutla 
y of isolated reports (ähäd). Once 
been rejected they maintained that 
mutäwatir reports from ahl al-lugha, 
was obligatory. 
3 
Giving more details about this view, al-Ghazäll 
put forward four points which if fulfilled, could make 
it legitimate to interpret al-amr al-mutlaq as obligatory. 
1. Mutäwatir means a Tradition or a report transmitted 
by large numbers of people through many different 
sources right from the Prophet or the Companion 
concerned. See Abü Zahra,. UsUl al-Fiqh, p. 84. 
2. ! had means a Tradition or a report transmitted by 
one or two people and did not enjoy popularity as 
al-mutäwatir. See Abü Zahra, op. cit., pp. 84-5. 
3. Amidi, al-Ihkam, vol. 2, p. 14. 
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He suggested that it might be reported from the people 
of language when they were defining meaning that al-amr 
al-mutlaq was defined in terms of 
Or there might be a report on the 
Prophet that the people of langua; 
al-mutlaq as obligatory through a 
Or that there was no rejection of 
absolute obligation. 
authority of the 
;e had defined al-amr 
consensus (i m'a6) . 
such an interpretation 
when it was mentioned before people of authority who 
would have had to reject it if they knew it to be wrong, 
He said that since none of these is possible with regard` 
to the form of the imperative (ifa"l) or the clause "I 
order you to do, " or a statement made by a Companion that 
we were ordered to do so and so, then one would have to 
wait until there was further evidence before defining it 
as obligatory. 
2 
Al-Ghazäll also tries to dismiss the view that 
al-amr al-mutlaq could be mushtarak between al-wäjib 
and al-mandüb or be interpreted as only iräda. After 
mentioning the opinions of others he said that the only 
way to remove the obstacle is to take notice of two 
things. One of them is whether the form (ifa"l) is a 
requirement or demand or not. The second is that if it 
contains a requirement, the requirement also exists in 
the case of al-mandfb as well as al-wäjib. As far as 
al-Ghazäli was concerned, he believed that al-mandüb was 
1. Al-Ghazäll, al-Mustasfä, vol. 1, p. 424. 
2. Ibid. 
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part of al-amr. He maintained that there were two stages 
with regard to that: the first was an indication of 
requirement and of obedience and the second is 
preference of what is supposed to be, but the latter 
one has nothing to do with the present discussion. He 
maintained that those who claim that ifa'l is mushtarka 
between ibäha (permission) and tahd! d (threat of punish- 
ment if abandoned) are not correct because one can 
differentiate between the language terms of imperative 
and prohibition (e. g. ifa'l and la-tafa'l) and "do if you 
wish" and "do not do if you wish. " He argued that if 
these expressions were without any context and reported 
on the authority of a man who was dead or absent, and 
not a specific activity, e. g. standing, sitting, fasting 
or prayer, but just about general activity, then the 
difference of meaning will come to one's mind, that 
there is a difference in the meaning of this form; in 
the same way it is possible to understand the difference 
between "Zayd stood up", "Zayd will stand up" and 
"Zayd is standing up". For the first refers to, the 
past, the second to the future, while the third refers 
to the present. Yet the past tense could be used for 
present and future for the past, if there were contexts 
to indicate that. 
1 
It appears that al-Ghazäli is trying to prove an 
activity described in language as dependent on its 
1. Al-Ghazäl3, al-Mustasfä, vol. 1, pp. 19-21. 
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context for any real meaning to be derived from, that 
description. Thus al-amr al-mutlaq without this 
necessary support could not be regarded as obligatory. 
At the same time he fails to back his own position with 
any evidence other than a clever logical argument. 
However 'urf (custom) should be taken into account. 
A certain word could have different interpretations: 
It may have a certain meaning which'is held by jurists 
and another interpretation held by ahl al-lugha or 
ahl al-kalam. 
In another attempt to dismiss the claim that al-amr 
al-mutlag should be interpreted as either obligatory or 
al-nudba, al-Xmidi maintained that all evidences produced 
by the Shäfi"ites are merely assumptions and therefore 
could be accepted'only if the discussion was based on, 
assumptions. 
1 He rejected the' interpretation given by 
Abi al-Husayn al-Basra to Q/24/54: "Obey God and Obey do 0 
the Apostle. " He said that the verse did not indicate 
obligation but the obligatory nature was established by 
the context where it is immediately followed by the 
words: "If you turn away he is only responsible for 
the duty placed on him and you for that placed on you. "2 
In his response Q/24/63: "Let those beware who 
withstand the Apostle's order lest some trial befall 
them, " alL1nidi suggested that al-amr here is not 
1. -Al-Arnidi, al-Ihkam, vol. 2, p. 18. 
2. Qur' an -24/54. 
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applicable to every order because it is not''general. 
He said that if anyone says that is general because 
of its association with threat, that would only be 
true if the, criterion about threat for al-amr al-wäjib 
differed from that concerning al-nudba. He gave an` 
example that to disobey the Prophet's order is to 
disbelieve what that order requires and not to carry 
out the obligation or nudba within it. He maintained 
that although this was his doctrine there was nothing 
in it which indicated that every order should be 
interpreted as obligatory*1 % 
The Mu'tazilites, Abü Hashim and the rest of those 
who said that al-amr al-mutlaq should be interpreted 
as al-mandüb like the Ash'arites, have little evidence 
to back their argument. They only adhere to a Tradition 
narrated by Abü Hurayra that the Prophet gave a speech 
to people and said, "God has imposed pilgrimage (hajj) 
upon you. " Then one man asked him, "Is that every year? " 
The Prophet refused to reply to him until he had repeated 
the question three times; then the Prophet replied, "No, 
only once. If I had said, Yes, it would have become an 
obligation and you would not have been able to have 
fulfilled it. Leave me and do not ask about anything 
I have kept silent about. Those who were before you 
perished because they questionehoo much and they dis- 
agreed with their prophets. If I order you to do 
1. A1-Elmidi, ope cit., p. 18. 
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something, do whatever you can, and if I forbid you 
1 
from doing something, beware of it. " They have a 
similar Tradition to this from Ibn Abbäs through Abü 
Sinn and al-Zuhri. They maintained that al-amr al- 
mutlaq should be interpreted as al-mandfb because the 
Prophet has limited the requirement of amr to our ability. 
In a rather subtle way they regard al-nudba as the 
minimum requirement of obligation. They interpreted 
this Tradition as meaning that the Prophet has assigned 
al-amr al-mutlaq only to the extent of our capacity and 
has urged us to do whatever we can do. They maintained 
" 
that that means al-nudba and therefore there is a sense 
of limited obligation in their interpretation of al-nudba. 
The differences of view cover the whole spectrum 
of the different groups and make it difficult to trace 
any clear picture of the influences which brought so 
much difference even within the same group. However, 
although we find speculative thinkers on both sides of 
the argument, it would seem likely that the basic positions 
are influenced by attitudes to the legal requirements of 
the shari"a. Those who wanted to regard al-amr al-mutlaq 
as obligatory tended to find support from the jurists, 
no matter how speculative their own background was. In 
this case, we can note the literalism of the Zähirites. 
Yet they were also supported by some Mu"tazilite thinkers 
1. Abü al-Naja, Ilm "Usül al-Figh, p. 123. 
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like Abü al-Husayn al-Basri. On the other hand, there 
is considerable scope for regarding those who held the 
view of tawagquf or of al-amr al-mutlag being understood 
" 
as nudba as being the more speculative side of usUl al- 
fiqh. 
The whole literalist and speculative tendencies 
involved the argument are exemplified in the different 
ft 
legal implications deduced from a Tradition reported by 
Malik b. Anas. To make this clear this Tradition can 
be used as an example. The Tradition narrates that when 
'Abd al-Rahmän got married the Prophet ordered him to 
celebrate it even by killing a goat. 
1 Shäfi'3 and 
Zähirites regard this Tradition as indicating that the 
marriage feast (walima) is obligatory and binding for 
every Muslim getting married. 
2 
But Ahmad b. Hanbal, 
/some of the 
as well as Ash'arites, Mu'tazilites and mutakallimin 
see the Tradition as sunna, while other scholars simply 
regard it as mubäh or sunna. 
3 
The main reason for 
difference appears to have arisen from their interpret- 
ation of al-amr al-mutlag. According to Shäfi'i, a 
6 
direct order from the Prophet must be interpreted as 
obligation4 while others either interpret it as al-mandüb 
1. Sana'ani, Subul al-Saläm, vol. 3, p. 154. 
2. Ibn Qudamä, al-Mugbn3, vol. 7, pp. 1-2. 
3. Sana'ani, op. cit., p. 1514. 
. 
4. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 
p. 11. 
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or refuse to count it as anything without its context, 
To Ash'arites and mutakallimin, the fact that the 
Prophet ordered Abd al-Rahman to slaughter a goat 
may not suffice to regard obligation as the interpret- 
ation of al-amr al-mutlaq; according to them they still 
require additional evidence. 
l 
As long as the problem 
of interpretation remains, the differences will continue. 
1, Amidl, al-Ihkäm, vol. 2, p. 18. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF AMR 
In this chapter an attempt wi11'be made to assess 
briefly the role and importance of amr. It is not 
possible to make such an, assessment without involving 
ourselves in one way or another in the theological' 
aspect of it. Therefore this discussion is bound to 
reflect same elements of theology. ' First, it is 
necessary to examine the various kinds of mir involved 
in-the process of making an amr'who the real . mir is 
and when his amr becomes binding. Thus it will enable 
us to categorize the ämir; in terms of us31 al-fiqh, 
into'three categories: 
1. God (Alläh). 
2. His Apostle (al-Rasül). 
3. The people of authority (ulü al-amr). 
By dividing ämir in this way we'have to bear in 
mind that not every obligation (amr) is directly from 
God (though on occasion God's amr may be implied in the 
amr of others). Also'by dividing it in'that way we 
will be able to give each one of them their due rights. 
Although there may be disputes and disagreement 
among usülls over how to interpret amr, there seems to 
be no disagreement known among them that amr plays a 
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dominant role in the Islamic legal system. It is 
believed that every action taken in the course of 
religion or in the course of private life involves 
amr because these were-originally commanded by God or 
by His Apostle. Those actions are legal and rewardable 
if they were taken in a lawful way and they may he- 
illegal if they were taken unlawfully. Among the 
Qur'änic examples which are normally cited in support 
of that are: Q/16/9, "God commands justice, the doing 
of God, and liberality to kith and kin and He forbids 
all shameful deeds and injustice and rebellion. He 
instructs you that you may receive admonition" and . 
Q/2/168, "0 people eat of what is on earth lawful and 
good, do not follow the-footsteps of theievil one, for 
he is to you an avowed enemy" as well as Q/2/172, "0 
you who believe eat of good things we have provided for 
you and be grateful to God. " -Because of these verses 
amr is regarded as the foundation stone upon which the 
belief of-every Muslim rests. 
Many Muslim scholars even went further in their 
attempt to emphasise the. 'importance of. amr, by maintaining 
that amr represents the major reason why God created 
mankind and that the role of man is only to obey God's 
commandments. In support of this view they put forward 
a series of Qur'änic interpretations to justify this 
view such as Q/4/64, "We sent not an Apostle but to 
be obeyed. " 
1 
1. A1-Tabar3, Tafsir, vol. 27, pp. 12-13. 
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QJ 9/31, "Yet they were commanded to worship but one God, 
there is no god but He" as well as Qf51/56, "I have only 
created jinns and man that they may serve me. " In this 
sense amr becomes "ibäda (worship) and obedience to it 
becomes obligation upon every Muslim. In their, inter- 
pretation of the latter verse, al-Tabarl maintained that 
"Serve me" in the verse means to bow to my command. He 
also attributed it to both "Ali b. Ab! Tälib and 'Abd 
Allah b. Abbäs. 
l 
This interpretation later appeared in 
al-Qurtubi's Tafsir together with 'Abd Allah b. Mas"ud's 
reading which confined the meaning of the verse to 
believers only. It reads, "I have only created jinns 
and men among the believers that they serve me. " 
2 
Mujähid and al-Baydawi also give different interpretations 
"that I may command them. "3 Nevertheless all the 
interpretations indicate the importance of amr in the 
Islamic legal perspective, since one can believe in God 
and believe in His Prophet but refuse to observe His 
commandments which is the amr. For this reason amr 
itself becomes part of the obligation so that one's 
Islam cannot be completed without believing in it and 
observing it properly. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Al-Qurtubi, Jämi' -=:. --Ahkam al-Qur'an, vol. 
17, 
pp. 55-56. Ibid., p. 55. 
3. Al-Baydäwi, Anwar al-Tanz31 wä Asrär al-Täwil, vol. 
5, p. 98. - 
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Thus amr which is originally for God and-extends 
to the Prophet as the Apostle of God and then to the 
sultan or governor and whoever takes over the affairs 
of the Muslims because they are the people who are 
responsible for observing and executing the command 
of God. @/4/59 combines the three groups, "0 you 
who believe, obey God and obey the Apostle and those 
in authority among you. " 
The second point in this discussion is the various 
kinds of emir involved in the amr and according to- 
Q/4/59 these have been divided into three categories, 
as we have already mentioned. 
First of all our discussion here will be on the 
command of God (amr Allah) and the command of the . 
Apostle (amr al-rasül) because both of them are 
inseparable to the extent that Muslim scholars always 
maintain that command of the Apostle is the command 
of God. "Whoever obeys the Apostle has obeyed God" 
Q/4/82. 
According to the Qur'än. God commanded Muslims on 
many occasions in the Qur'än to obey His command (amr) 
and . t_- ,;, any belief in Him which is not associated with 
obedience to His commandments is. invalid. Also it 
appears that in almost every occasion He commands He 
also associates it with the obedience-to the command 
of the Apostle and that gives the command of. the Apostle 
the same status in the sense that disobedience---to the 
command of either of them will automatically render - 
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belief in the other one invalid. On some occasions He 
gave the impression that amr of the Prophet is the amr 
of God, Q/8/20 "0 you who believe! Obey God and His 
Apostle and turn not away from him-when you hear--(him 
speak)" and Q/4/82, "Whoever obeys the Apostle has 
obeyed God. " These verses and many others in the Qur'än 
are typical examples normally cited in favour of that 
and they are of underlying importance for amr and they 
also make it clear that there is no difference between 
the command of God and the command of the Apostle. 
However, what remains unclear is whether or not any 
discretion made by the Apostle which is based on his 
personal view, not on his understanding of the Qur'an, 
could also be regarded as a command of God. There is 
not much discussion of this issue by usUlls. Perhaps 
they think that it is not worth it arguing about it 
or may be for some other reasons which we are unaware of. 
However among the few scholars who called attention to 
such things were al-Shäfi'i and the later Hanbali 
scholar, Ibn Taymiyya. 
In a clear reference to that al-Shäfi63 gave the 
impression that if the Prophet gives a command or a 
decision which is not based on the text of the Qur'än 
or inspiration it will only be regarded as a sunna of 
the Apostle and implicitly one can abandon such a 
decision without any offence having been committed. 
Al-Shäfi'i's view on this issue came on his comment on 
the case of al-Zubayr b. A"wwn (d. 36 A. H. ) a relation 
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of the Prophet and another man. 
1 The latter rejected 
a decision made by the Prophet when he first thought 
that the Prophet had decided in favour of Zubayr. He 
protested to the Prophet only to anger the Prophet so 
that he changed his decision to one in favour of Zubayr 
and in accordance with the Qur'änic decision. Then 
Q/4/68 was revealed, "But not by thy Lord they will not 
become believers until they make thee judge in their 
disputes and do not afterwards find difficulty in thy 
decisions but surrender in full submission. " -According 
1. There is consensus that the man who was involved 
in the dispute with Zubayr was an Ansär3 farmer 
who has been present at the Battle of Badr, but 
his name remains a matter of dispute. The most 
popular opinion named him as Hätib b. Abi Balta'a. 
He also has been named as Th'alaba b. Hätib. The 
Prophet told Zubayr who had property on the upper 
slopes of land needing irrigation to water his own 
land and then release the water to the land of his 
neighbour. The Ansäri man told the Prophet, "I 
see you are favouring your nephew. " Then the face 
of the Prophet changed in anger and he told Zubayr, 
"Hold back the water until it will reach the edge 
of the reservoir (al-jadr). " See al-Qurtubi, 
Tafslr, vol. 5, pp. 266-267. 
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to al-Shäfi"i this is a sunna laid down by the Prophet 
not commanded in the text of the Qur'än. He said that 
"If this decision were a Qur'änic decision, it should 
have been prescribed in the text of the Book of God. " 
He went on, "If men fail to accept a decision based on 
"e. 
a clear text of the Book of God theynundoubtedly-cease 
to be believers for they are rejecting a decision'based 
on divine legislation. "1 This appears to be indicating 
that if the Prophet's decision is not based on the text 
of the Book it is no different from other decision 
by any other human being. 
As for Ibn Taymiyya he also emphasised the obligation 
of a Muslim to obey the command of God and the command of 
the Apostle. - He said that it is the principle of Isläm 
to obey them. He cited the Islamic pledge, "Witness that 
there is no other god other than Allah and witness'that' 
Muhammad is the messenger of Allah. " He maintained that 
this is a matter of agreement among those who have 
knowledge and belief, even though some of them may 
differ in action and condition. There is no learned 
Muslim who has any doubt about the obligation of man to 
obey God and His Apostle and that obedience to anybody 
other than them will become obligation only when He (God) 
makes it an obligation. 
2 
Ibn Taymiyya goes further -, sºr 
1. A1-Shäfi"3, al-Risäla, p. 115. 
I 
2. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu4, (Kitäb _'_-UpUl al-Fiqh) 
vol. 19, pp. 68-69. 
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the real obligation and obedience is only-to God, but 
there is no way to know what His commands are other 
than through the prophets. Thus any one of these 
who informs us only inform-us about His commands and 
His directives and it is obligation to obey him and 
believe him'in whatever he may command or inform. 
' 
It seems that both al-Shäfi"3 and Ibn Taymiyya are 
saying that the command of the Prophet only becomes an 
obligation by virtue-of its divine connection, since 
most of his commands are based either on the existing 
order in the Qur'än or another instruction he may have = 
received from God. However, if there is clear evidence 
that the command of the Prophet is based only on-his 
personal view which is not in accord with the text of 
the Qur'an or common regulation, it will be regarded 
as a sunna and one can defy that kind of order in favour 
of a Qur'änic text or a common practice which is based 
on the Qur' ä, nic text. 
Although there seems to be little study of this 
issue among ancient scholars, there seems to be enough 
evidence to justify the view that if the command of 
the Prophet is based on his own personal view or 
contradicts the Qur'an, then it could be defied in 
1. Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
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favour of the Qur'än and a common practice. 
1 
1. The question of whether or not the amr of the 
Prophet which is based on his personal judgement 
or discretion is different from the amr of God as 
dictated to the Prophet also involves a discussion 
of the nature of the Prophet's i tihäd (i. e. whether 
or not he is entitled to use reason to produce a 
legal decision). Muslim scholars divided among 
themselves on this issue. Muhammad Siddique who 
made full study about the Prophet's i tihäd summarised 
their views into three as follows: 
The first group comprises those who reject 
the very concept of the Prophet's i tihad in the 
above mentioned matter. According to them, being 
the bearer of divine revelation, the Prophet is in 
every matter guided by and subjected to revelation. 
There is no need for him to exercise his own i tihäd. 
This point of view is generally attributed to 
Ash'arites. However, among the Mu'tazilites Abü 
'Ali al-Jubbä'i (d. 303 A. H. ) and Abt Häshim al- 
Jubbä'3 (d. 321 A. H. ) can also be included in this 
group. Shawkäni has also added the name of Abi 
Mansur al-Mäturid3 in the above mentioned group. 
The second group comprises those jurists who 
accept in theory the logical possibility of the 
Prophet's entitlement to ijtihäd. However they 
adopt the stance that there is no absolute evidence 




Therefore on account of this some members of this 
group deny completely the practice of the Prophet's 
i tihäd while others adopt an uncommitted posture. 
Al-Ghazäli and al-Bägiläni have taken this latter 
position. 
The third group comprises the numerous jurists 
who not only accept the idea and possibility of the 
Prophet's ijtihäd in theory but consider that there 
is evidence to prove that such an ijtihäd had taken 
place. This point of view was originally attributed 
to Ahmad b. Hanbal. However, some later writers 
attributed it to Abü Yusuf as well. Later Hanbalites 
and most Hanafite jurists have also taken this 
position. Qäd3 'Abd al-Jabbär, Abi al-Husayn al- 
Basra and some Shäfi'ite jurists have also adopted 
this view and if the statement of al-Quräf3 is to 
be accepted then al-Shäfi'3 himself was in agreement 
with this view. However, the statements of al-midi 
indicate that whilst al-Shäfi'1 accepted the idea in 
theory, he had not reported any evidence in this 
regard. 
Each group put forward evidence in support of 
their view. For more details see Siddique, 
A Study of Evolution of I tj ihäd, pp. 69-78 
(Edinburgh University thesis). 
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In support of that we have three events here in. 
which the Companions either defied a clear order of 
the Prophet or disagreed with his personal view in 
favour of another one which accords with the Qur'an 
and common practice. The Prophet himself did not oppose 
them or rebuke them for doing so. 
The first of these examples, as reported by al- 
WAgidi1 (d. 207 A. H. ) is that the Prophet sought the 
opinion of his Companions on certain position 'j' which 
they should take up and get ready for their enemies on 
the. day of Badr.. Then a Companion, Hubäb b. al-Mundhir, 
asked the Prophet whether the position was where God 
had asked him to, take up so that they could not go 
beyond it or stop before it or whether it was only an 
opinion and war strategy. The Prophet replied that it 
was only an opinion (personal discretion) and war, 
strategy. Then Hubäb told the Prophet that the place 
was-not a suitable place and advised the Prophet and 
the rest of the Companions to move to another place 
which was more secure than the one proposed by the 
Prophet. 
2 This was one occasion where the personal 
1. Al-Wägid3's full name is Muhammad b. 'Umar al-Wägid!. 
He is one of the early historians whose wide knowledge 
has earned him a good reputation among scholars of 
every time. He died in 207 A. H. according to Ibn-ol- 
-Nadlm. See Ibn ýNadim, 
Fihrist, p. 98. 
2. Al-W gidä., Kitäb al-Maghäzi, vol. 1, p. 53. 
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view of the Prophet was rejected in favour of a common 
practice and Hubäb's question about whether or not the 
Prophet's idea was based on an inspiration has further 
demonstrated that only what is based on an inspiration 
cannot be rejected. 
Another one took place after the Battle of Badr 
when the Prophet asked AbU Bakr and 'Umar about what 
to do with the prisoners. Abü Bakr advised him (the 
Prophet) that they were his relatives and suggested 
that fidya (ransom) should be taken from them so that 
the Muslims could have'influence and authority over 
them. This view'accorded with the view of the Prophet 
and he accepted it. "Umar'for his part suggested I that 
they should be killed because they were unbelievers. 
Later it was revealed in Q/8/67, "It is not fitting 
for an Apostle that he should have`prisonersaof war 
until 'he hath subdued the land. Ye look'for the 
temporal goods of this world, but God-looketh to the 
Hereafter and God is exalted in might, wise, " which 
supported 'Umar's view and blamed the Prophet for 
accepting al-fidya (ransom). 
1 
This is further'clear 
evidence which distinguishes between the personal 
authority of the Prophet and that of God. 
The third-one is even more obvious and precise. 
The event was-reported also by al-Wägidi and al-Bukhärl 
in the book of prayer in a state of fear. It happened 
1. Al-Qurtubi, Jämi' al-Ahkäm, vol. 8, pp. 45-47. 
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after the Campaign of Ahzäb (parties). In the Tradition 
Ibn 'Umar reported that when people returned from the 
Campaign of Ahzäb, the Prophet forbade them-praying 
salät al-'asr until they reached the quarters of the 
Ban3 Quraiza. However the time for prayer came while 
they were still on their way. Some of them prayed while 
others refused to pray until they reached the quarters 
of the BanU Quraiza because of the command of the 
Prophet. When they mentioned it to the Prophet he did 
not blame either side. The wording of al-Bukhar3's 
version specifically says: "No one is to offer the 
'asr prayer but at (the quarters of) the Banü Quraiza. "1 
This particular. Tradition has been cited in many 
places as an example that amr could be delayed till 
after the first time appropriate for it. The, last 
sentence in which the transmitter said that this act 
was mentioned to the Prophet and he did not blame, 
either side also served as an indication that the 
Prophet himself took notice that his command was 
abandoned in favour of the rule which is based on the 
command of God that every prayer should be carried 
out at its due time. Yet the Prophet quickly rebuked 
another man, Abü Sa93d b. Mall! (d. 73 A. H. ), when he 
refused to answer the Prophet's call with the excuse 
1. A1-Bukhara, Sah-1h al-Bukhäri, vol. 2, pp. 34-35. 
(Istanbul Edition of 1977). Also al-Wägidi, 
Kitäb a1-Magäzi, vol. 2, p. 497. 
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that he was praying, on the grounds that his decision 
not to answer contradicted the rule of the Qur'an and 
the command of God. 
l Q/8/24, "0 you who believe! 
Answer God and His Apostle when he calls you to that 
which will give you life and know that God comes in 
between a man and his heart and that it is He to whom 
you shall (all) be gathered. " 
These evidences, if they are genuine, indicate that 
the amr of the Prophet is different from that of God 
and becomes binding only when it is connected with the 
authority of God. This does not in any way contradict 
countless verses in the Qur'an where God has commanded 
Muslims to follow his command because those verses 
seem to be concerning general authority. In order to 
make that clear we can divide amr or the authority of 
the Prophet and the way of obeying it into two categories: 
One is obedience in general issues such as obeying his 
command when he commands anything in which there is no 
room for any discretion, like his command that morning 
prayer should be two rak'as and that Ramadä. n fast must 
be one lunar month-as well as his command that Muslims 
should go out to fight certain wars at certain'times. 
All those are basic issues about which Q/24/63'comments: 
"Let those beware who withstand the Apostle's order' 
lest some trial befall them or a grievous penalty be 
1. A1-Qurtubi, Jami" al-Ahkäm, vol. 7, p. 388. 
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inflicted on them. " Many other verses of that kind 
in the Qur'an warned against defying such an order. 
The second category is like this: Under normal 
circumstances the Prophet does not command or impose 
anything without -" instructions based either on 
Qur'anic injunction or inspiration received in some 
other way. That has been emphasised by Q/53/3-5, 
"Nor does he say (aught) of (his own) desire. It is 
no less than inspiration sent down to him. " In that 
sense anything he commands is a command of God which 
every Muslim is bound to observe as far as possible. 
But it has happened on many occasions that the Prophet 
has to depend on his own personal discretion either 
because the revelation came later or for another 
reason as happened in the case of the prisoners'-in 
the Battle of Badr which we mentioned earlier. These 
are the occasions where other able people are allowed 
to compete with the Prophet. Those who are capable 
of reaching a satisfactory conclusion are not absolutely 
bound by the Prophet's authority provided that their aim 
is only to follow what they think is more appropriate 
and they have presented their case respectfully. 
As for the majority of scholars who believe that 
the command to obey the Prophet should remain in its 
general application, they seem to believe that the 
command in the Qur'ä. n was a general one not specific. 
Some of them are of the opinion that they are not aware 
of any evidence to limit it and therefore everything 
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the Prophet says must be unquestioned. This fact 
becomes evident in al-Tabar' s comment on Q/4/59 when 
he said that the verse indicated that God has generalised 
the command to obey the Prophet and has not differentiated 
between any time. Therefore it must remain like that. 
l 
A similar view to this has been expressed by many other 
scholars. 
The third command under question here is the command 
of the people in authority (ulü al-amr). As we might 
expect, the term ulü al-amr attracted different 
definitions among the usülls and the jurists alike 
and that automatically created different implications. 
According to al-Shäfi'i "those in authority" means the 
commander of the Apostle's army. He says: "That is 
what more than one commentator has told us. But God 
knows best. "2 Al-Shäfi'3's'definition seems to be 
popular among early scholars like Maymfn b. Mihrän 
(d. 116 or 117 A. H. )3 and Mugätil b. Sulyman al-'Azd3 
(d. 150 A. H. ) 
4 
Another definition according to 
al-Qurtub! originated from Jäbir b. Abd Allah the 
famous Companion (d. 73 A. H. ) who defined u13 al-amr 
1. A1-Tabari, Tafsir, vol. 5, p. 150. 
2. Shäfi61, al-Risäla, p. 112. 
3. Al-Qurtubi, Jämi' al-Ahkäm, vol. 5, p. 259- 
4. Ibid., p. 259. 
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as ahl Qur'an wa-al-'ilml (those who have-knowledge of 
Qur'an and other religious knowledge such as al-figh and 
so on). This definition was also supported by the 
1. 'Ilm is one of the broadest words in the Arabic 
language, it has been used to mean different 
subjects. Literally it means knowledge and 
awareness, but it could be used to mean different 
definite things such as 'iim al-figh in the field 
of Islamic law and 'ilm al-kal. m, 'ilm al-Tafs! r, 
'ilm al-Qur'än and so on. Therefore it depends 
on what field it was used. For example, if the 
term is used in the Islamic they only mean 'ilm 
al-figh unless it was clarified like saying 'ilm 
al-had-Ith or 'ilm al-h-säb then it will mean that 
they had particular 'ilm in mind and it could 
mean general knowledge in a particular area such 
as 'älim for somebody who has general knowledge 
of religion. According to the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, 'ilm was later categorized into three: 
'ilm nazar, such as knowledge of things when you 
know them you have done everything opposite to it 
is 'ilm 'aural knowledge of religious duties 
al-ibädät your knowledge is not yet completed 
until you have acted upon it. See E. I. (New 
Edition) vol. III, pp. 1132-1133. 
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leading Successor Mujähid b. Jabr or Jubayr and Malik 
b. Anas (d. 179 A. H. ). 1 The third definition came from 
Ibn Kaysän (d. 299 A. H. )2 who also defined ulü al-amr 
as people of intellect and reason, those who should 
govern the affairs of people. 
3 
Although there wasn't 
any evidence to identify Ibn Kaysän as a member of 
ahl al-kaläm his definition seems to have reflected 
by ahl al-kaläm's idea which normally put. emphasis on 
the reason. However, al-Bay Awl (d. 685 A. H. ) later 
put forward another one which reflects the first two 
definitions put forward by al-Shäfi'i and al-Qurtub3 .. 
in support of early scholars like Jäbir b. 'Abd Allah, 
Maymün and Mugätil. According to al-Baydäwi,. ulü al-amr 
means governors during the lifetime of the Prophet and 
after him and that includes khuläfä', judges and 
leaders of the Apostle's army. 
4 
These are the most 
popular definitions given to ulU al-amr which in one 
way or the other refer to the same meaning and the 
same objectives of the Qur'än. They still enjoy support 
1. A1-Qurtubi, Jämi'. al-Ahkam, vol. 5, p. 259. 
2. Ibn Kaysän, AbU al-Hasan Muhammad b. Ahmad b. 
Kaysä. n al-Nahawi (d. 299 A. H. ). See Yakut, vol. -6, 
pp. 280-282. 
3. A1-Qurtub3, Jämi" al-Ahkäm, vol. 5, p. 259. 
4.1 A1-Tabari, Tafs! r, vol. 5, p. 149. 
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of later scholars. 
' 
However, there are many other definitions which 
one can only consider as personal ones because they do` 
not enjoy the popularity which the first group does 
and they do not seem'to represent the objective of-the 
Qur'an. One of these definitions came from' 
'Ikrima (d. 105 A. H. ) who defined ulü al-amr as referring 
to Abü Bakr and 'Umar while Shi'ites interpret it as 
meaning 'A13 and the protected Imäms. 
2 
These definitions are necessary because it will 
show the extent of authority and the obedience each one 
of them should receive. As for those who defined ulü 
al-amr as referring to Abi Bakr and 'Umar or 'Ali. and 
ßi1 ýS 
the protected Imäms as the Shi'ites have put it, n 
will 
mean that after the death of every one of them obedience 
to ulü al-amr will no longer be in operation whereas if 
it means the leader of the Apostle's army, Governors and 
the people of intellect as it had elsewhere been defined, 
obedience to their command will continue after their 
1. Ibn Taymiyya also defined ulU al-amr as the master 
of authority who ordered the people and forbid 
them. They include those with power and authority 
(al-qudra wa al-sultan). He also divides them into 
two categories: princes and scholars. See Sälih, 
The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyya, p. 120. 
2. A1-Qurtubi, Jami' al-Ahkam, vol. 5, p. 259. 
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own particular deaths as other people will-succeed them. 
Except that the Shi'ites hold the view that'the protected 
Imams will be operating in hiding and that their authority 
will remain. 
1 
However, the discussion on the command of ülü al-amr 
is. unlike that of the Prophet because of the limited 
number of references to them. Apart from the Qur'änic 
evidences such as Q/4/59, "Obey God and obey His Apostle 
1. The Imämiyya's view on üln al-amr which they 
defined as al-imam al-ma' spun is in some way 
different from the other schools. According to 
them there is no difference between the Prophet 
and the Immen except that the Imä. m did not transmit 
a divine Scripture. To ignore or disobey the 
divinely invested Imäm was infidelity equal to 
ignoring or disobeying the Prophet. On top of 
that the Imam is conditioned to be fully inunune 
(ma"sum) from sin and error. Although the Imäm 
was entitled to political leadership as much as 
to religious authority, his imamate did not depend 
on his actual rule or any attempt to gain it. They 
also hold the view that the last of the Imäms is 
in concealment and he continues to live and operate 
the functions of the imaship. See E. I. (New 
Edition), vol. III, pp. 1166-1167. 
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and those in authority among you"1 which came direct to 
indicate the importance of their power there are few 
other Traditions attributed to the Prophet which also' 
serve as evidence'for the obligation of the obedience 
to the command of those in authority. There seem'to' 
be insufficient details worked out about the-limit of 
the obedience which they should receive. That absence 
of clearly worked out details from the early-scholars 
has been a major factor in the continuation of the 
nature and the limit of obedience a leader should 
1. Another Qur'änic evidence which many scholars 
have used to support Q/4/59 as evidence of 
importance of obedience to the command of ülü 
al-amr was Q/4/83, "When there comes to them 
some matter touching (public safety or fear 
they spread it abroad - If they had only 
referred it to the Apostle, or to those charged 
with authority (ülü al-amr) among them, the 
proper investigations would have tested it from 
them direct. Were it not for the Grace and 
Mercy of God unto you all but a few of you 
would have fallen into the clutches of Satan. " 
But many of them hold the view that this verse 
refers only to ulamä' (learned people). In fact 
it is because of this verse that many of them 
interpreted ülü al-amr as meaning only 'älim 
rather than those who hold political power without 
'ilm. See al-Qurtubi, Jami' al-Ahkäm, vol. 5, p. 291. 
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receive from the-, people and when that should become 
necessary. For this reason Muslim scholars seem to 
have divided on-this issue, some of them see the power 
of "those in authority" (ülü al-amr) as a limited one 
which made them deserve a, very limited obedience while 
others hold the view that with the few Qur'ä, nic 
evidences in support of their rights and some Traditions 
from the Prophet they deserve full obedience. 
Their disagreement arose from their, different 
understanding of the Qur'änic evidence and the limited 
recognition given by some of-them to the additional 
evidence from the Prophet which most of those who 
favour absolute obedience do not accept. Those who 
were opposed to the absolute seem to be. regarding the 
content of the verse as not comprehensive enough to. 
mandate absolute obedience to flit al-amr as we have 
already mentioned. In addition to that most of them 
did not even refer to the Traditions put forward by 
their opponents. The Traditions <TTý, ', Iif they recognised 
them would have made it obligatory for them to accept 
that the command to obey ülü al-amr is a comprehensive 
and absolute one. Al-Shäfi'i who is. one of those who 
maintained that obedience to 1 al-amr was a limited 
one did not mention any of the Traditions. Although 
he maintained that obedience to the command of those 
in authority (ülü al-amr) is not absolute, he did not 
give full details about the level of the obedience they 
deserve. But he seems to regard the clause in the verse 
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"If you should quarrel about anything refer it to God 
and the Apostle"1 without giving the final say to ülü 
al-amr as well as an indication of those in authority 
being equal to the people ordered to obey them and a 
limitation of the power of the ülü al-amr. Because in 
the event of a dispute they have no final say, instead 
both of them are told to refer it to God and the Apostle 
only. Al-Shäfi"i says, "So they were commanded to obey 
'those in authority' - the ones whom the Apostle 
appointed, with conditional but not absolute obedience, 
concerning their rights and duties. However God said: 
'If you should quarrel about anything, refer it to God'' 
and His Apostle, that is in the event of disagreement. 
He went on that this (i. e. the meaning implied in the 
latter command) is if God wills, as He said about 'those 
in authority' namely, that 'if you should quarrel' (but 
God knows best) whether they (the people) and the 
commander whom they were ordered to obey should refer 
it to God and the Apostle for a settlement on the basis 
of what God and His Apostle said, if they know it. "2 
This explanation seems to indicate the wide gap 
the scholars placed between the command of the Prophet 
and that of ülü al-amr. Perhaps this involves the 
idea that ülü al-amr are just ordinary men who do not 
possess extra power other than the privilege of leader- 
1. Q/4/59. 
2. Shäfi'3, al-Risäla, p. 113. 
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ship to which obedience is due only for the sake of 
law and order. Asimilar modest interpretation was 
earlier reported from Abü Hanifa. He said, "If any 
instruction comes from God we accept it very gladly 
and with pleasure ('all al-rä's wa al-'ain) and any 
instruction from the Prophet we-listen (to, him) and 
obey him and any instruction from the Companions we 
will select from their opinions though we do not 
rebel against them. Any instruction from the Successor, 
they are men and we are men. "1 
Although Abü Hanifa did not indicate whether or 
not if the instructor was the leader (ämir) who-is in 
authority or a learned man as many others defined flu 
al-amr he seems to regard the instruction of anybody 
after the Prophet as just being from an ordinary man 
whom he considers himself to be equal to.. However, 
little is known about his attitude towards the Qur'änic 
evidence which is the main problem of interpretation. 
In another attempt to strengthen the view that 
obedience to the command of ülü al-amr is not absolute 
another early scholar, Sahl b. "Abd Allah al-Tustari 
(d. 283 A. H. ) suggested where obedience to the command 
of ülü al-amr or the authorities was necessary. He 
said that one should obey the sultan on seven occasions: 
1. Samaragand3, Tuhfat al-Fugä', vol. 1, p. 11. 
(Commentary by Muhammad al-Mintasir al-Kattan3 
the editor. ) 
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When he commands coining money (darb al-daräh-Im wa 
danänir), when fixing measurement and weights (makäyil 
wa al-mawäzin), law of Häjj (ahkäm al-hajj), Friday 
0 
prayer (al-juma'ah), two Muslim festivals (salät al- 
'idayn) and the Muslim holy war (al-jihäd). He went 
on that if a leader (sultan) forbids an "älim from 
giving a fatwä (legal opinion), the "älim has no right 
to give the fatwä and if he did give it he had dis- 
obeyed. But if the commander was only am-Ir (governor) 
he may give the fatwä against his wishes (am-1r). 
1 
A similar explanation to this came from Ibn al- 
Khuwayz Mindäd, 
2 
a Mäliki scholar. He maintained that 
obedience to the sultän is an obligation only in 
what is not disobedience to God and it is not an 
obligation in whatever there is-disobedience to God. 
He continues: "That is why we said that it is not 
appropriate nowadays to obey or assist them or glorify 
them and obligation is only to go to war with them and 
decisions are for them, appointments of ImAm (leader 
of the prayer), al-hisba (marketing supervisory committee) 
1. Al-Qurtub3, Jami' al-Ahkä. m, vol. 5, p. 259. 
2. Ibn al-Khuwayz Mindäd's full name and date of 
death 1Sy not yet been established, but it 
appears that he lived between the third and 
fourth century of Is15m. 
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as long as they do that in accordance with the Islamic 
law. - If they lead the prayer and they are sinful 
(fasiq) in terms of disobedience, prayer after them 
is acceptable. But if they are heretics (mubtadi'a)" 
the prayer is not appropriate with them unless one is 
afraid and performs the prayer out of fear and then 
later one should repeat the prayer. "1 
These are the examples and arguments put forward 
by those who opposed absolute obedience. In addition 
to the early explanation they seem to be indicating 
the occasion where the obedience to the command of ü13 
al-amr is paramount as the occasions which affect the 
whole-community or the security, of the community. This 
is shown in-the examples given by both Sahl b. "Abd 
Alläh and Ibn Khuwayz. 
As for those who believe that the power of ülü al_ 
amr is an absolute one. they put forward two conditions 
which could make ew"enjoy absolute obedience: One of 
them is that he should be a just ruler. Second he 
must not command something which involves disobedience 
of God. 
2 
Al-Tabari however adds another one, that he 
must be appointed by Muslims themselves and nobody else. 
3 
However, they maintained that ülü al-amr should be 
1. Ibid. 
2. A1-Qurtubi, Jämi' al-Ahkam, vol. 5, p. 259. Also 
see al-Tabar3, Tafs3r, vol. 5, p. 150. 
3. A1-Tabari, Tafs! r, vol. 5, p. 150. 
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given absolute obedience. Their main evidence is 
Q/4/59 which has been cited earlier. In addition to 
that they also put forward two Traditions in which the 
Prophet emphasised the importance of obedience to, the 
command of the leader5. (ülü al-amr) even though their 
actions may not be good. The first of these Traditions 
4 was reported by Abü Hurayra who maintained that 
the Prophet said: "Some people will govern you after 
me, the honest among them will govern you with honesty 
while the profligate among them will govern you-with 
profligacy. Listen to them and obey them in everything 
which accords with the truth and pray after. them. If 
they do well that is in your favour and if they do badly 
that is in your favour but against themselves. "1 
The second Tradition came through 'Abd Allah b. 
'Umar from the Prophet that the latter said: "It is 
the duty of every Muslim to obey his leader in what he 
likes and what he hates unless he was ordered to disobey 
(God or His Apostle). Whoever has been ordered to 
disobey (God) must not obey. "2 
According to their own view these Traditions=-clearly 
indicate that one must obey ones leader =-iall 
circumstances as long as he did not involve-one in 
anything against the principles of Isläm. They appear 




obedience to which is a matter of divine command and 
therefore they placed the command of MU al-amr at 
the same level as that of God and His Apostle. This 
feeling is clearly shown in al-Tabar3's comment on 
the Traditions. He'mentioned both Traditions in his 
Tafsir. He says, "If it is certain that it is not 
necessary to obey anybody other than God or His Apostle 
or a just leader (imam 4 ! dl) and God has commanded us 
by the content of Q/4/59 to obey those who govern our 
affairs, then it has become clear that those whom God 
has ordered us to obey among those who take care of our 
affairs are those who govern and those whcMuslims 
themselves have appointed, not anybody else. Even 
though it is an obligation to accept an order from 
anybody who commands that abandoning disobedience of 
God should be abandoned and who calls for obedience 
of God. Also no obedience is obligatory to anybody 
in whatever he orders or forbids as long as there is 
no evidence indicating that it is obligatory, except 
for those leaders to whom God has imposed obedience. 
Al-Tabari concluded that it is obligatory for whoever 
they ordered to obey them. He must obey them on 
anything in which there is no disobedience to God. 
1 
Furthermore they put forward another story in 
which they maintainedlwas the reason why Q/4/59 was 
revealed. This story was narrated by 'Abd Allah b. 
1. Ibid. 
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AbbAs who maintained that Q/4/59 was revealed in the 
case of 'Abd Allah b. Hudhayfa when the Prophet sent 
him as head of a military unit. 'Abd Allah ordered 
them to light a fire then he ordered them to enter 
into it. He asked them, "Didn't the Prophet tell you 
to obey me when he said 'Whoever obeys my. governor has 
obeyed me. '" They replied to him, "We believe in God 
and obey the Prophet only to escape from the fire. " 
When they returned to the Prophet he approved of their 
action and told them that there is no obedience for 
any creature in anything in which there is disobedience 
of God. He (the Prophet) also cited Q/4/29, "Do not 
kill (or destroy yourselves) for verily God hath been 
to you most merciful. "1 
It is surprising that the scholars of usül al-fiqh 
have not discussed this problem very thoroughly. It is 
true that in discussions on ijtihäd the status of the 
Prophet's ijtihad is dealt with. This discussion can 
be seen to be also relevant to the status of the Prophet's 
amr. However, the nature and status of ult al-amr is 
a problem which had been mainly dealt with in works of 
tafs1r and does not appear in works of usül al-fiqh. 
It would seem to be an important aspect of amr, and the 
scholars of us3l al-fiqh have failed to deal with it 
thor ghly. In mitigation, it might be argued that they 
1. A1-Qurtubi, J zni4 al-Ahk n, vol. 5, p. 160. 
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left this discussion to their studies of tafsir. Yet, 
it would seem that such a discussion is necessary for 
amr in usül al-fiqh. 
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CHAPTER III 
NATURE OF THE ACTION ENJOINED BY AMR 
This chapter concerns the operation of amr as far 
as jurists were concerned. It deals with the debate 
about the restricted and unrestricted nature of the 
action enjoined by an amr in the sense of whether the 
latter requires the action enjoined by the amr to be. 
repeated. Thus it will also be concerned with the 
problem of the time of an amr and the various differing 
views about that, including the implications of their 
differences. 
The Problem of Unrestricted Command (Amr al-Mutlaq) 
There has been a considerable discussion-over the , 
obligatory nature of al-amr al-mutlaq in the first 
chapter. Al-amr al-mutlaq is one of the aspects of amr 
which is subject to much argument and many different 
interpretations among scholars of al-usül. Here the 
principal concern is the scope of-this obligation, 'in 
terms of whether al-amr al-mutlaq needs to be carried 
out only once or whether it has a wider application. 
When-the imir commands someone to carry out a 
certain action without specifying whether or not the 
action should be carried out once or continuously, is 
it enough for the ma'mür to carry it out once or does it 
mean that he has to continue repeating it? If we accept 
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that he has to continue, 'then it means that he will 
continue endlessly. On the other hand, - if-we accept 
that once only is required, ' then-that would mean that 
he needs fresh authority if he is to carry out the 
action a second time. These problems represent a 
major area of disagreement among the usülls. 
Some of them are of the opinion that al-amr al-mutlaq 
implies repetition and every unrestricted command should 
be based on that rule as long as there-is no sign that 
it should be carried out once only. That is the view of 
al-Qur f-i which he projected back to Mälik b. Anas. 
1 
Al-Nasaf3 also attributed it to Malik as well as some 
Shafi'ite scholars like Abn Ibrahim Ismä"il al-Muzani 
(d. 264 A. H. ) and Abü Ishäq-al-Isfar'än3 Ibrahim b. 
Muhammad b. Ibräh3m b. Mihrän (d. 418 A. H. and others. 
2 
" 
This group put forward a crude analogy based on language 
rules backed up by some arguments based on reason. -'They 
suggested that since the prohibition of a certain action 
was the result of its repulsiveness'and that prohibition 
would continue forever, then commanding someone to a 
certain action must be as a result of its goodness and 
thus the amr must continue forever because commanding 
(amr) is a direct opposite/, rohibition. 
3 
Besides that, 
all unrestricted commands (al-awämir al-mutlaga) in the 
11 A1-Quräfi, Sharh Tanqih al-Füsll, p. 130. 
2. Ibn al-Malak, Sharp al-Manär, p. 137. 
3. Ibn Qudäina, Rawdat Näzir, p. 103. 
.I 
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Qur'än and the Sunna such as Q/2/43, "And be steadfast 
in prayer, practise regular charity and bow downyour" 
heads with those who bow down" and Q/2/185, "Fast the 
month of al-Ramadan" and so on, ' indicate repetition and 
for this reason, 
1 
Muslims carry out these practices 
regularly. They also maintain that the possibility'of 
abrogating some part of al-amr al-mutlaq as well as the 
possibility of excluding (istithnä') some part of the 
al-amr al-mutlaq are another indication that it should 
be based on continuation as abrogation and exclusion of 
something commanded once will mean (al-bad') to start 
afresh and contradiction respectively. ' 
2" 
Apart from the analogy evidence allegedly put 
forward by Malik and his followers on repetition, they 
also produce a Tradition from the Prophet which they 
interpreted as meaning that al-amr al-mutlaq requires 
repetition. The Tradition was narrated by Abd Allah b. 
Abbäs through Abü Hurayra in different wordings. The 
context of the Tradition is that the Prophet gave a 
sermon one day and he said: Oh! People, God has imposed 
hajj (holy pilgrimage) upon you so perform hajj. Then 
Aqra' b. H bis (around 40 A . H) asked the Prophet, "Is 
that every year? " The Prophet did not reply until Aqra' 
had repeated the question three times. Then the Prophet 
1. Murtadä, al-DhariFj, vol. 1, p. 102. 
2. Al-Razi, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 172; also see 
Ibn al-Malak, Sharp al-Manär, p. 137. 
-128- 
said, "If I said, Yes, it would have become an obligation 
(upon you) and you would not be able to fulfil it. " He 
went on, "The hajj is only once and anything above that 
is an extra (al-tatawwa'). 
l Mälik and his followers 
based their evidence on understanding this Tradition 
and argued that Aqra' who was an Arab man and expert 
on the language had understood repetition in the tone 
of the command, otherwise he could not have asked such 
a question. If al-amr al-mutlaq had meant only once 
literally, the tone of the command would not have 
presented any difficulty to him otherwise his question 
would have been meaningless. 
2 
Therefore, according to 
them, it is clear that it requires repetition. 
In the case of a husband saying to his wife, "You 
are divorced" an operation which may involve three 
stages, Mälik and those who favour repetition (takrar) 
gave the wife the choice of divorcing herself once or 
twice or three times, either at one time-or separately. 
That is if the husband said that he did not intend 
any specific number but if he said that he intended 
one or two then she has no power to do anything but 
whatever the husband had said of his intentions. Thus, 
although they may regard al-amr al-mutlaq as involving 
repetition, they do not ordinarily accept it in the 
1. Ibn Malak, Shari al-Manar, p. 137. 
2. Al-Bukhara, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 125. 
I 
-129- 
presence of a stated intention and the context in which 
the ämir has specified his intention. 
l 
However, the majority of scholars from all schools 
and most of the mutakallimin are of the opinion that Pk*16r`^'ý', ^'j 
al-amr al-mutlaq once will mean that. the ma'mur has 
fulfilled his obligation. 
2 
But this group further 
divides among themselves. 
Some of them maintained that although al-amr al- 
mutlaq does not indicate repetition directly but 
contains some probabilities for repetition 
they were considered through context could mean 
la. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123. 
b. In Malik, Muwalta' (Shaybän1 Recension) Egyptian 
. edition of 1387, pp. 191-2. 
A Tradition from Näfi' on the authority of 'Abd 
Allah b. 'Umar reports that he used to: say that, 
if a man gives his wife choice in her affairs (i. e. 
her divorce), she has the right to say or determine 
how many times the divorce will be, one, two or 
three. Unless the man denies it and says I did 
not mean more than once then he will take oath 
and have the right to determine the number. In 
the same Tradition al-Shaybä. ni confirmed that the 
opinion of Abü Han! fa is that the choice is with 
the husband. If he says one or two or three 
his statement will be final. 




However,, both of them agreed that ful- 
filling al-amr al-mutlaq once has satisfied the require- 
ment of the amr except that the latter group made'a 
reservation for this in terms of the-context and the 
declaration of intention. 
2 
According-to them, if one 
is commanded to perform certain actions one has ful- 
filled one's obligation by doing it once, but there 
is still a feeling of repetition understandable in the 
amr which could be put into action by the appearance of 
a sign or intention. This is the only view which is 
3 
directly attributed to al-Shafi'3 himself. Ibn Qud. ma 
from the Hanball school and al-Amidi and others also 
followed it. Others said that al-amr al-mutlaq does 
not require any repetition whatsoever, because a command 
is merely a demand for action which does not signify 
anything other than the demand itself. 
5, This view was 
the view of Hanafite scholars6 as well as some of the 
mutakallimTn'including Abü al-Husayn al-Basr37 and the 
Zähir3 scholar Ibn Hazm. 
8 
1. Al-Nasafl, Sharh al-Manär, p. 137. 
2. Al-Amidi, al-Ihkäm, vol. 2, p. 22. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Al-Bukhiäri, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 122. 
5. A1-Khudari Bik, Us31 al-Fiqh, p. 199. 
6. Al-Quräf, Sharh Tangih al-Fusül, p. 130. 
7. Abü al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 108. 
8. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, p. 316. 
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A further suspended (tawagqaf) judgementS on whether, 
al-amr al-mutlaq should be regarded as requiring repetition 
or not because neither of the two is more appropriate than 
the other and therefore it is appropriate to suspend 
judgement until the exact implications of-the amr are, 
known. Those who hold this view are termed ahl-al-wagf 
and represented by Imam al-Haramayn and the Shiite 
al-Murtadä. Thus the different views of those who do 
not accept-repetition can be summarised as follows: 
1. The opinion that it does not directly imply 
repetition but it contains some probabilities 
which cannot be ignored and those probabilities 
could imply repetition just by showing asign of 
intention. 
2. The opinion that it does not require repetition 
because amr is merely a demand for action and 
doing it once has fulfilled its obligation. 
3. The opinion of ahl al-wagf which suggested that 
at least once is required but whether or not 
extra is needed is not known until there is 
evidence. 
Shäfi'3 and those who followed him who are of the 
opinion that al-amr al-mutlaq does not require repetition 
but contains probability are in fact very similar in this 
to those who reject the idea of repetition outright, in 
terms of their defence of their view. However their 
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interpretation of this rejection has made them paradoxically 
closer to those who favour repetition. They also argued 
that if someone says for example "pray" or "fast", that 
involves a command to perform the action of praying and 
the action of fasting through the imperative form (if"al) 
of the verb whose root meaning (al-masdar) includes the 
idea of the action being performed a number of times. 
Therefore it should be interpreted in that way. 
1 To 
them if someone says to his wife, "You are divorced 
three times" that divorce will occur in that number 
because the masdar involves the possibility of a number 
of times and the command is completed by the specification 
of the number. Yet if he says, "You are divorced" without 
specifying any number it will occur only once but 
nevertheless probability of number still remains 
understandable and whenever a context is shown which 
can indicate number it will be based on it. 
2 
Thus Malik's opinion is closer to that of Shäfi'i' i 
in principle but not in practice because Mälik is saying 
that it requires repetition without context while'Shäfi'3 
maintained that it requires repetition only with context. 
It appears that Shäfi'3 and those who agree with 
him are saying that a command made by an . mir, e. g. 
if'al or idrib and anything in that form, is an 
1. Ibn Mälak, Sharh al-Manar, p. 137- 
2. Al-Amidl, al-Ihkam f! Usül al-Ahkam, vol. 2, p. 22. 
See also al-Bukhär3, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 123. 
-133- 
inconclusive statement because the number of times the 
action should be performed has not been stated. Thus 
there is as much need for "once" to be indicated if 
the action is only meant to be performed once and the 
verb itself implies that the action should be performed 
a number of times. Whenever the mir shows his intention 
or there is context which indicates that he wants the 
action to be performed once or a number of times that 
statement will be completed. This interpretation has 
brought their opinion closer to those who favour 
repetition except that they based their term of 
repetition on context or declaration of intention 
while those who favour repetition say its without any 
condition. 
Al-Elmidi provides another example in support of 
that view. If a man sends his servant to buy one piece 
of bread or meat and he bought more than one then the 
servant is liable to be blamed because there is no 
context to justify his action of buying more than one. 
Even though the word contained probability for that, 
yet the addition of the number limited it. 
l 
Ih 
Those who supported Shafi'i11 maintaining that 
al-amr al-mutlaq contained probability of repetition 
also used the Tradition about the pilgrimage to support 
their view that al-amr al-mutlaq contains this probability 




However, those who reject outright that al-amr 
al-mutlaq requires repetition, argue that al-amr does 
not contain any number of times or specific indications 
of times when al-amr should be performed. 
2 
They gave 
as an example for that that if a master commands his 
servant to enter-a house or asked him to buy meat 
nobody would understand repetition in that command. 
And if the master blames the servant for disobedience 
or for abandoning repetition, the master himself 
deserves blame from wise people because there was 
nothing indicating repetition in al-amr al-mutlaq. 
3 
On the other hand, if the servant repeated the action, 
his master would have every right'to rebuke him and say 
that he had not commanded the action to''be repeated. 
4 
However, they agreed with their opponents that there 
are some awämir in the Qur'än which are based or must 
be based on repetition. Yet they maintained that that 
did not mean that they were originally meant to be 
repeated. 
5 
1. A1-Bukhär3, Käshf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 125. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, Rawdat al-Nazir, p. 104. 
3. Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu"tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 108. 
4. Ibid. 
5. A1-Ghazali, Mustasf , vol. 2, p. 7. 
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The most detailed argument about their opinion 
came from a Zähirite scholar Ibn Hazm and the late 
Hanafite scholar 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Bukhara (d. 730 A. H. 
Ibn Hazm maintained that the correct opinion was that 
one has fulfilled his obligation by carrying out al-amr 
al-mutlaq once because it is impossible to be obedient 
and disobedient in the same action. He said that if 
one ordered a certain action to be performed without 
giving details that it should be performed repeatedly 
and the action was done once by the ma'mur, the latter 
deserves to be called obedient and he is no longer 
disobedient. 
1 Ibn Hazm is aware of Shafi`l's opinion 
that blessing for the Prophet during the last rak'a of 
every prayer should be based on repetition as a matter 
of obligation on the basis that al-amr al-mutlaq at 
least contains probability. He suggested that if the 
evidence given by the Shäfi'ites here on the obligatory 
nature of repetition is correct, then to fix the 
blessings during the sitting of the last rak'a of the 
prayer would not have been better than the time of 
standing (al-wuqüf) and of bowing (rukü') as well as 
at every movement of human life because the verse did 
not say where in alt it should be said, nor how many 
times, so that if the Shäf! 'ites were right according 
to their own argument they should be saying it at every 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, p. 316. 
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point in the course of the prayer (salät). 
l Ibn Hazm 
further maintained that those who made repetition 
compulsory said it only at the sitting during the last 
rak'a in the prayer after the second al-tashähud. 
2 
He 
put forward another Tradition in which refuge was sought 
against someone to whom the name of the Prophet was 
mentioned in his presence and he did not say the blessing 
on him. Ibn Hazm concluded that if that Tradition was 
authentic he would have said that it was obligatory for 
everyone to say the blessing on the Prophet whenever he 
was mentioned. But if the Tradition was not correct 
then the most certain and authentic decision is that 
whoever says the blessing on him (the Prophet) once, 
God will say bless him ten times. Also it is certain 
that whoever refuses to bless the Prophet would be 
considered as an unbeliever, but if one says the 
blessing on him once, for example, and then abandoned 
it one would be regarded as negligent and as having 
deprived oneself of a significant reward without 
being a sinner. 
3 
The remark made here by Ibn Hazm can leave one with 
the impression that Ibn Hazm separates between obligatory 
nature of repetition and the obligatory nature of the 
determination to carry out al-amr al-mutlaq in future. 
1. Ibn Iiazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 3, p. 316. 
2. Ibid., P. 319. 
3. Ibid., p. 316. 
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He rejected the obligatory nature of repetition while 
he believed that one should have the determination to 
carry it out in the future, even though one may not do 
it. That determination is one of the evidences put 
forward by those who favour repetition of 'al-amr al- 
mutlaq as one indication of repetition but most of the 
opponents of repetition (al-takrär) have constantly, - 
rejected it. 
l 
However, Ibn Hazm maintained that what made the - 
view of repetition so invalid was that if it was correct, 
it, would have made it compulsory for someone greeted to 
answer the greeting forever in order to conform with 
the obligation to repeat-a sunna from the'Prophet: 
"When you are greeted-with a certain greeting, greet 
(them) with better than that or answer it. "2 Ibn Hazm 
maintained that there is no disagreement'(among scholars) 
if one answers once that one would be regarded as having 
answered the greeting. He cited another example, Q/4/92: 
"Blood money should be paid to his family. And a 
believing slave should be free. " He said that this 
is an indication that repetition is not necessary 
unless it was specifically mentioned because compensation 
is required only once. 
3 
Ibn Hazm believes that those who 
say that al-ainr al-mutlaq requires repetition said it 
1. A1-Ämid!, al-Ihkam f3 Usül al-Ahkam, vol. 2, p. 25. 
2. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 3, p. 317. 
3. Ibid., P. 317. 
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or practised it on minor issues while adopting the 
opposite view on most issues. 
I 
Ibn Hazm's view was echoed by al-Bukhar3 in his 
book Kashf al-Asrar which he wrote as a commentary on 
the Kanz al-Usül of al-Bazdawi (d. 483 A. H. ). A1-Bukhär3 
himself was Hanafite. Al-Bukhär3 started by defining the 
terms takrär and 'umUm. He seems to imply that 'umüm is 
an order (amr) which although singular in form, i. e.. 
requiring once,. nevertheless because of its comprehensive 
nature and general implication requires the order to be 
carried out more. than once. Takrär, on the other hand, 
he-seems to imply 
__'ý. 
an order where repetition is made 
clear by the nature of the words of the order (amr). 
But it appears that he regards al-'umüm as a division 
within the tal crär itself. 
2 
However,, he fails to give a 
detailed explanation about the singular, form of the 
"umfm which he is trying to defend. The examples he 
gave in support of both definitions also indicate that 
he uses al-'umilm for some kind of al-takrär which is 
actually less than al-takrUr. He said that the minimum 
3 
for al=umiun will be three times at one occasion and 
the minimum for al-takrär is that the action should be 
twice. 
4 
He gave examples for that al-"umüm as a man 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 3, p. 319. 
2. Al-Bukhara, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 122. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 122. 
4. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 122. 
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who divorced with three statements of divorce at one 
time and an example for al-takrär as aman who divorced 
one after'anotherl (at different times). He suggested 
that these two terms could have been used to mean 
al-dawäm (continuation) and that both of them are 
synonyms here because al-'umTim is not expected in a 
commanded action except in the way of repetition 
(al-takrär). 2 He quoted a statement from Kitab al-Mizän 
that the word al-takrär was not used here in its 
original meaning- which is repetition of certain action 
itself because that view was not welcomed by ahl al-kaläm 
but it was used here only as renewal of similarity in 
the sense of synonyms. 
3 
It seems that he regards that 
as al-"umiim continuation. A1-Bukhäri also quoted 
another definition for al-takrär from another book 
(al-Qawäti") as "performing a certain action and'- 
returning to that action after it has been finished. "4 
However, al-Bukhär3 maintained that al-amr al-mutlaq 
does not require repetition nor does it contain any 
probability of repetition. 
5 
He also attributed this 
view to some people whom he did not name but described 
as "Mashayikhuna"6 (our scholars). He reported another 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123., 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123. 
4. Ibid., vol. 1, , p. 
123. - 
$. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 123. 
6. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 123. 
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statement from Abü Yusr1 who attributed this view to 
both Mälik, al-Shafi'i and many other scholars. But 
al-Bukhär3 himself has already identified al-Shafi'i 
with the view that al-amr al-mutlaq does not require 
repetition but contains the probability of repetition. 
2 
As far as this view is concerned, if a man tells 
his wife "divorce yourself" for example, the wife has' 
power to divorce herself only one of the required 
threefold divorces needed for the full divorce.:. This 
is the case regardless of whether the husband had not 
intended any particular number of divorces or whether 
he had intended one or two divorces. But if he said 
3 
that he intended three then three would occur at once. 
A1-Bukhär3 maintained that the tradition about 
the pilgrimage cannot be taken to imply repetition. ' 
He argued that if the tradition had required*repetition 
it would not have presented any problem to Aqra' because 
he would have understood the repetition implicit in the 
command. Instead they interpreted Agra"'s question as 
showing that he was confused about whether or not hajj 
is like other religious performances which are repeated 
like Zakät and Salat. But since hajj is a periodical 
1. Abü Yusr is Muhammad al-Bazdawl the author of 
Kanz al-Usül which al-Bukhäri based his commentary 41 
upon 
2; A1-Bukhär3, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 123. 
3. Ibid. 
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obligation, he was, confuse, d as to whether or not it 
should be treated like the others. 
l Therefore he asked 
to ascertain. However, they rejected that he asked 
because he thought. that al-amr al-mutlaq necessarily 
involved repetition. 
Shäfi"i solved the problem of repetition of the 
blessing for the Prophet during the. last rak"a of every 
prayer by arguing for its repetition as-a matter of 
obligation on the basis that al-amr al-mutlaq at least 
contains, probability. And that view was supported by. 
the Qur, 'ä. nic verse: "God and His Angels send blessings 
on the, Prophet. 0! Ye that believe! Send ye blessings 
on him and salute him with all respect. " .. 
That verse 
2 
along with a Tradition in which a Companion asked the 
Prophet: "God has commanded us to say blessings on you, 
so teach us how to say blessings. ", The Prophet cited 
al-salat al-Ibrählmiyya which was normally said at the 
end of every-prayer: Allahuma sail! 'ala Muhammad wa 'ala 
äl-Muhammad kamä sallayta 'ala Ibrähim wa bärik 'all 
Muhammad wa 'ala äl-Muhammad kamä. bärakta 'ala Ibrahim 
f3 al-' alamin inaka ham! d Majid. 3 
On the other hand, ahl al-wagf, represented by Immen 
al-Haramayn and by the Sh3'ite al-Murtadä, put forward 
a number of suggestions. They pointed out. that whether 
1. Al-Bukhäri, Kashf al-AsrAr, vol. 1, p. 123. 
2. Qur'än 33/56. 
3. Sana'an1, Subul al-Sa1äm, vol. 3, p. 192. 
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or not al-amr al-mutlaq should be interpreted as 
requiring repetition or requiring to be performed 
once is not clear and for that reason it is appropriate 
to confirm from the mir whether or not he meant 
repetition or once. They argued that if it has been 
confined to either repetition or there has been a 
clear statement like idrib wähida (beat once) it 
would not be necessary to ask him to confirm it. 
l 
These people who support wagf also argue that if 
someone says "do it once" or "do it continuously"-this 
could have been a refutation of both views, in support 
of repetition or in support of doing it once only, 
because if you say that al-amr al-mutlaq requires 
repetition by its nature, it should be supposed that 
everyone would naturally know that when you say if'al, 
everybody will realise that you meant repetition. On 
the other hand, if al-amr al-mutlaq only requires the 
action to be performed once, it should be supposed 
that when you say if'al everybody will realise that 
you mean the action to be performed once. 
2 The fact 
that there are two parties putting forward contradictory 
understandings of the number of times al-amr al-mutlaq 
should be performed indicates that the best position, 
in their view, was to withhold judgement as to the 
1. Al-Murtadä, al-Dhari-, vol. 1, p. 101; also see 
Imäm al-Haramayn, al-Burhän, vol. l. pp. 127-129 
2. Al-Murtadä, al-Dhari -r., vol. 1, p. 101. 
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number of times it should be performed. 
Al-Murtadä also tried to explain the basic 
differences on this point in al-Dhar! 'a ilä Usül al- 
Shar3'a. After citing opinions of several schools with 
their differences he maintained that the reality with 
regardo to these differences only involved arguments 
about whether there was an additional number of times 
involved in al-amr al-mutlaq because it already contained 
once without any disagreement among scholars. Those who 
argued for repetition also admitted that once is needed 
and more than once also. While those who limited it to 
once said that no additional number was needed. On the 
other hand, ahl al-waqf maintained that once was needed 
without any doubt but declined to say whether or not 
additional times were required. Al-Murtadä maintained 
that this latter view is the correct view. He argued, 
in support of that, that it was not appropriate to 
understand what the word did not obviously require nor 
to understand the way of applying it to what it could 
be applied to which it did not require. He cited the 
form of imperative (idrib) and maintained that the word 
did not contain place, time nor the instrument with 
which the beating could be carried out. He'said that 
for that reason it is necessary not to understand from 
the word what it did not require. He suggested that 
one can only say that it requires once because that 
is the minimum which complied with the command. 
1 
1. Al-Murtadä, al-Dhari Ov, vol. 1, p. 100. 
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Al-Murtada gave another reason. that the amr occurs 
in the Qur'än as well as customary usage implying, 
repetition sometimes and at another time implying 
only once without addition. He said that the use of 
one expression in two different senses indicates that 
it could basically mean-. both ideas unless evidence was 
provided to limit it to one of them. Al-Murtadä like 
other scholars advocating al-wagf used the possibility 
of asking the mir whether or not he meant repetition 
or once as further evidence. of wagf as well,, as 
restriction like "do it once" and "unrestricted", 
e. g. "do it for ever"* 
1 
r" .l-, 
It seems tha, t al-Murtadä. followed this view in 
conformity with his original principle that once a 
certain word has been successfully used for two 
different meanings the word should be regarded as 
originally sharing both meanings. That also was the 
view he adopted earlier on whether the word "amr" is 
originally for al-gawl al-makhsüs or for the action 
when he maintained that it was for both of them. On 
the basis of this rule only context can show which one 
the amir intended. 
2 However his insistence on this 
doctrine underlines the importance he placed on the 
language in defining legal principles. 
In another attempt to substantiate the view that 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 27. 
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al-amr al-mutlaq does not require repetition, Fakhr al- 
Din al-Razi (d. 606 A. H. ) also maintained that the form 
of imperative was originally established for demand 
(for action) without any feeling of either many or once. 
But if that demanded action can be performed once it 
will be enough. 
1 He took notice of differing opinions 
like those who maintained that it requires once or those 
who say that it requires repetition and so on, but he 
insisted that there was no indication of that. Among 
the evidences he gave in support of his view was the 
consensus of all Muslim scholars that some of the 
commandments in the Qur'an are based on repetition, 
e. g. command for five daily prayers while some others 
are based on once, e. g. command for hajj2 (holy pilgrimage). 
Fakhr al-Din al-Räzi differentiates between the command 
of God and the command of human beings. He said that 
in the case of human beings it may not require repetition 
at all sometimes and at others it may require repetition. 
He gave an example for the first case that if a master 
orders his servant to buy meat, nobody can sense 
repetition in that order and if the master blames the 
servant for not carrying out his order on the basis 
of repetition, the wise people will blame him because- 
there was no proof for that requirement. He also gave an 
example of the second case which may require repetition 
1. Al-Räzi, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, pp. 162-63. 
2. Ibid., p. 164. 
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as if someone says "take care of my sheep" and he took 
care of them for one hour and then released them, he 
would be blamed for releasing them. Al-nazi concluded 
that since that be the case reality did not require 
repetition because it actually indicated commonness 
(all al-gadr al-mushtarka) between two different 
possibilities. At the same time there, is no indication 
as to which one of the possibilities is envisaged, 
i. e. there is no indication whatsoever as to repetition 
nor to performing an, action once. It is merely a demand 
except that it is not possible to connect that word to 
al-wu, jüb (obligation) with anything less than. once. So 
once became more or less like necessity to be performed 
as the ma'mur bihi. In this way once was indicated. 
1 
On the other hand, al-Razi examined both the 
customary use of language and the logical aspects of, " 
al-amr al-mutlaq as meaning repetition. With the. 
customary use of language, he maintained that there 
was no difference between say yaf6al and if'al except 
that the first is a report (khabar) and the second is 
a demand (talab) He argued that everybody agrees that the 
meaning of al and its content would be completed in 
the performance of the action once. Therefore the same 
meaning must be contained in the imperative form (if'al) 
otherwise they would have differed in other respects 
1. Ibid., pp. 165-166. 
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than their difference in being khabar and talab. On 
the logical aspect of it he argued that the opinion 
that it required repetition would make the requirement 
of its performance occupy all the time of the man 
responsible for it (mukallaf) and therefore there 
would be no time left without it being due to be 
carried out (al-ma'mur bihi). Since the word did not 
indicate any specific time, then to confine it to a 
certain time would not be any better and yet basing 
it on every time is not possible. 
l 
The argument as to whether the action enjoined by 
al-amr al-mutlaq required repetition or not is really 
a very important argument about the nature of the 
injunctions of the Qur'an and the sunna. Yet there 
was always implicit understanding among all the 
disputants as to the obligations of the main injunctions 
of the shar36a. It is only in matters like the case of 
divorce through the declaration of the husband that ä 
serious legal difference arises. The Mälikites, in 
adopting the general view of repetition, seem to be 
taking the most all-embracing attitude towards the 
injunctions of the shar3"a while those who reject 
repetition seem to be taking a very literalist stance 
on the actual words. It is not surprising to find the 
Zähiris among them. It is not surprising either that 
mutakallim! n have taken up an intermediate position 
between the two views. Their argument appears, 
naturally, the most logical. 
1. Al-Räz3, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 166. 
-148- 
The Problem of Restricted Command (al-Amr al-Mu'allag) 
Thus are the views of scholars concerning un- 
restricted command (al-amr al-mutlaq) but restricted 
command (al-amr al-mu"allaq) also has its own problem. 
For those who based al-amr al-mutlaq on repetition and 
those who maintained that it contained probability of 
repetition, restricted command (al-amr al-mu'allaq or 
al-muc'yad as some scholars call it) is more likely to 
be based on repetition as they regard tall! or tagyid 
itself as a sign of designation, therefore they are in 
agreement on the need for its repetition. 
Disagreement on al-amr al-mu'allaq came among those 
who had rejected the view that al-amr al-mutlaq required 
repetition. Here it is not easy to reject it because 
the context is more obvious, therefore some of them said 
that al-amr al-mu'allaq requires repetition while others 
still insist that it did not require repetition (al-takrär). 
But before going into details about their opinions it is 
useful to give some examples for al-amr al-mu"allaq. 
Al-amr al-mu'allag is the one whose designation is 
clear and known either by specifying its time, the place 
in which it must take place or by making it dependent on 
certain conditions which must be fulfilled or any" other 
thing of that kind which will make it understandable 
to, everyone. 
1 As already mentioned it is also called 
1. Ibn Malak, Sharh al-Manär, p. 137. 
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al-amr al-mugayyad. "1 Al-amr al-mu'allaq could come 
in two different ways: ' by condition (shart) or reason 
('i11a). E. g. @/5/6, "If ye are in a state of ritual 
impurity bathe your whole body" or "if Khalid comes 
give him two pounds. " Al-amr'al-mu'allaq could come 
in the way of'quality, e. g. Q/5/41, "As to the thief, 
male or female, cut off his or her hands. A punishment 
by way of example from God for their crime. And God 
is exalted in power" or Q/24/2, "The woman and man 
guilty of adultery or fornication flog each of them'' 
with a'hundred'stripes. " In the first example taking 
a bath and-giving money are due'only when the condition 
of being impure and the arrival'of Khalid have been met 
respectively or happened. While cutting hands and 
flogging in the second examples' depend on the existence 
of theft or adultery. " 
There is a dispute on how to identify the shart 
(condition) from the''illa (reason). Some of the usülls 
maintained that there is no difference between the shart 
and the "illa in the sense of implication and whenever 
either one of them is available the verdict (al-hukm) 
will be available while others believe that the shart 
is one thing and the 'illa is another thing. The shart 
does not necessarily imply any hukm unlike the "illa 
which always must be accompanied by a hukm. 
2 Nevertheless 
1. Ibn Mälak, Sharp al-Manär, p. 137. 
2. Al-Bukharl, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 124. 
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it appears that the 'illa is the most important of them. 
Among those who believe that the shart and the 'illa 
are not the same was Muhammad al-Arvin Shingiti. He 
gave some examples of an 4illa and a shart without - 
being accompanied-by hukm or amr and an example of 
the 'ills whose command to perform was not repeated 
when the "illa itself was in reality repeated, e. g. 
One who urinates several times or one who has sexualr 
l 
intercourse with his wife several times. Thus the 
'ills (reason) for the-command to perform-ablution is 
repeated and therefore by implication one is to renew 
2 it once one's ablution (ghisl)repeatedly- while the 
command itself for it is made only once. Another 
example is like someone who committed adultery several 
times which will be punished once. 
2 
He gave an example 
of a case in which the "illa and the command were 
repeated together: if someone beats a pregnant woman 
and she has a miscarriage, he has to-pay-two ghurra. 
If someone has twin babies, he has to slaughter two 
goats (agiqatan) for the 'agiqa ceremony. 
3 
It appears that Muhammad al-Amin's view enjoys 
support from other scholars like the Sh3'ites and 
ahl al-wägf but discussion on the difference between 
shart and " ills, though very useful, is not the heart 
1. Shinglti, Mudhakarat al-Us31 al-Fiqh, p. 195. 
2. Ibid., p. 195. 
3. Ibid., p. 195. 
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of the investigation here. The main argument is whether 
or not al-amr al-mu"allaq (or al-mugayyad) also require 
the commanded action to be repeated by repetition of 
that al-ta"liq on the shart or "illa as was the case 
in al-amr al-mutlaq, according to those who held that 
view. 
Those scholars like Malik, 
1 
al-Muzan3 and AbU 
Ishäq al-Isfarän1,2 who have held the view that al-amr 
al-mutlaq requires repetition believe that in the case 
of al-amr al-mu"allaq it is even more appropriate to 
require repetition because they consider al-t a'lig on 
the shart or the 'illa as a direct context which al-amr 
al-mutlaq lacks. However, those who have earlier 
rejected the idea of repetition like Abü Hanifa3 and 
some of his followers and those who maintained that it 
only contained probability like Shäfi43 and some of his 
followers4 divided among themselves. Some of them 
changed their minds and supported Malik and other 
scholars who maintained that al-amr al-mu'allaq will be 
repeated with the repetition of what it depends upon. 
5 
Shäfi'3 also favours this view. 
6 
Abi Hanifa and most 
of his followers, many scholars from Ahmad b. Hanbal's 
11 Al-Quräfi, Shart Tangih al-Fusül, p. 130. 
2. Ibn al-Malak, Sharh al-Manär, p. 137. 
3. A1-Bukhär3, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, pp. 122-3. 
4. Ibn al-Malak, Sharp al-Manär, p. 137. 
5. Al-Quraf , Sharp Tangih al-Fusül, p. 131. 
6. Ibn al-Malak, Sharp al-Manar, pp. 137-138. 
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school and the Shiites are of the opinion that there 
is no difference between al-amr al-mutlaq and al-mu"allaq. 
Therefore if al-amr al-mutlaq did not require repetition 
the same is the case for al-amr al-mu'allag. 
1 
Aimad b. 
Hanbal himself-was reported by Ibn Qud'hma as being in 
favour of Malik and Shäfi'i's opinion. 
2 
The main reason for the disagreement here seems 
to have arisen out of the difficulty of verifying what 
the amr actually depends upon. If it is certain that 
what it depends upon is its 'illa (i e. adultery is the 
'illa for flogging or stoning as a punishment), it 
appears that there is an agreement among'the'majority 
of scholars that that kind of command (amr) will be 
repeated with repetition of that 'illa'or reason. Even" 
most of the Shiites and a considerable number of those 
who oppose repetition support this kind of repetition, 
3 
but not all of them and some of those who support it 
interpret it in a different way. Thus al-Amidl who 
himself is opposed to repetition has maintained' that 
there is agreement also on that basis that it is 
sufficient to present the repetition of the 'illa as 
legal evidence whenever it is available. 
4 
But if what 
the amr depends upon has only a limited effect upon it, 
1. Al-Bukhärl, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, ' p. 123. 
2. Ibn Qudämma, al-Mughn3, vol. 8, p. 164. 
3. Al-Murtada, al-Dhari -, vol. 1, pp. 112-114. 
4. Al-Amid-1, Ihkam, vol. 2, pp. 28-29. 
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like the shart, then most of the scholars did not 
support repetition in that circumstance. 
I 
An example 
of that is in the kind of command which says, "If Sa"3d 
comes, give him two pounds. " -Opponents of repetition 
argued that the arrival of Said was-not the reason why 
he deserved the money and that is why it is not necessary 
to give him another two pounds if he comes on a second 
occasion. 
The Hanafites are the most active opponents of 
repetition. They do not believe in the repetition of 
the amr whether it is mutlaq or mu6allaq. 
2 However, 
in the case of repetition being as a result of the 'illa 
like Q/24/2, "The woman and the man guilty of adultery 
or fornication flog each of them with a hundred stripes. " 
They repeat the flogging as many times3 as the sexual 
1. Al-midi, al-Ihkam, vol. 2, p. 28. 
2. Al-Bukhäri, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, pp. 122-3- 
3. This is only if the person involved has been 
punished for the first one before he committed 
another one. But if it has happened several times 
before the case comes to the Imäm or Qadi there is 
no disagreement that he will be flogged one hundred 
stripes only. See al-Sana'n3, Subul al-Saläm, 
vol. 4, p. 9 and also Ibn Qudäina, al-Mughn1, 
vol. 8, p. 213. 
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intercourse is repeated. Yet in the case of Q/5/4l, 
"As to the thief, male or female, cut off his or, her 
hands, a punishment by way of example from God" which 
also falls under the same principles They only cut 
off the right hand of the thief on the first occasion 
of stealing and his left leg on the second occasion of 
stealing and detain him on the third. 
1 They maintained 
that Ibn Mas"üd's reading of the Qur'ä. nic verse has 
specified that only the right hand of the thief should 
be cut. 
2 And once it has been cut there will be no 
right hand left to be cut. This is the summary view of 
Hanafites concerning the repetition of cutting as a 
result of the repetition of stealing. 
Although Aba Hanifa himself is known to have 
opposed any kind of repetition, there is little. direct 
1. Muhammad b. Hassan al-Shaybani (d. 189 A. H. ) has 
attributed it to 'Umar, 'All, Abü Hanifa. and the 
. 
generality of the Hanafites of his time though he 
did not mention anything about detention or what 
will happen to him if he steals a third time. See 
Malik, Muwa a (Shaybani version) p. 239. Also', 
see Ibn al-Malak, Shari al-Manär, p. 147. 
2a. Ibn al-Malak, Shari al-Man. r, p. 148. 
b. Ibn Mas"ud's reading which is not in the existing 
Qur'an, reads: "Male thieves and female thieves 
cut their rights, " instead of hands as it exists 
in other readings. (See Tafs! r al-Qurtubi, vol. 6, 
p. 167. ) 
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information from him on the issue of repetition of 
al-amr al-mu'allaq. Most of the information we have 
about his opinion came through his scholars. Among 
them was 'Abd al-'Az! z al-Bukhär3 the author of'Kashf 
al-Asrär, 
ýa 
commentary work on Kanz al-Usül of al-Bazdawi. 
Al-Bukhär3 gave more details about the Hanafites'stand 
on the issue of repetition of al-amr or hukm with the 
repetition of the "illa. In the book he quoted'al-Bazdaw3 
who reported that some of our scholars (he meant Hanafites 
and he called them mashäyikhunä) are of the opinion that 
al-amr al-mutlaq did not require repetition nor did it 
contain any probability of repetition. But if it is` 
based on the shart or 'ills then it will require. 
repetition1 like Q/24/2, "The woman and the man guilty 
of adultery or fornication flog each of them" or sifa 
like QJ5/41, "As to thief, male or female, cut off his 
or her hand: a punishment by the way of example. "-' Al- 
Bazdaw3 added that the majority of Hanafite scholars 
are of the opinion that arnr did not require repetition 
whether it was mutlaq or mu'allaq and that a command for 
action would be fulfilled by performing-it at the minimum 
level in which the ma'mür could be regarded as obedient 
by doing it. 2 Commenting on that report, al-Bukhara 
maintained that the first opinion which suggested that 
if amr depended on shart or sifa it would be repeated 
1. Al-Bukhärl, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 122. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123. 
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was the view of the Shäfi"ites (probably indicating the 
mutakallimin) among those who have already maintained 
that al-amr al-mutlaq did not require repetition 'but 
contained probability. He said that that view was 
proper according to their principle because-when al-amr 
al-mutlaq contained probability of repetition then its 
dependence on condition'or quality is the context that 
confirms that probability. But according to those who 
maintained that it does not require repetition itself 
nor contained probability of repetition its dependence 
on a condition made no difference to this. 
l 
Al-Bukhär3 himself is in favour of the Hanafites' 
opinion2 and that was the opinion of Abi Yusr al-Bazdawi 
who attributed it to both Mälik and Shäfi'3, though 
investigation has shown that both of them are"in fact 
in favour of the opinion that if the amr is based on a 
sharp or sifa it will be repeated with the repetition of 
either the shart or sifa. Al-Bukhärl quoted another 
Hanafite scholar who was of the opinion that if amr 
depends on a shart or sifa it could require repetition. 
But he insisted that the truth is that an amr did not 
require repetition nor contain it whether it depends on 
anything or not. 
3 
1. Al. -Bukhär3, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 123. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123. 
3- Ibid., vol. 1, p. 123- 
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Al-Bukhär3 is aware of other evidence withheld by 
those who support repetition of the hukm with the 
repetition of the condition (sharp) like Q/17/78, 
"Establish regular prayers at the. sun's decline" which 
they said will make prayer be repeated with repetition 
of the sun's decline. And QJ5/6, "If you are in a state 
of ritual impurity bathe your whole body"1 which they 
said will make ghusl be repeated with the repetition 
of sexual intercourse, along with a Tradition from the 
Prophet in which he said in the case of annual taxation 
of the camel, "From five freely grazing camels a goat 
(he meant that a goat will be paid as taxation of five 
freely grazing camels) and that makes taxation payment 
of a goat as taxation of five camels on condition of 
them being freely grazing. "2 He was also aware that 
they regarded the shart as similar to the 'ilia because 
according to them if the shart exists that which is 
conditioned (al-mashrüt) also will remain. They even 
believe that the sharp is more emphatic than the 'illa 
because the mashrut will disappear with the disappearance 
of shart unlike the ma'lül which may not disappear with 
the disappearance of the 'illa. 
3 
In his reaction to these arguments, al-Bukhäri 
maintained that the interpretations of these were 
invalid because there was no effect of shart on 40 
1. Al-Bukhär3, Kashf al-Asrär, vol. 1, p. 124. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 124. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 124. 
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repetition, because if someone says idrib it does not 
require repetition and the same is the'case if he says 
idribhu in Man ga'3man (beat him if he is standing). 
He said that that does not require repetition either. 
' 
He said that one only appeared to be intending'that the 
expression of darb refers to the particular circumstance 
of standing on that occasion. He believes that repetition 
of the commandments of God are not on the basis of 
linguistic necessity but because of a divine evidence 
which exists in every condition. He cited Q/3/93, "God 
requires pilgrimage thereto for men who can afford the 
journey. " He argued that despite the fact that hajj is 
an obligation, it will not be repeated as an obligation 
with repetition of the shart which is the ability to go 
to the hajj. 
2 
Regarding their comparison of the shart with the 
'ills, he rejected that view which he described as 
weak (da'3f) because according to him the 'illa always 
necessitates a hu1Qn and it will never be separated from 
the necessitated hukm. He said that as far as he was 
concerned the shart was not a necessitating point and 
that is why shart could be available with availability 
of the mashrüt as well as the mashrüt without shart. 
3 
He went on the difference between them is that 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 128. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 128. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 128. 
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the confirmation of a hulan is limited to the 'illa 
without any further evidence. But confirmation of 
the mashrüt is not limited to the shart only but needs 
additional necessitating evidence which will necessitate 
it and that is an 'illa. 
1 
He further maintained that 
all evidences put forward by the Shafi"ites in which"-' 
they maintained that the hukm was repeated with the 
repetition of the shart are in fact involved with the 
sharp being either directly or indirectly an 'illa. 
2 
Regarding the cutting off of the four limbs of ,a 
thief in accordance with the repetition of the hukm 
with the repetition of the shart, al-Bukhäri maintained 
that as far as he was concerned the four limbs of a 
thief would not be cut off, but the thief would be' 
detained until he repented after the right hand and 
left leg were cut off. 
3 He is aware of Shäfi'i's opinion 
and practice that the four limbs of the thief should be 
cut off because according to Shäfi'i God used the word 
hand (yad) in the plural (ayd3)'and attributed it to' 
the male thief and the female thief and that has 
necessitated it to be general. 
4 
Al-Bukh7ar3 argued that 
the idea of plurality is not workable because neither 
the male thief nor the female thief had two right 
hands. He argued that since they only have one right 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 128. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 128. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 131. 
4. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 131. 
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\, hand each it would seem more appropriate that the next 
thing to be cut would be the left, since the left hand 
also could be used to steal. 
1 
However, he went on to 
point out that the limb to be cut on the second time 
was specified as the left leg by both sunna and the 
consensus of Muslim scholars. Surprisingly, according 
to him, this does not contradict the statement established 
by the Qur'än. He further maintained that Ibn Mas'üd's 
reading of right hand (aymän) did not contradict the 
general reading of hands (aydl) but rather restricted 
it because according to him obligation is to cut one 
hand and Ibn Mas'3d's reading, which restricted the 
cutting to the right hand, was an additional explanation 
which made it to look as if God was saying "cut off the 
right hand from their hands because the cutting does not 
apply to the left hand. "2 Al-Bukhäri further defended 
the Hanafites' rejection of cutting anything off on the 
third and fourth occasions of theft by maintaining that 
if the Qur'änic verse'had implied cutting off the=left 
hand it would have to be after the first hand, and the 
left leg would not have been cut while the left hand 
still remained uncut because that would involve diverting 
away from a specified text. 
3 
On the basis that Ibn Mas"üd's reading was a 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 131- 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 131. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 131. 
-161- 
restriction to the general reading, Hanafites interpret 
(al-aydi) in the general reading as a metaphorical use 
for-the dual like Q/66/4, "If ye two turn in repentance 
to Him (God) your hearts are indeed so inclined. " Al- 
Bukhär3 argued that it is'not possible to operate on'' 
the basis of the plural term (aydi) for the following 
reason: since it is clear that the left hand was not 
included in the Qur'änic verse and that it did not 
contain any meaning other than the right hand then it 
is baseless for opponents to use the verse as evidence 
as well as their analogical interpretation because there 
is no definition for it. 
l 
Also he argued in grammatical 
terms and maintained that since the infinitive form' 
(al-masdar) of säriq (which is sar a) did not contain 
numbering then it is not appropriate to mean by the 
verse anything other-than, right'hands and that 'is 
because it does not contain numbering. Therefore he 
suggested that the word could have been used to mean 
either the maximum number possible (al-kull) or the 
minimum number possible (al-agall) but he rules out 
the possibility of maximum (al-kull) here because he 
said that the number of*thefts it involved may not be 
known until the end of the thief's life and that may 
mean that the thief would not have his hand cut off 
until the time of his death even if he stole thousands 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 131. 
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of times. 
I He also maintained. that the consensus of 
Muslim scholars was against the maximum, being meant 
here. So, it is clear that only one stealing is meant. 
Therefore it looks as if God is saying in the verse:, 
"Any male or female who undertakes an act of stealing, 
cut off their hands. "2 He also suggests that the 
obvious meaning of the verse requires both hands to be 
cut for one stealing although that has been ruled out 
by consensus of Muslim scholars. Then it is clear that 
the only obligation which remains to be understandable 
from the verse is the cutting off of one hand for one 
theft for every male thief and every female thief. 
3 
Again he added that that one hand may be right or left 
(according to the obvious meaning) but consensus 
, 
according to him has confirmed again that the right 
hand was meant. The sunna both in statement and 
practice as well as Ibn Mas'üd's reading of the right 
hand (a än) have also confirmed it. So, the left hand 
is not intended. 
4 
Al-Bukhäri argued that if the word 
sarq contained any numbering ('adad) as opponents have 
maintained, it would be appropriate to confirm the 
cutting off of the left hand through the literal meaning 
of that verse as it was in the case of the right hand 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 132. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 132. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 132, 
4. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 132. 
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and it would look as if the Qur'. nic verse was saying, 
"If any male undertakes an act of stealing, cut off. 
from him for every stealing one hand. "1 He reported 
a similar view from a book called Turq Khaläf by Imam, 
al-Bargharl (around 400 A. H) who also maintained-that 
it was not possible to operate according to the general 
reading of the verse because God did not mention sar a 
(as infinitive) but He only mentioned säri (thief - 
the person who took the action of stealing instead of. 
using the infinitive form al-masdar). 
2 
That, according 
to him, requires sar a, but it did not contain more than 
one theft according to the consensus of scholars. There- 
fore, for one theft one hand only would be cut off. If 
the general reading is workable here, both hands would 
have been cut for one theft because the punishment was 
for one crime, like a hundred lashes for a fornication. 
The consensus was that for one theft only the right hand- 
would be cut off then that shows that the verse contained 
only the right hand. 
Al-Bukhäri said that it could be argued that it has 
been established that flogging would be repeated with 
the repetition of fornication by one person despite the 
fact that the infinitive (al-masdar) which is zina' did 
not indicate repetition or numbering ('adad) as the 
Hanafites have claimed in the case of theft. Theft also 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 132. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 132. 
-164- 
should be treated in the same way. To this argument, 
he replied that it had also been established in the 
principle of Islamic law that the infinitive (al-masdar) 
in that case of zinä' is considered as a reason (Gills) 
because the place for carrying out the hukm (which is 
a body which is to be flogged) still existed. He also 
admitted that sarga is the reason for cutting, off. a hand 
as well, but insisted that there is Qur'änic evidence 
that only the right hand should be cut and if it had 
been cut once, there will be no place for cutting any 
more and that is why it would not be. repeated. 
1 
Yet, despite all these arguments, he allowed the 
left leg to be cut off for a second offence on the basis 
of the sunna and. the consensus of the Muslims. 
However, other scholars who also have the same view 
give different. evidence. For example, the Hanbali 
scholar Ibn Qud ma who is also an opponent of the 
fourfold cutting together with repetition of the 'ilia 
or the shart quoted-a Tradition in which "Ali b. Abi 
Tälib refused to cut the thief more than twice purely on 
humanitarian grounds and that was based on his personal 
discretion rather than Qur'ä. nic evidence. or the interpret- 
ation of it. In the Tradition "All was quoted as having 
asked his companions about their opinion and they 
replied to him that he should cut off a . third limb on 
the third occasion. He argued that it is better to kill 
1. Ibid., vol. ' 1, p. 132. 
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him then, though he deserves no killing. But if he 
cuts him again there will be nothing left for him by 
which he could feed himself nor would'he'be able to' 
perform the ablution for prayer'or walk to his own 
business, all of which are also obligations. " Tien he 
sent the thief to prison and after a few days he brought 
him out again and asked his companions about their 
opinions. They told him the same-thing and he also 
repeated the same reason and ordered the thief to be 
flogged severely and set free. 
l If'this Tradition is 
true, it shows that'-'All's practice was purely on 
personal discretion rather than the alleged practice 
of the Prophet which he was supposed to be aware of. 
On the other hand, Malik, Shäfi"1 and most of 
their scholars who held the view' that al-amr''al-mu' allaq 
requires repetition insisted that al-amr al-mu'ällaq 
either by an 'ills or a shart will be'repeated by'the 
repetition of either one of them. 
2 
Al-Quräfi, who, 
although a Mälik3 scholar, was opposed to repetition, 
maintained that those who maintain takrär for the amr, 
without their being a share when there is an 'ills or 
sabab also maintain takrär when there'is shart by the 
same reason as they used to maintain takrär without 
shart but with an "illa because according to them 
linguistically sharts are in fact causes. 
3 
Abü al-Husayn 
1. Ibn Qudäma, al-Müghni, vol. -8, pp. 264+-265. 
2. Al-Quräfl, Sharh Tanqih al-Fusül, P. 131. 
3. Ibid. 
-166-. 
al-Basra also reported a similar view. He'said that 
they always strengthen that view by maintaining that 
the sharp is more effective and more emphatic than the 
'illa because the hukm will disappear with the dis- 
appearance of the shart and hukm will not necessarily' 
disappear with the disappearance of the 'illa. 
l 
However, Mälik and Shäfi'3 also flog for fornication 
repeatedly as long as sexual intercourse is repeated. 
2- 
They also cut the thief's left hand on, the third offence 
and his right leg on the fourth offence andýthen detain 
him on the fifth time3 or kill him according to one 
opinion. 
4 
All that is in "addition to his right hand 
and left leg which have already been cut on the first 
two offences of theft. That fourfold cutting is on the 
basis the view that al-amr al-mu' allagi requires 
repetition. This they deduced on the basis of Tradition 
from Jäbir b. 'Abd Allah al-Ansär3 who reported that 
the Prophet said: "Whoever steals cut him and if he 
repeats cut him four times. "5 In another Tradition 
which is also attributed to Jäbir b. 'Abd Allah, he 
1. Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitab al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 117. 
2. A1-Sana6ani, Subul al-Salam, vol. 4, p. 9. 
3. Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahd, vol. 2, p. 453. 
4. Ibid., p. 453. 
5. Ibn Malak, al-Manär, p. 147. 
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reported that a thief was brought to the Prophet who 
told them on seeing him to kill him and they replied 
that he was only a thief. "Then he-'ordered them to cut 
off his hand. That very man was brought another three 
times with the same reaction from the Prophet-(i. e., the 
Prophet ordering them to cut off'one of his-limbs), 
1 
These Traditions are in addition 
Ito Q/5/41 which is 
basically an injunction to cut off the hand of a thief. 
Thus Ibn Mas"üd's reading, which was used by the opponents 
of repetition and specified the right hand as the one to 
be cut off, seems to have enjoyed little or no recognition 
from both Malik and Shäfi'i because they regard-the 
Tradition of Jäbir b. 'Abd Alläh as indicating the 
practice of the Prophet which corresponds for them to 
the obvious meaning of the Qur'än. 
2 
Therefore they 
argued that the hand in the verse is a general term 
which could be the right or left hand. For Shäfi'3, 
in particular, it is a matter of principle rather than 
mere investigation. He cannot abandon the practice of 
the Prophet in favour of a reading which he considers as 
an isolated report. 
3 
He always rejected readings or 
Traditions which were not generally accepted. 
4 
1. Ibn Qudina, al-Mughn3, vol. 8, p. 264. 
2. Ibn Malak, al-Manär, p. 149. 
3. Ibid., p. 149. 
4. Shafi43, Risäla, p. 215 (translated by Mäjid 
Kaddur3). 
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What could be regarded as direct information from 
Malik in support of his view concerning the cutting off 
of limbs of the thief on the basis of repetition of the 
hukm with repetition. of the "illa was a Tradition in 
the Muwatta' in the recension of Yahyä b. YahyA al-Layth3. 
Malik himself transmitted the Tradition from 'Abd al- 
Rahm in b. al-Qäsim from his father who reported that a 
man whose hand and leg had already been cut off stayed 
as a guest of Abi Bakr. This man stole a jewel belonging 
to Abi Bakr's wife. After confessing, or someone giving 
evidence against him, Abü Bakr ordered his left hand to 
be cut off. Commenting on this Tradition Malik said: 
"The practice as far as we are concerned is that 
whoever steals several times is then apprehended. w 
one hand only will be cut off for all those thefts if 
he has not yet undergone any punishment before. But if 
he has been punished for a stealing before and then 
steals again, in terms which require cutting, then he 
will be cut again. " This is a clear indication that 
Malik interprets the hand as a general reading as well 
as Jäbir's Tradition as a general term. 
l 
Other evidence that ShIfi'3 also interpreted the 
hand in the Qur'änic verse and the Tradition as a 
general term could be seen in a commentary he made on 
a Tradition which he transmitted himself through a 
group of transmitters to Abü Hurayra who actually 
1. MLlik, Muwatta', pp. 600-601. 
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claimed to have heard the Tradition from the Prophet. 
However, the Prophet only said that'the thief's hand 
should be cut off and if he steals again his leg should 
be cut. The Tradition did not specify whether or not 
the right hand should be cut or the left nor did it 
mention how many times a thief should have his limbs 
cut. Later Shäfi"i said that that evidence had 
indicated that Abi Bakr cut the left hand of a thief 
whose hand and leg had already been cut. On the 
basis of this Tradition Shäfi'3 said, "If a man steals 
I will cut his right hand from the joint between the 
palm and wrist and if he steals again I will cut his 
left leg from'the joint at the anklebone and on the 
third time I will cut his left hand from the joint 
between the palm and the wrist and on the fourth time- 
I will cut his right leg from the joint at the anklebone 
and on the fifth time I will punish him and detain him. "2 
This Tradition and statement from Shäfi'i himself 
indicates that he too interpreted the hand in the 
Tradition as a general term which could be right or 
left hand or leg and that has given him the chance to 
interpret al-amr al-mu"allaq as requiring repetition. 
It seems that the Tradition of Abil Bakr's practice 
made Shäfi'3 adopt the decision of repetition in this 
case. Thus he modified his stand with regard to al-amr 
1. Shäfi'3, Kitäb al-Umm, vol. 8, p. 264. 
2. Ibid., vol. 8, p. 264. 
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al-mu"allaq so that'the'probability of"repetition, 
which he argued-for in 'the case of al-amr`al-mutlaq, y 
became a requirement in the case'of al-amr äl-mu'allaq. 
Apart from the argument in favour and against 
repetition there seems to be another opinion which 
tries to reach a compromise between the two arguments. 
This opinion is largely ' followed, by the most prominent 
scholars of usül, particularly al-mutakallimfln like 
Fakhr al-D3n al-Räz3, al-Ghazäli and others. However, 
it seems that their suggestion has made the whole 
discussion even more complicated rather than making it 
clearer. While they reject the view that al-shart 
could have any effect on the action depending on it 
they also maintained that if it is based on commanding 
by analogy or if the command was from God it may not 
come within the common regulation. 
1 
Such a complication 
could be clearly seen in al-Fakhr'al-Din al-RRz3's 
attempt to find a compromise between the two views. 
He believes that a distinction needs to be made between 
man's action and God's action. He said that the fact 
that the hukm would not necessarily be repeated with 
the repetition of the 'illa in the case of a human being, 
does not mean that it would not be so in the case of God. 
He regards that view as a matter of agreement among 
us11li. 
2 
At the same time he maintained that although 
Al-Razi, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 183. 
2. Ibid., vol. " 1, p. 186. 
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al-amr al-mu'allaq may not require repetition through.. 
the spoken word, it does require it through an analogical 
process. 
' He gave the example-that-if a command is. 
combined with analogy it will result in the repetition 
of an action because it will give a sense of repetition. 
Therefore there should be no contradiction between the 
opinion which maintained that al-amr al-mu"allaq did 
not require repetition and the opinion which maintained 
that it does require it. 
2 
In a long argument with both those in favour and, 
those who oppose repetition, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi gave 
many examples to show that the two opinions could both 
be correct. But most of his arguments. concentrate on 
logical conclusions. - He divided the argument intoýtwo 
stages; the first was against repetition and the second 
one was in defence of repetition. The latter one is the 
concern of this discussion. He maintained that. the 
dependence of a command on either al-sifa3 or al-shart 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 187. 
2. Al-Raze, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 187. 
3. Sifa is almost the equivalent of 'ills. In the 
command "the thief and the woman thief cut off 
their hand" it could be carried that the thief. 
describes the nature of the person and is therefore 
the Fifa. Some scholars maintain that 'illa and 
Fifa are the same thing while others differentiate 
between the two terms. 
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could require repetition through an analogical process. 
He gave the example that if God says, "If he is an 
adulterous (man) stone him, " that indicates that God 
made adultery a reason for the obligation of stoning. 
Thus, whenever the case is like that, it is necessary 
that the hukm should be repeated. 
I 
To explain that. 
example he cited another example that if someone says, 
"If he is a learned and ascetic man, kill him and if. he 
is ignorant and an offender, honour him, " that statement 
is customarily wrong and everybody can recognise that. 
The wrongness may either be because the commander had 
made ignorance and offence a reason for deserving honour 
or because it did not mean that. He maintained that the 
latter is not correct because it did not convey the 
reason (, ilia). Yet at the same, time there is no 
contradiction between ignorance and deserving honour 
through another reason, i. e. heroism, generosity and so 
on. Therefore confirmation of deserving honour with the 
fact that he was ignorant and an. offender is not contrary 
to common sense. He went on that for that reason it was 
necessary not to interpret it in that way and whenever 
it was interpreted in that way we can be sure that it 
was invalid. He concluded that dislike for it was only 
due because it gave the impression that the commander 
(ämir) had made an offence as reason for deserving 
honour which confirms that the dependence of a certain 
1. Al-Räzi, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 181. 
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hukm on a certain quality gives the feeling that the 
quality was the reason. And if that comes from God it 
would create belief that God has made that quality the 
reason and that would undoubtedly necessitate the 
repetition of the hukm with the repetition of that 
quality. He maintained that this view was the consensus 
of the usUlis. 
l 
Some of the opponents of the above view maintained 
that on the contrary it was invalid to assume repetition 
of al-hukm because of the repetition of al-spart. They 
argued that if a man told his wife orirzccasion, "If you 
ti 
enter the house you are divorced" this'does`not necessarily 
apply to another occasion when his wife enters the house. 
The shart - "if you enter the house" - could well 
have been specific to one occasion. Therefore, repetition 
of the shart would not necessarily require repetition 
of the hukm - "you are divorced". Fakhr al-Din a1-Räz3 
gives a modified version of this view. He agrees with 
the argument concerning marriage already discussed. If 
a man says, "I free my slave Ghänim because he is a 
black" and that man has another black slave, it is not 
necessary for him to free the other slave because he 
freed GhBnim. He explained the process of reasoning 
involved as being merely an indication (tanbmh) of. 
causality ('illiyya) which does not go'beyond the 
statement of that causality. On the other hand, he 
1. Al-Räzi, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 183. 
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said if we have knowledge or think it is probable 
(dhanannä) that God has made something as reason for 
a hukm then the repetition of that hinan will be 
necessitated by the repetition, of that reason according 
to the consensus of those who argue by analogy.. He 
concluded that that shows that the fact that the hukm 
will not necessarily be repeated with the repetition 
of what it depends upon in the case of a human being 
does not mean that it will not be so in the case of God. 
He said that it could be argued that it is not inferred 
from the language but it could only be inferred from 
the command made by God or the Prophet, through reasoning 
by analogy. 
l 
His explanation has shown clearly the extent, of 
his belief that the repetition of the amr as a result 
of the repetition of the 'ilia is not inherent in itself 
but can be inferred if it is associated with a command 
of God or the Prophet. 
A1-Ghazäli. also is of the opinion that the command 
of God will be automatically interpreted as meaning 
repetition though he has reservations on certain kinds 
of commands.. He also rejected the view that al-amr 
al-mu"allag requires repetition. However, it seems 
that he limited his opposition to repetition of al-amr 
al-mu'allaq to a case which involves a sharp or a sifa. 
He regards sifa as different from "illa. He maintained 
1. Al-Raz3, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 183. 
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that the correct view was that the shart had no effect 
on the amr because if one says: idrib, it does not seem 
to give the sense of repetition. Also in his view, if 
one says idribhu in kRna gä'iman (beat him if he is 
standing) it-did not require repetition either because 
one only appeared to be intending that the expression 
of darb should refer to the particular circumstance of 
standing on that occasion. 
l 
He maintained-that there 
is no difference between that example and the example 
of someone saying to his agent, "Divorce my wife if she 
enters. " Repetition of entry on another . occasion would 
not require repetition of the hukm. The same is also 
true if one says directly to one's wife,: "If you enter 
the house you are divorced. " Thus repetition ofithe 
shart would only require repetition of, the amr if one 
said to one's wife, whenever you enter the-house, you 
are divorced. 
2 
However, al-Ghazäl3 suggests that the 
Qur'änic injunction: "Whoever is present (at his home) 
during that month should spend it in fasting" (Q/2/185) 
requires it, and when the sun is set, prayer requires 
the repetition of the amr whenever the shart is repeated. 
He argued that those examples were no different-from the 
case of a man saying to his wives, "Whoever is present 
during that month is divorced. "3 He went on that the 
1. Al-Ghazäl3, al-Mustasfä, vol. 2, p. 8. 
2. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 8. 
3. Ibid., vol.. 2, p. 8. 
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problems for those who support repetition were two: 
One of them is that they regard the 'illaias similar to 
the shart and thus maintained that the hukm would be 
repeated with the repetition of the 'ills, which in 
this case was actually a shart because the 'ills in 
Islamic law was an indication of the requirement of 
the law. Al-Ghazäli argued against this that the 'ills 
was of two kinds: rational and that associated with 
revealed law. It was'natural for the rational 'illa 
to require the repetition because the essence of the 
rational cause requires that which is caused. 
l On the 
other hand, the mere association of requirement with a 
cause without there being another context with which to 
compare it would not necessarily require the repetition 
of the requirement. This is the process of adopting a 
law through i äs, which means that God has given us a 
mandate to follow the requirement of 'illä given the 
appropriate repetition of the context. He said that 
it looks as if God is saying that the hukm is established 
by the 'illa and you must follow it. 
2 
The second problem for those who support repetition 
of shart or 'illa according to al-Ghazäli was that they 
maintained that the commandment of God can only be 
repeated with the repetition of reasons, e. g. 9/5/7: 
"If you are in a state of ritual impurity bathe your 
1. Ibid., p. 8. 
2. Ibid., p. 8. 
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whole body" and "When you prepare for prayer, wash your 
faces. " He said that those examples were not obligations 
merely because of logical association nor because of 
linguistic necessity but because of a divine reason 
which exists in every condition (shart). 
l 
He gave 
4/3/97 as an example: "God requires pilgrimage thereto 
for men who can afford the journey. " He argued that the 
hajj is also an obligation but it will not be repeated 
with repetition of the shart which is the ability to 
afford to make the journey. 
2 
It seems that al-Ghazäli is trying to draw a 
distinction between what is acceptable on a logical 
basis and what is acceptable on the basis of divine 
regulation (i. e. shari"a and so on). His argument 
shows that he believes that conclusion or hukm could 
be proclaimed on the basis of logical conclusion 
provided that it has nothing to do with religion and 
law. At the same time he also accepts that in the case 
of the law or shari'a it could be a necessity but not 
because of the conclusion reached on the linguistic 
calculation but on a special belief that a divine command 
was meant to be a necessity. His explanation of the 
first of what he terms as two problems shows that he 
was not opposed to the repetition of al-amr al-mu"allaq 
particularly if the ta'13q was 'illa (reason) in the 
1. Ibid., p. 8. 
2. Ibid., p. 8. 
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case of al-shari'a but the requirement of repetion 
here was not because of the regulation drawn out on 
the basis of linguistic calculation but because it was 
made to require repetition by God. 
The problems of the repetition of the amr in both 
al-amr al-mutlaq and al-amr al-mu'allaq reveal some- 
basic problems faced by scholars of law in discussing 
the application of the law. The four trends - 
repetition, probability, outright rejection of repetition 
. and suspension of judgement until" further evidence - 
which were indicated in al-amr al-mutlaq also appear 
in al-amr al-mu'allaq. However, -in the latter 'case, 
repetition has won over completely some of the supporters 
of probability of repetition. The main division seems 
to be between those who argue for repetition and those 
who argue for further contextual evidence before 
repetition is a requirement. The implications in 
some legal matters-were-quite large. However, it was 
probably only theoretical in'terms of a thief who was 
caught four times. It is to be hoped that if he was 
involved in such thieving, he came before a gadi who 
did belong to the school of repetition. 
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The Effect of Time on Amr 
The time in which an amr is expected to be carried 
out is likely to have considerable. impact on the nature 
of the amr. It also caused a heated controversy among 
usülls. In order to make what they mean by time clear 
it is possible to'define the time of an amr as follows: 
Every amr has three times in which the person with 
the responsibility to obey it (mukallaf or ma'mür) is 
required to carry out his obligation (Va jib). The first 
of those times begins immediately after the amr has been 
commanded or after the time fixed for it has become due. 
That period has been termed al-wagt al-awwal. 
1 At the 
other extreme the third time is when, if the mukallaf 
fails to carry out amr during the appropriate" period 
and therefore has allowed the time to lapse`, he''will 
then be regarded as disobedient. They also termed that 
period al-wagt al-thälith. 
2 They also call it al-wagt 
al-darüri. 
The second time is that between the first''period 
and the third period (i. e. between the beginning of 
the requirement to perform the amr and the time in which, 
if the mukallaf fails to perform the amr, it"will lapse). 
3 
That period is termed al-wagt al-thäni. 
1. Abi Husayn al-Basr., ^ Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, p. 120. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 120. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 120; also see Shing1ti, Mudhakra, 
P. 13. 
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The amr or obligation may sometimes be further 
divided into two different kinds, both involving time. 
Thus in the five daily prayers (salawät), there are 
specific times for the performance of these salawät. 
However, within those specific times there is a period 
which gives a certain leeway for the performance of the 
amr of salä. t. 'Thus the fajr prayer must be said'from the 
time of fa Jr to the time of sunrise. This gives a certain 
degree, although limited, of extension of time. This kind 
of amr is called al-wäjib al-muwassa'1 (i. e, the extended 
period for the obligation). It has involved such 
requirements as zakät, hajj, etc. 
Thus the fast of Ramadän must begin at dawn of the 
first day of Ramadan and continue until sunset of each 
day until the final day of the month. No leeway is 
allowed in the sense that, although a person may fast 
a little longer than that each day, the actual- 
require-ment is absolutely from those specific times. This is 
known as al-wäjib al-mudayyaq. 
2 
The first of these is the particular concern of 
this investigation as there is no disagreement among 
jurists that the latter one could only be done within 
the time limit, unless an exception has been made. 
Although the same particular terms to describe 
1. Al-Jaziri, Kitab al-Figh, vol. 1, pp. 180-181. 
Also see Shing3ti, al-Mudhakray p. 11. 
2. Ibid., p. 11. 
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these may not always be used by all usills, they 
generally agreed with the ideas involved. The ideas 
themselves are first clearly defined by the usülis 
and jurists after Shäfi'i, though they are implicit 
in the legal works which these scholars inherited 
right from the early period of Islam and they are -"" 
deduced from doctrines of the early schools of law. 
That is why most of the available early evidences 
in support of them are based on interpretation rather. 
than clear statements. There is indeed little direct 
information from most of the early jurists and usülIs 
such as Abü Hanifa, Malik, Shäfi'i and Ahmad b. Hanbal, 
even though they are sometimes cited as authorities. 
The only direct information which suggests that the' 
development of the ideas involved in-those later terms 
might have started from the period of Abü Han! fa and 
Shäfi' came from two Hanafite scholars, 'Abd al-Latif 
b. 'Abd al-Azlz b. Malak and Yahyä al-Rahaw3, in their 
commentary on Sharh al-Manär of 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad, - 40 
who is well known as al-Nasari. 
l 
In the book, Ibn 
Malak and al-Rahäwi maintained that most of the Hanafites 
are of the opinion that al-amr al-mutlaq does not require 
immediately implementation (al-fawr) but allows a period 
of delay (tarakhi). Al-Rahäwi also attributed this view 
to most of Shäfi'ites and ahl al-kaläm and Abü Yusüf 
(d. 182 A. H. ), a pupil of Abü Hanifa. As evidence of . 
its early appearance in the Hanafi law, he says that 
it is the doctrine of Abü Hanifa as reported by Abü 
1. Al-Nasafl, Sharh al-Manär, p. 222. 
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Sahl al-Zujaj, and that this probably goes back to 
Abü Hanf a. 
' 
Al-Nasaf3 himself is in favour of this 
view and both Ibn Malak and al-Rahäw3 reported that 
it was opposed by another Hanafite, al-Karkhi (d. 340 
A. H. ), some of the Shäfi'ites, the 4Ammat ahl al-Had! th, 
some of the Mu'tazilites, Muhammad b. Hasan al-Shaybän3 
(d. 187 A. H. ,a pupil of Abt Hanifa and Shäfi'3 himself, 
according to another report from Abi Sahl al-Zujaj. They 
hold the view that al-amr al-mutlaq should be based on 
immediate implementation (al-fawr). 2 
If these reports were true, then it may mean that 
the use of the terms and the classification of them 
started during the period of AbU IJanifa, MAlik and 
Shä. fi43. On the-other hand, the view that Abü Hanifa 
is opposed to the early implementation of al-amr al- 
mutlaq and that Shäfi'3 is in favour of early implement- 
ation would be both contrary to what is widely reported 
from them and their popular practice, which most of 
their followers have strictly adhered to. 
3 For example, 
Hanafites and hMälikites are known for their insistence 
that hajj should be based on immediate implementation 
and that any delay of hajj after the year in which one 
has the ability to do it is regarded as disobedience. 
4 
1. Ibid., p. 222. 
2. Ibid., p. 222. 
3. Ibid., p. 222. But for the contrary view see Abü 
Ishäq al-Shiräzi, al-Tabsra, p. 52 and al-Baydäw3, 
al-Minhäj, vol. 2, p. 44. 
4. Ibn QudMma, al-Mughni, vol. 3, p. 241. 
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Though they disagree over how to'interpret the level of 
delay which could bring amr out of. being the'time when 
it should be done (al-ädä'). 
1 
Moreover, it appears that Abü Sahl al-Zujaj, 'whose 
date of death is still tobe ' established, is later than 
either Abi Han! fa. or Shäfi'i and also later'than Abt .. 
Yüsuf and Muhammad b. Hasan al-Shaybäni, he cannot 
have reported that information from either Abi Yüsuf 
or anybody of his age. However, it is believed that 
it was al-Karkhi (d. 340 A. H. )', who actually formed 
that impression from the argument between AbüýYüsuf 
and'Muhammad b. Hasan al-Shaybäni over whether or not 
the hajj should be performed as an obligation as soon 
as a person is able to perform it. 
2 
As for al-Shafi'3, the suggestion that he personally 
used these terms has been attributed to him in two ways: 
la. Ibn QudBna, al-Mughn3, vol. 3, p. 242, 
b. al-' ada) is a term used for carrying out the 
obligation at the appropriate time; al-gadä' is 
to carry out obligation after the original time 
legally fixed for it has lapsed (see Ibn Qudna, 
al-Rawda_, p. 31). 
2. Al-Badkhasi, Sharh al-Badkhasw,, vol. 1, 
, 
p. 44. This 
book is a commentary work 
. on ;.,,! 
tMinhä j al-Wusül 
fl 'ilm al-Us31 of Qad3 Abd Allah b. 'Umar al-Baydäw3 
(d. 685 A. H. ). 
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One is that he favours(al-fawr)l early implementation. 
The second is that he favours (al-tarakh3)2 the 
possibility of delaying al-amr al-mutlaq. But there 
was no strong evidence to-back the view that he"used 
the terms or 'that they were used-in his ' period ' in 'the 
way they were attributed. However, there are some 
convincing evidences that both were deduced from his 
doctrine and later attributed to'him. 
The first view that suggests that he favours 
immediate implementation (al-fawr) may have been - 
deduced out of his early doctrine in Iraq that one 
should observe al-mut"dba'a3 in ablution, the view 
which he later abandoned when he moved to Egypt. For 
example, he said in al-"Umm, ' in the case 'of `al-mutäba'a, 
1. Al-Nasaf , Sharh al-Manär, p. 222. 
2. Ibid., p. 222; 
p. 44. 
also see Sharh al-Badkhasl, vol. 2, 
3. In fact Shä. fi'3 used the word al-mutäba' a, which 
is from al-tatäb' u. Al-mutäba' a , "or al-muwä, llät 
or al-fawr are the same with regard to ablution. 
But al-fawr is more general, - , I.. %k( application in 
different ways, while al-mutäba"a or al-muwällat is 
limited to uninterrupted action in ablution. They 
are used in the law books. See Shäfi'i, al-'Umm, 
vol. 1, pp. 30-31 (al-mutäba"-a). 
Ibn Rushd, al-Mugaddmat, vol. 1, p. 53 (al-fawr). 
Ibn Rushd, Bidäyät al-Mu tahid, vol. 1, p. 17 
(al-muwällät). 
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that it is an obligation and that it must be observed 
in the absence of necessary impediment such as moving 
from one place to another for serious danger, e. g. a 
wall collapsing, fire, insufficient . water and so on. ; - 
And thus leaving a man who interrupted his ablution 
without any one of these reasons only with the option 
of starting a fresh , ablution. 
1 But according to Raba' 
b. Sulayman. (d. 270 A. H. ), Shäfi'i has abandoned this 
view and allowed a break, whether for necessity. or not. 
2 
In that regard, Shafi"i said that he. did not-see. in the 
case of al-mutäba" a what he saw . 
in the case of, bringing 
one action forward before another (al-tagdim) of part 
of one ablution or another, and. then he declared that 
"Our fundamental doctrine is that he (the person 
performing ablution) should wash as he_wishes-even 
if he interrupts the process because God only., says, 
'Nor in a state of ritual impurity (except when 
travelling on the road) until after washing your- 
whole body' Q/4/43 and this person is washing even. - 
if he interrupts the action for a time. " Shäfi'. i 
concluded that "I would not have said that it is 
enough for him without this evidence. "3 This - 
explanation from Shäfi'i himself may have put those 
who maintained that his doctrine was al-tarakh3 right, 
1. Shäfi'3, al-'Umm, vol. It p. 30. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p.. 30. , 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 31. 
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even though they did not get the use of explicit 
terminology from him, because it is implicit in'his 
of interpretation the above Qur'ä. nic evidence, but 
those who were aware only of his first doctrine could 
have based their attribution on that as well. 
Another view which suggested that-all attributed 
opinions to either Abi }; ianifa, Mälik, Shäfi' i. and 
other scholars of their age were only deduced from 
their doctrine, could be further strengthened by 
subsequent reports from other scholars in the same 
way. For example, al-Quräfi reported that al-amr al- 
mutlaq should be based on early implementation and 
that it was the view of Mälikites and Hanafites, 
except our Maghribites colleagues (Mälikis) and 
Shäfi'ites. 1 Then he`said that that was maintained 
by Qädi 'Abd al-Wahab b. 'Al! b. Nasr, 'a Mälikite 
scholar (d. 422 A. H. ) in his book 'al-Mullakhas which 
our Malik3 colleagues support, that amr'should be 
based on early implementation. Al-Quräf! added later 
that the opinion was only understood from Mälik's view 
that amr should be based on early implementation (al-fawr), 
such as his view that one should make hajj immediately 
one has the ability to do it, as well as his forbidding 
of the interruption of ablution (tafriqat al-wudü') and 
many other things of that kind in his doctrine. 
2 
This 
1. £l-Quräf"1, Sharh al-TangTh, p. 129. 
2. Ibid., p. 129. 
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report was echoed by a Zaydite scholar, Muhammad b. 
'All al-Shawkän3, (d. 1255 A. H. ), who also reported 
from Ibn Burhan; 
l 
who maintained that there was no 
text reported either from Abü Hanifa or Sh. fi'3 
concerning the time of amr and the attribution of 
any opinion to them is based on an interpretation 
of their doctrine? This is a widely reported view 
and it gives the impression that development of these 
terms started later even than Shafi'i's period. 
However the question of exactly-when the amr 
should be carried out is-the main-point of this 
discussion and the point under investigation here' 
is whether or not there is any other principle upon 
which scholars based their doctrine, other than - 
literary interpretation. This would help determine- 
whether or not al-fawr is obligatory for an-amr. 
There seem to be four major opinions altogether- 
from which we can examine and see how the individual 
schools reached their conclusions on the timing-of 
amr. 
As already mentioned, Hanafites, 
3 
Mälikites4 and 
1. Ibn Burhän. His full name is Ahmad b. 'All b. 
Muhammad al-Khalil AbU al-Fathi al-Shafi"l. He 
lived in Baghdad (d. 520 A. H. ). 
- 
2. Al-Shawkän3, Irshäd, p. 88. Also see al-Shiräzi, 
al-Tabsra, - p. 53. 
3. A1-Sh! räzi, al-Tabsra, pp. 52-53. 
4. Al-Quräf3, Sharh al-Tanqlh, p. 129. 
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some Hanbalitesl and the generality of ahl al-hadith, 
2 
are of the opinion that al-amr al-mutlaq requires 
immediate implementation. That is their interpretation 
of Q/3/133, "Be quick in the race for forgiveness from 
your Lord And for a garden whose width is that of the 
earth, " and Q/23/61, "It is these who are foremostin 
them. " They maintained that both these verses included 
God's commandments and thus, according to them, 'the . 
command "Be quick" involves all activities which could 
lead to forgiveness-. Thus rapid implementation of the 
commandment of God is the best way to this. 
3 
Although the Hanafites, Mälikites'and, Hanbalites 
are united in their view that amr must be `carried out 
at an early time, it-'seems that they differ on many 
occasions on the point which could be regarded-as an 
early time. This led to disagreement on many issues. 
For example, they all agree that hajj must be performed 
immediately one is able to do that and if a man delays 
it till the following year, 'he is guilty of negligence 
because he has abandoned the obligation of early 
implementation. 
4 
On the question of zakät, Mälikites 
and Hanbalites are also agreed that early implementation 
1. Ibn Qudäma, al-Rawda, p. 105. 
2. Al-Nasafl, Sharti al-Manär, p. 222.. 
3. Ibn Qudä. zna, al-Rawda, p. 105. 
4. Ibn Qudä. ma, al-Mughni, vol. 3, pp. 241-242; 
also see al-Jazir3, Kitäb al-Figh, vol. 1, p. 631. 
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is a matter of obligation. 
1 There are two conflicting 
reports from Hanafites: One puts them with Mälikites 
and Hanbalites and-that accords with their doctrine. 
2 
Another one, which. was reported by the Hanbal3 scholar, 
Ibn Qud. ma, puts forward the view that Abü Hanifa is 
with Shaft' l, who rejected that zakät should'be based 
on early implementation. This view has the provision, 
that zakät must be paid early if there is a demand for 
it to be paid. 
3 
. 
On the question of the five daily salawät, _the 
Hanafites and Mälikites seem to be more moderate, while 
Hanbalites are adamant that one must say-each salät 
immediately the time for it becomes due. Therefore 
any delay till-the second period (which is-between the 
first and the third) and the third period is regarded 
as negligence, though they still regard the. salät, as 
having been properly and appropriately performed salät, 
rather than performed as a-, later compensation-, for-its 
non-performance at the correct time (gadä') as long as 
it was started while there was still time, within-the 
third period sufficient for at'least one rak'a to be 
completed, even though the rest of the-salät-would`be-ý 
1. Malik, al-Mudawwana, vol. 1, p. 245; also see 
Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 2, p. 684+. 
2. Al-Nasaf3, Sharh al-Manär, p. 222. 
3. Ibn Qud'ana, ` al-Mughni., vol. 2, p. 684. 
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performed after the time. 
I 
As for the Mälikites, they further divided the 
time into their own peculiar division-of al-wagt al- 
ikhtiyäri and al-wagt al-darüri (time of choice-and 
time of necessity). The time of choice. seems to 
include both the first and the second period. If a -. 
man delays his salät till the end of the second period 
by starting before the end of the time of choice, and 
has prayed up to one rak'a (like Hanbalites) and 
completed the rest within the time of necessity (al- 
darür3), he is not guilty of negligence. They only 
expect him to have completed at least one rak'a in 
order to consider his salät as ädä' rather than gadä'. 
Otherwise it will be regarded as qadR' and he will be 
guilty of negligence. 
2 
One important difference between Malikites and 
Hanbalites here is that, in the case of the Mälikites, 
if the salät was started at the time, of choice and 
completed at the time of necessity, the obligation 
has been fulfilled without any negligence, because the 
Mälikites particularly consider salät as an obligation 
which can be performed within the extended time of these 
periods, whereas Hanbalites consider any delay from the 
1. Ibn QudRma, al-Mughnl, vol. 1, pp. 372-373; 
also see al-Jazir3, al_Figh, vol. 1, pp. 180-181. 
2. Wa-lik, al-Mudawwana, vol. 1,, p. 56; 
also see al-Jaziri, al-Figh, vol. 1, p. 181. 
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first period till the second or third time as negligence 
l 
with regard to the amr. 





some of the Mu'tazilites4 and 
the Shiites, is that amr is a mere demand for action 
which does not include in any way an indication of the 
time the amr should be carried out. This is the view 
that was widely attributed to Shafi'i himself. 
5 
Although 
they do not oppose the amr-being carried out at an early 
time, they do consider it as recommended (mandüb), 
which is understood through separate evidence outside 
the scope of amr and, therefore, they allow some delay 
to the last minute in the third period. That is when, 
if the obligation of salät has not been performed, 
disobedience is considered to have arisen. That delay ` 
is based on the condition that the mukallaf is sure 
that the time will not run out before he could carry 
it out, and he has not foreseen anything that could 
prevent him from doing it before the end of the time. 
6 
1. Ibn Rusted, al-Mugadmmat, pp. 108-109. 
2. Al-Baydawi, al-Minhaj al-Usül, vol. 2, p. 44. 
3. Al-Shawkä. ni., Irshad, p. 88. 
4. Abü al-Husayn al-Basr!, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 120. 
5. Al-Sh3räz3, al-Tabsra, p. 53; also see al-Ghäzäl3, 
al-Mustasf , vol. 2, pp. 9-10. 
6. Al-Murtadä, al-Dhari-ý--Q-ý., vol. 1, p. 135; also see 
Abi al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu"tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 125. 
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In addition to that, he must substitute (badal)1 
immediate compliance by "azm (determination) that he 
will carry it out before the end of the time. 
2 
Al- 
Bägilän3 claims that badal is the determination to 
obey in the, future. He says: "Whoever delays obedience 
without there occurring in his mind the determination 
(to obey) has disobeyed his Lord. " Then he makes it 
(badal) applicable to every time which may show some 
uncertainty about (immediate) obedience and the 
determination (to delay obedience) until the moment 
possible. 
3 Then that time (i. e. from the beginning 
to the last possible) is specified for carrying out 
the action. 
According to this group, which held the second 
opinion, if the mukallaf decides not to carry amr 
out at the beginning of the time and substitutes it 
by determination 'azm and decides to delay it until 
the moment possible, he will not be guilty of negligence; 
and if he dies before the end of the time, he does not 
have any responsibility for the fact that it had not 
been performed, because he was allowed either-to perform 
it immediately or to determine to carry it out in future. 
1. Badal: to "substitute", to substitute immediate 
obedience with the determination to obey before the 
last time when the action can be validly carried out. 
2. Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 125, 
3. Imäm al-Haramayn, al-Burhan, vol. 1, p. 237. 
4. Al-Murtadä, al-Dharit 7, vol. 1, p. 136. 
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Moreover, they do not see any difference between 
obligation and the time itself. In other words, al-fawr 
is not obligation. Therefore the basic principle is 
that nothing should be regarded as obligatory, requiring 
immediate implementation, unless there was another 
context outside the mere demand for action'. For example, 
on the issue of hajj and zakät, /both of which their 
opponents have advocated al-fawr as duties which it is 
proved are subject to the obligation of early implementation, 
they permitted delay based on the above mentioned" 
conditions. 
On the question of al-tatäbu' in ablution, they 
maintained, as would be expected, that it is not 
obligatory. 
l 
Although there is not actual evidence 
in Shäfi'35surviving books for his assertion that 
al-fawr is not obligatory with regard to amr, one of 
the principal supports for his having held this doctrine 
is his attitude to al-tatäbu' (i. e. the uninterrupted 
performance of the various actions in the ritual 
purification), which he maintained was not obligatory. 
2 
There is also another statement from him regarding the 
time of hajj. The statement also may have been the 
sources of evidence for those who attributed the view 
that amr does not require immediate implementation to 
him. In the statement which is in al-'Umm, Shäfi'3 
1. Shawkanl, Irshäd, p. 88. 
2. Shäfi'3, al-'Umm, vol. 1, pp. 30-31. 
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says that God made hajj obligatory after the Prophet's 
migration to Madina and the Prophet ordered Abü Bakr 
to perform hajj while he himself stayed at Madina. 
That was after he had returned from Täbük. He was 
neither fighting nor busy with anything. Also staying 
at Madina with him were many people who were capable 
of performing hajj, such as his wives. On this basis 
Shafi43 argued that if delaying hajj is like someone 
who delays al-salät (prayer) until its time has gone, 
then the Prophet would not have delayed it nor those 
who did so with him. Then Shäfi"i declared that the 
time of hajj is between when it is due and when one 
dies. 
l 
This clear statement has also given an indication 
not only that al-fawr is not obligatory but also that 
there is no divine guide-line on the exact time when 
amr should be carried out. If it had been obligatory 
to carry out the amr at an early time, the Prophet would 
have mentioned it. Lack of such evidence, which if it 
were available would be binding, may be one of the 
reasons why Shäfi"I changed his mind on al-tatäbu" as 
well and followed the obvious meaning of the Qur'änic 
injunction on ablution, which did not commit one to a 
particular time or condition. 
2 
Fakhr al-Din al-Räz3 has put forward another opinion, 
1. Shäfi'i , al'Umm, vol. 8, p. 63. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 31. 
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which is also interesting. His own view seems to 
represent a small fraction among ahl al-kaläm. He 
maintained that al-amr al-mutlaq, by its nature, could 
jointly require both al-fawr and al-tarakh3.1 On the 
basis of this view only the context would indicate which 
one is meant. This view seems to be a doctrine based 
on linguistic interpretation. In fact, this is the 
view which this group of ahl äl-kal n maintained on 
several occasions on the question of amr. 
2 In their 
definition of amr in the sense of time,. they do agree 
with Shäfi'ites that amr is a mere demand'for action, 
but later interpreted that to mean that, there is a 
joint connection (mushtarak) between commanding something 
in terms of al-fawr (immediate implementation)--at one 
time, and in terms of al-tarakh3-"at another time. There- 
fore that demand for action could be on the `basi-s - of 
early implementation or on the basis of al-tarakhi at 
another time, without any indication in the word itself 
as to whether or not-it was specific for any one of them. 
3 
This view seems to have originated from their principle 
that amr'is common between al-gawl al-makhsus and the 
action, rather than being special to one of them as we 
have discussed in detail at the beginning of the first 
chapter. 
4 
1. Al-RAz3, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, pp. 189-190. 
2. See above, pp. 145-146. 
3. Al-Räzi, al-Mahsfl, vol. 1, p. 190. 
4. See above, pp. 40-49. 
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Since the majority of ahl al-ka1 m traditionally 
belong to the Shäfi'ite madhhab, the different interpret- 
ation of a few of them here can only be taken as verbal 
opposition and a demonstration of the ability to exercise 
their own personal discretion whenever it is needed, 
while in practice they did not put forward any different 
way of when and how amr should be carried out. 
Finally, al-Murtadä and Imäm al-Haramayn, with 
another group-of Shäfi'ites and some Ash'arites, in 
two separate versions declare that they would defer 
their judgement until they would be able to establish 
the fact. 1 They are referred to as ahl al-wagf. Their 
declaration, however, which could be viewed by outsiders 
as a further complication of an already complicated issue, 
did little or nothing to give any guidance on exactly 
when or how amr should be carried out. Furthermore, 
their argument appears to be nothing more than the 
argument of the Shäfi'ites on the issue of the time of 
amr and that of ahl al-hadith because,, despite the 
declaration by both al-Murtadä and Im. m al-Haramayn 
that their doctrine is that of al-tawagquf, they both 
produced nothing different in their doctrines to what the 
Shäfi"ites and ahl al-hadith had already put forward 
respectively. For example, al-Murtadä is strongly in 
favour of al-badal bi-al-4azm (substitution of immediate 
1. Al-Murtadä, al-Dharica ., vol . 1, p. 131; 
also see Imam al-Haramayn, al-Burhan, vol. 1, p. 232. 
-197- 
compliance by determination), He also maintained that 
there must be a time limit for determination. 
1 
Both 
conditions which the Shafi"ites regard as the main 
reason for believing in the possibility of delaying 
al-amr al-mut laq. Imäm al-Haramayn, on the other hand, 0 40 
also insists that his own doctrine was that of tawagquf, 
while he agrees with ahl al-hadith that performing an 
amr at an early time is a matter of obedience. He was 
also opposed to the idea of al-badal and made a strong 
attack on those who support it along with the possibility 
of delaying amr. 
2 
In his account of tawagquf, Imäm al-Harainayn 
maintained that if someone performs an amr at the 
early time, he would be regarded as obedient. He 
said that there is no doubt about that. He further 
maintained that if amr was delayed and performed at a 
later hour, one could not say that the obligation had 
been fulfilled. 3 Clarifying his own understanding of 
al-fawr and al-tarakhi. Im2, m al-Haramayn explained that 
what needed further explanation was the wording of the 
amr. As to those who interpreted the form as meaning 
al-fawr, there was no objection to that, but the 
interpretation that it means the possibility of delay 
is weak, because that implies that the form of al-amr 
1. A1-Murtadä, al-DhariCg-., vol. 1, p. 135. 
2. Imäm al-Haramayn, al-Burhän, vol. 1, p. ' 132. 
3. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 233. 
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al-mutlaq by its nature requires the possibility of. 
delaying (al-tarakhi), so that if we. presume that 
someone complied with it immediately that action, would 
not be considered correct. No one has ever accepted, 
such doctrine. He concluded that the appropriate thing 
for the opinion which was attributed to-both ShUfill 
and Qäd3 Abü Bakr al-Bägiläni, would be if they could 
confine themselves to the view that amr requires 
compliance and then declare that the, time, of that 
compliance is not known. 
1 From this explanation, his 
position can be recognised and it has forced some 
opponents of al-fawr to question his neutrality. Al- 
Shawkän3, who also quoted him as saying that "demand 
for action is certain and the only thing doubtful is 
whether or not delay is-possible. Therefore al-fawr is; 
necessary in order to ensure fulfilling the responsibility, " 
commented that this statement is not consistent with what 
he has put forward as tawagquf, on whether. or not an amr 
requires al-fawr (immediate implementation), because his 
emphasis on the obligatory nature of al-fawr contradicts, 
his doctrine of al-tao gquf, as well as his statement 
that in whatever manner al-mukallaf carries out the amr 
he has fulfilled the requirement of the-form of the amr. 
2 
As for al-Murtadä, he started by citing-, the opinions 
of other schools on the question of the time of the amr. 
1. Imäm al-Haramayn, al-Burhän, vol. 1, p. 133. 
2. Al-Shawkäni, Irshäd, p. 90. 
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He said that another group are of the opinion that what 
is compulsory for whoever heard al-amr al-mutlaq which 
has no context or indication of the time of implementation, 
is to know that one was commanded to carry it out. Then 
the judgement about identifying any time or attempting to 
find what evidence indicated it, could be deferred. He 
maintained that there was no time understandable from the 
word "amr", nor the specification of choice of time. And 
it is not appropriate to try to understand from the word, 
what it did not contain, as it is not appropriate to try 
to understand from it any place or numbering and any 
other things the word did not contain. He further 
pointed out that an amr could come in the Qur'än and 
in the customary usage of ahi al-lugha at times for 
immediate implementation, at other times for al-tarakhi. 
He emphasised that it has been explained several times 
that obvious usage of certain words for two different 
meanings requires that it is the origin for both and 
common (mushtarak) between them. 
l 
This explanation is more appropriate for his doctrine 
as al-tawagquf, but complications arose when he declared 
himself in favour of al-badal bi-al-'azm (substitution 
of immediate implementation of an amr by determination 
to carry it out) and his failure to put forward any new 
idea based on his doctrine in addition to his open 
defence of the Shäfi'ites' opinion. This support became 
1. Al-Murtad 1, al-DhariEcq : -.., vol. 1, pp. 131-132, 
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apparent when he said in reply tolahl al-haddth, those 
who have earlier argued that the possibility of delaying 
amr will turn it into a supererogatory action (al-näfila). 
He replied that that is not true because if it is possible 
to delay it, one must determine to carry it out in the 
future. Thus an obligatory determination is placed 
upon such a person if he performs it at the later time. 
This distinguishes it from näfila, because it is possible 
to delay näfila without badal; unlike obligation which 
cannot be delayed without badal. 
l 
To the argument that 
this would require confirmation of substitution without 
evidence, he replied that if we know by evidence that 
the mir, who obliged the action, did not want fawn but 
only wanted al-tarakh! and choice (al-takhayyur), then 
there is no choice other than to confirm this badal. 
And by so doing, we did not confirm the badal without 
evidence. He concluded that that argument can only be 
valid for those who maintained that al-amr al-mutlaq, 
by its nature, requires delay without any separate 
evidence. 
2 Then al-Murtadä tries to define al-"azm 
and says: al-'azm logically is substitution of every 
obligation which is delayed, such as the act of making 
up religious performances (gadä' al-din) and every 
other dealing, because if he abandons the obligatory 
action together with the determination to carry it out,, 
1. Al-Murtadä, al-DhariCQ:.,, vol. 1, p. 134. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, P., 134. 
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in future, he will deserve blame. 
1 
This is part of the convincing evidence that 
suggests that al-Murtadä, despite his claim to be. 
adopting the doctrine of al-tawagquf, is in fact in 
favour of the Shäfi"ites idea and he. has not produced 
any different idea from that of the Shäfi''ites. Also 
this evidence from al-Murtadd and the evidence from 
Imam al-Haramayn, who also seems to advocate the doctrine 
of ahl al-had1th behind al-tawaqquf, seems to have 
resulted in four opinions put forward in an attempt to 
find common ground for exactly what time amr should be 
carried out. It is noticeable from these-opinions that 
the ahl al-had1th and Shäfi'ites appear to, be the most 
well-rooted and consistent of them. The later arguments 
of al-Räzi, Murtadä and Imäm al-Haramayn are based on 
the earlier two arguments. 
In an attempt to substantiate their claim, ahl al- 
had3th cited more verses from the Qur'an, which they 
considered to indicate the obligatory nature of immediate 
implementation. However, all these verses appear to be 
based on mere interpretation and no one has been able to 
produce precise evidence, either from the Qur'an or from 
the Tradition of the Prophet, which could be acceptable 
to all parties., For example, they quoted Q/7/12: "What 
prevented thee from bowing down when ,I commanded thee. " 
This, according to their own view, -requires immediate 
1. A1-Murtada, al-Dhariýq-, vol. 1, p. 135. 
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implementation because idh (when) is for time. There- 
fore the meaning of the'verse looks as" if God is saying 
"What prevented you from bowing at the period I ordered 
you to bow. " They'argued that if the amr had not 
required immediate implementation, Iblis, to whom God 
addressed this verse, would have argued, "Though you 
commanded me, you did not ask me to carry it out 
immediately and therefore I can bow whenever. I wish. "1 
Besides that, they also cited Q/7/185: "Do they see 
nothing in the Government of heavens and earth and al l°'` 
that is created? (Do'they-not see) that it may well'be 
that their term is nigh drawing to an. end? In what 
message after this will they then believe. " This, they 
maintained, is a clear warning against the-delaying of 
an amr in order to avoid failure because of a gradual 
decline as the result of old age. 
2 
However, this 
interpretation obviously further demonstrates the - "' 
weakness of the argument of ahl al-hadith, rather than 
strengthening it, as it is far from pointing to the 
heart of the argument about the time of obeying the amr, 
either directly or indirectly, except by generalising 
every word of the amr to imply a specific' intention. 
But that may not be acceptable to many scholars. The 
first of these two Qur'ä. nic-examples though, seems to 
be indicating some kind of time of amr by careful 
1. A1-Baydawi, al-Minhli, vol. 2, p. 45. 
2, Ibid., vol. 2, p. 45., 
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interpretation, namely the view thAt idh of its nature 
indicates time and, therefore, God wished in the verse 
that His amr should be obeyed immediately. But since 
it is not a clear cut evidence, it still gives some 
doubt and it will be very difficult to accept such an 
interpretation and base one's daily activities on it. 
The absence of any direct evidence from the Qur'an or 
from the Prophet on the time of al-amr al-mutlaq, as we 
have on many issues, has made the whole argument here 
based on speculation and has presented great difficulties 
in finding appropriate analogies. For example, in the 
case of zakAt, the Prophet said "f- ikaz al-khums"` 
77 
(One fifth should be paid as zakä, t of gold ore). 
' This 
has given precise evidence to the amr concerned, and if 
there is some aspect which still needs some clarification, 
there is a basis for rational deduction (i tihäd). But 
in the case of the time of al-amr al-mutlaq, the evidence 
put forward so far has not provided a satisfactory 
argument, which could give the impression that the time 
of al-amr al-mutlaq was meant when these statements were 
made. For this reason, it is easy to justify the arguments 
of the Shäfi"ites against the earlier Qur'änic evidences 
(Q/3/133 and Q/23/61) put forward by ahl al-hadith, which, 
the Shäfi'ites maintained, though indicating general 
encouragement for performing good actions speedily, is 
nevertheless, a recommendation (mandfb) which could not 
1. Mä1ik, Muwatta, p. 271. 
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be particularly applicable to any specific time.. Therefore 
any evidence that aznr should be carried out on the basis 
of al-fawr or al-tarakhi must come separately, not on., 
the basis of mere demand for action. 
l 
In fact the logical conclusion which ahl al-had3th 
themselves put forward, would have been more relevant 
if they had argued only on its basis, i. e. that they 
wanted to base al-amr al-mutlaq on customary practice 
and logical conclusions, because there is not sufficient 
evidence from the Qur'an to determine the time of amr 
in general terms. If they had supported this view. with 
that conclusion, it may have attracted many more people 
than the method of Qur'ä. nic interpretations which were 
very difficult to reconcile. Even then,, however, it 
would not have been binding on anybody to follow it. 
For example, on the question of substitution 
(al-badal),, which some of them preferred to ignore, 
those who recognised it maintained that there was a 
difference between al-badal and al-'azm and that 'azm 
is obligation,. even before the amr becomes due. That 
implies that one must determine to carry out. the 
obligation whenever it comes and, when the amr becomes 
due, that 'azm becomes invalid. because that will be the 
time to carry out amr. without delay. At that time, 
the '-azm is no, longer needed. 
2 
This, seems _to mean 
that 
1. Badkhash3, Sharh al-Badkhashi, vol. 2, pp. 45-46; 
also see al-Shawkäni, Irshä, d, p. 89. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, al-Rawda, p. 106. 
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'azm, according to. them, 
itself and a fundamental 
al-mukallaf must bear in 
they seem to agree in gei 
is a. separate obligation in, 
principle which 
his mind every time. However, 
neral that al-badal is not 
useful for axnr, on the grounds-that al-badal seems to 
be projected as a permanent replacement for obligation 
and once it has been substituted, it need not be carried 
out in future; unlike this kind of al-badal, which is 
only a temporary measure. 
l 
On the other hand, they analysed the reasons why 
they objected to the delay of al-amr al-mutlaq in three 
separate arguments, as follows: 
1. The requirement of. al-amr al-mutlaq, according to 
ahl al-lisän, is fawr, to the extent, that if a-- 
master says to his., slave: "fetch me-water to drink, " 
and the slave delays it, they find. it. proper to 
rebuke the slave and blame him because he defied 
his order. This argument seems to be acceptable. 
2 
2.. They argued that there must be a time limit (al-ghäya) 
and the best is immediately after the amr has been 
commanded, because by that time the mukallaf will 
be regarded as obedient and he will be out of danger 
of failing to carry it out by accident. Also, 
because the amr is the reason for the action being 
an obligation and, therefore, its hukm must follow 
1. Ibn Qudxna, al-Rawda, p. 106. 
2. Ibid., p. 106. 
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it in comparison with buying and selling and any 
other dealing which always takes effect immediately. 
l 
3, The possibility of delaying the amr to an unspecified 
time is contrary to the spirit of obligation, because 
it can only be delayed, either to a specified or to 
an unspecified time. The second is invalid, because 
it is not appropriate to delay the amr to an unknown 
time, as that will imply the imposition of what is 
beyond the capacity of the mukallaf (taklif mä lä 
yutfq). Also, if the mukallaf makes the limit as 
the time he thinks he can live until, that is 
invalid as well, because one can die unexpectedly. 
One will not reach a position where one will be 
able to be certain about death, except when, one 
feels the approach of death through infirmity, and 
then it would be very difficult to carry out such 
religious obligations as the pilgrimage. 
2 
These arguments are more relevant to the issue of 
the time of amr, though it did not bring the problem 
much closer to being solved. But it did give a clear 
picture of the reasons why those who advocated an early 
time, advocated'it. 
The Zähirites among ahl al-hadith seem'to have gone 
further than other schools by their insistence that 
1. Ibn Qudana, al-Rawda, p. 106. 
2. Ibid., p. 106 
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al-amr al-mutlaq canýonly be carried out within the 
time limit and, once the time is over, there is no 
gada' unless it was specifically mentioned. 
1 
Their 
main point of evidence is that there is no evidence 
that the future time is equal to the present time in 
terms of the validity of compliance with the amr, 
because. according to them, all God's commandments are 
made to suit a certain benefit (maslah) at a certain 
time. Once that time is over, it is not useful to 
perform that amr at another-time, unless there is a 
further instruction from the mir that the future time 
is equal to"the present. 
2 
This attitude seems to have 
originated from their refusal to accept the validity 
of i äs, which the other schools had adopted to cope 
with such situations. For example, the Zähirites do 
not allow someone who deliberately delayed his prayer 
or Ramaran fast until the time has passed, to make it up 
(gadä) on the ground that there is no evidence for that. 
3 
At the same time, they agree with other schools that a 
sleeping person can make up his prayer at a, -later period, 
and a sick person or a menstruating woman can all make 
up their Ramadan fast whenever they become fit, because 
they consider that time as the same as the original 
time of doing it in these cases. - In both cases there 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ikhäm, vol. 3, P-301- 
2. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, pp. 301-302; also see 
al-QuräfI, a 3h, p. 130. 
3. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, PP. 3 01-3 02 . 
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is a specific Qur'änic requirement for this to take 
place but the Zähiris regard these Qur'änic injunctions 
as not equivalent to gada'. 
l 
Other schools maintained 
that anybody who failed to pray or fast, deliberately 
or because of an accident, must make it up no matter,, 
how long it may be. 
2 
That view is based on an, analogy 
deduced from a Tradition from the Prophet, in which he: -, 
replied to a question from a man who asked him whether 
or not he can perform haj j on-behalf of his father, . who 
has'already died. The Prophet replied by saying that, 
"God's debt is the most rightful to be repaid" (Dyn 
Allah ahaq bil gadä'). 
3 
The Zähirites did not reject 
the validity of this Tradition, but applied it only to 
the incident, because applying it-to other similar 
incidents would mean i äs, which they rejected. 
The Zähirites not only put more Qur'ä. nic evidence 
forward in support of the obligatory nature of al-fawr, 
they also succeeded in finding some-Traditions, which,, ' 
other schools had either ignored, -or were not aware of 
the possibility ofýinterpreting them. A leading Zähirite 
scholar, Ibn Hazm, gives detailed accounts of the ahl al- 
hadith point of view as well as the Zähirites'attitude- 
towards al-gadä' . 
Ibn Ha started by reporting that-some-people, whom 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkan, vol. 3, p. 302, 
2. Ibid., vol. 3,304. 
3. Ibid., vol. 3, P. 306. 
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he did not name (probably Shafi"ites), are of the 
opinion that God's commandments should be based on - 
al-tarakhi (possibility of delay), while others 
maintained that it must be based on immediate implement- 
ation (al-fawr) unless al-tarakhi is permitted through 
another text or the'consensus of Muslim scholars. 
l Ibn 
Hazm maintained that the latter view was the correct one 
which cannot be disputed. He cited Q/3/133, which ahl 
al-hadith had already put forward. He stressed that 
God's commandments should be interpreted as obligation 
(al-wujüb) and when God commands us to be-quick in 
performing action and doing things which will bring 
forgiveness, he interpreted that as an obligation to 
be quick to do what God orders us, in the moment of 
ordering, without any delay or hesitation. 
2 
Ibn Hazm is aware of the reason why other people, 
namely the Shäfi'ites, took different views and'that it 
was their belief that Q/3/133 did not specifically imply 
a 
the obligatory nature al-fawr and, therefore, they 
n 
argued that it was insufficient as evidence because, 
even in their own argument, they conceded that the 
order to be quick to do what would lead to forgiveness, 
was only general encouragement and did not refer to any 
particular action. Ibn Hazm argues somewhat tenuously 
that the opposite interpretation to their view is made 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, p. 294. 
2. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 295. 
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clear by the content of Q/27/90: "Do ye receive a 
reward other than that which ye have earned by your 
deed, " which proves that no one can be given forgiveness 
except by (his) good conduct. Yet the relevance of 
this argument is somewhat tenuous. He goes on to 
maintain that we know what God meant by Q/3/133 was to 
be quick to good conduct which would lead to forgiveness 
from God, since there is no other way to be quick other 
than that. He said that that was what the condition 
warranted and it was based on two evidences: One is 
the clear text which has been revealed about that, i. e. 
that nobody will be rewarded with forgiveness and any 
other thing except within the limit of his conduct. The 
second is the clear text which has been revealed, that 
God will not impose anything upon anyone without 
providing him the means with which he can do it. 
Nobody is capable of being quick to obtain forgiveness 
without using good conduct as the'means. 
1 
Ibn'Hazm then divided the obligation into three 
categories of time. However his divisions are not very 
different from the popular ones already mentioned at 
the beginning of this discussion about the time of amr, 
except that it reflected the attitude of the Zähirites 
towards the time of al-amr, which did not recognise the 
possibility of al-gadä' based on analogy (al-giyas)2 and, 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, p. 295. 
2. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 301. 
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in some way, was more rigid in its interpretation. The 
divisions are as follows: 
1. What hasra very, limited time which has no leeway on 
either side (before and after), like the fast oft, 
Ramadän. Ibn Hazm maintained, that one cannot perform 
it until the, time will become due, and once the time 
is over, that means that al-mukallaf has failed to 
carry it out as was required of him. He cannot 
w 
make it, up unless there is fresh authority that 
gadä' is acceptable. 
l This is only the view of the 
Zähirites school of law, because other schools allow 
gad al. In fact they make gad! ' compulsory in all 
circumstances. 
2 
2. What has some leeway 
similar things. Ibn 
evidence that one is 
last period (al-wagt 
perform it before it 
the time is over, it 
like salät (prayer) and other 
Hazm maintained that there was 
allowed to delay it until the 
al-thälith) and one must not 
is due (al-wagt al-awwal). If 
is as the previous division. 
3 
3. An amr which is not connected with a specific time. 
Ibn Hazm maintained that this kind must be performed 
at the beginning of the time (al-wagt al-awwal). 
This, according to Ibn Hazm, will remain the 
responsibility of the mukallaf until he carries 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 3, p. 302. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, al-Rawda, pp. 106-107. 
3. Ibn Hazm, al-IhkUm, vol. 3, p. 295. 
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it out, even if he delays it. 
1 
This last involves 
three types: 
1. Those like making up the fast of Ram aciän in 
the case of a sick person and traveller. Ibn 
Hazm insists that he must perform it immediately 
he is fit. If he performs it immediately, he 
has fulfilled his obligation and, if he delays 
it again without any other reason, he has dis- 
obeyed God by delaying it, but he still has to 
make it up no matter how long it may be. 
2 
2. An amr connected'with time, which has a limited 
beginning but has no limited end, such as the 
obligation of zakät. This one'is"like°the 
previous one and will remain the responsibility 
of the mukallaf until-he"has carried it out. 
3 
3. An amr connected with a limited period which is 
repeated, such as hajj which is connected with 
time during the year, but it is not up to one 
to perform it in a certain year. However it 
must be performed immediately on becoming able 
to perform it, like the two previous cases. 
4 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkzn, vol. 3, p. 295. 
2. Ibid., vol. 3, p. '295. 
3. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 295-296. 
4. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 296. 
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These are the Zähirites' divisions of obligation 
based on time. Because of. their belief that future time 
is not equal to the present time in terms of benefit, 
al-badal or al-'azm was completely taken out of their- 
discussion. In fact, Ibn Hazm didýnot make any reference 
to it. Perhaps he saw it as another kind, of giyäs, which 
had no evidence to support it. If he had accepted the 
validity of al-"azm, i äs would'have: been much more 
acceptable. 
Ibn Hazm concentrated most of his arguments; on 
defending the belief that al-amr al-mutlaq required 
al-fawr. He cited more evidences from-the Qur'än, as- 
well as some Traditions, which in. one-way-or the other 
were associated with the Prophet. Ibn Hazm`, himself, 
admitted that some of this evidence had nothing to<ýdo 
with the question of the time of amr, but he insisted 
that they have to be-interpreted in this way. 
l 
-- 
Ibn Hazm cited Q/9/22: "If a contingent from every 
expedition remained behind they could devote themselves 
to studies in religion and admonish the people when they 
return to them, " and QJ49/6: "0 you who believe if a 
wicked person comes to you with any news ascertain the 
truth lest you harm people-unwittingly afterwards, 
become full of repentance for what you have-done. "- 
Ibn Hazm explains that these-verses have made-it clear 
that God's commandments should be interpreted as requiring 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, p. 297. 
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early implementation (fawr), because he obliged us to 
be cautious in accepting any report-from a wicked person, 
which means that He excluded it from the admonition, 'so 
there is no choice other than to wait or comply immediately, 
no third option except abandoning them altogether. Ibn 
Hazm argued that to suspend judgement (tawagquf)-itself 
amounts to abandoning it. He went on that when God 
singled out the reports of a wicked person by urging 
caution, He had distinguished from reports of a 
person who was not wicked and had made it obligatory to 
be quick to carry out the reports of a just person. 
Therefore fawr becomes obligatory by this clear evidence 
and tawagquf becomes invalid except in the case of a 
wicked person. Ibn Hazm further cited two Traditions. 
The first Tradition in which the Prophet said to some 
people who preferred to stay in the back lines during 
the prayer because of some abhorred things which they 
had in mind. He said, "People will remain delaying 
themselves (means keeping themselves behind) until 
God will delay them. "1 Ibn Hazm said though this 
Tradition came only to oblige people to try to get to 
the front line in the prayer, it could be interpreted 
according to its obvious meaning and wording. 
2 
This latest evidence in support of the obligatory 
nature of fawr further confirms our earlier observation 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkäm, vol. 3, p. 297. 0 11 
2. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 297. 
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that there is no general guideline or divine evidence 
to back the claim that al-amr al-mutlaq required early 
implementation. These Qur'B. nic examples given by Ibn 
Hazm do not in anyway indicate that, and the interpretation 
of the argument becomes more -confusing. The second 
Tradition, which Ibn Hazm dragged into this discussion, 
when he has already cited one similar to it in the 
argument about the obligatory nature of al-amr al-mutlaq, 
did not contain any possibility of time either. The 
Tradition was narrated: Dakwän, 
1 
a slave who belonged 
to 'Ä'isha the wife of the Prophet, reported from 'A'isha 
that the Prophet arrived in Mecca on-theý5th or 6th of 
Dhu al-Hijja and he came in to me. He was very angry. 
I said to him, "Whoever had annoyed you. God will put 
him in the hell. " The Prophet replied, "Donft you 
understand that I ordered people to do something and 
they hesitate (yataraddadün). "2 Ibn Hazm maintained 
1. Ibn Hazm mentioned him as Dakwä. n with''dä1 and it 
appears that the correct form is DHAKWAN with'dhäl. 
The most detailed information about him came from 
Ibn Hajar al-'AsgalAni. In al-Isäbah he described 
him as slave of the Prophet (Mawlä al-Ras31), which 
automatically gave him the status of the Companion. 
He reported that from Ibn Itbän. In al-TahdhTb al- 
TahdhIb, he describes him as slave of "A'isha. It 
seems that his Companionship is in doubt because 
none of those who supplied him with information 
about Dhakwän considered him as Companion. However 
Ibn Hajar did not mention his full name. 
2. Ibn Hazm, al-Ihk7m, vol. 3, p. 299. 
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that this Tradition has removed every doubt that his 
order should be interpreted as requiring obligation as 
well as fawr. But if this Tradition points to anything, 
it only indicates the obligatory nature of al-amr al- 
mutlaq. 
In this explanation given by Ibn Hazm at least we 
are able to see a clear picture of the way and how 
ahl al-hadith came to their conclusion on the time of 
amr. However, their stand raises the question of what 
might be the reason for their engaging themselves in 
such a very hectic argument, which they cannot find 
very satisfactory evidence to substantiate. But since 
their explanation represents only one side of the 
argument, it would be. better to defer any predication 
of what might be the reason until the argument of the 
other side is considered. 
As for the ShAfi'ites and-their supporters among 
ahl al-kalam, they do not put forward any evidence 
either from the Qur'än or from the Tradition of the 
Prophet. They only based their opposition on thorough- 
scrutinization of the existing evidence put forward by 
their opponents. On most issues, they have a tendency 
to discredit what they consider to be a claim without 
strong evidence. 
As has already been mentioned earlier, the-Shäfi`ites 
insist that al-amr al-mutlaq does not require fawr and 
that Q/3/133 did not indicate this either: neither by 
its form as an imperative, nor by its meaning as command. 
Therefore they declare that fawr is not obligatory. They 
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argued that any indication that al-amr al-mutlaq 
requires fawr must be separate evidence not merely 
based on the form of amr as an imperative. However, 
many Shafi'ite scholars have attempted to substantiate 
this view by putting forward a series of analyses in 
which they aim at rendering the evidence of ahl al-hadith 
logically invalid. The Mu'tazila scholar, Abü al-Husayn 
al-Basra, maintained that al-amr al-mutlaq did not 
require immediate implementation (fawr) and delay was 
possible. He said that it was the view of early Mu'tazila 
scholars: Abü 'All al-Jubbä'i and his son, Abü Häshim. 
He also attributed it to Sh7afi'ite. scholars. 
1 
Abü al- 
la. Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 120. 
b. The view that al-amr al-mutlaq requires al-tarakh3 
1 40 
by its nature, to the extent that if-one performs 
it in the early time it will not be acceptable, 
has been attributed to both al-Jubbä'i_, and AbU 
al-Husayn al-Basra and some Ashalrites,, but so far 
we cannot find very strong evidence to support. it. 
The view which Abü al-Husayn al-Basri declared for 
himself and for both al-Jubbä'3s was that of the 
Shäfi'ites and that is the possibility of delaying 
amr, which means that performing it at an early 
period is even better for those who can afford to 
do that. See Abü al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb al- 
Mu°tamad, vol. 1, p. 120. 
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Husayn al-Basra put forward some evidence which is 
purely based on logical conclusion. He argued that 
if amr had required fawr, it would either be through 
its wording or through its meaning. He insisted that 
amr did not require fawr by any one of them. He gave 
an example to substantiate the view that if someone 
says if'al, there wasn't any mention of any time, 
either early or late. He suggested that it only 
indicates that the action should take place. 
' 
AbU 
al-Husayn al-Basra completely ignored the Qur'ä. nic 
evidence. In fact he did not make any reference to 
it; perhaps he thought that any argument about the 
time of amr could only be discussed rationally and 
not on the basis of divine evidence. According to 
his own view, if amr takes place either in the first 
time (al-wagt al-awwal) or in the second time (al-wagt 
al-than! ) and in the third time (al-wagt al-thälith), 
it has been fulfilled and that means that the mukallaf 
has complied with the order. He argued that, on this 
basis, it was not possible to say that he had performed 
it in the time the . mir did not want. 
2 
According to 
Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, the case appears as if the amir 
is saying: "Do it whenever you wish and I did not 
make it compulsory in the early time. " He seems to be 
saying that once the beginning of the time is known as 
1. Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu°tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 121. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 121. 
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well as the end, and there is no evidence that we should 
confine amr to either side of it, there is no need to 
tighten up the time by trying to confine it to a certain 
period out of a limited period. He does not seem to be 
taking into account the idea of precaution, which ahl- 
al-hadith used as one reason for regarding fawr as 
obligatory, nor did he accept the suggestion that to 
base al-amr al-mutlaq on fawr was more logical. 
Abü al-Husayn al-Basra gave more examples to, 
emphasise that immediate implementation is not under- 
standable from the word if-al (as form of imperative). 
He said that if someone says "give a dirham to one man, " 
for example, ', °-, = , according to him' it is possible 
for 
ýnoY" 
that man to pay the dirham 
ti 
he wishes and to any man he 
wishes, because the order (amr) did not confine him to 
a special dirham. He argued that the time of am r also 
must be like that. It should not be confined to a- 
certain time because no one time is speciVi. 4Jr- 
He further pointed out that if someone says if'al, he 
only'meant a demand for action in the future, like if 
he said, "Khälid will be doing, " he was only telling us 
that action would take place. As this information did 
not deny that action could take place a short. period 
afterwards, the amr could not do so either. Abü al-- 
Husayn al-Basri goes on to say that al-amr al-mutlaq 
did not require it by its meaning, except by saying 
that amr means obligation (wu nb) and obligation cannot 
be completed with the possibility of delaying amr. He 
maintained that that is invalid too, because some action 
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could be obligatory and yet the mukallaf could be given 
a choice of carrying it out at the beginning of time, 
or in the later period, as long as he is sure that the 
time will not run out-if he did not carry it out in the 
first period. However, he admitted that the mukallaf 
is not allowed to delay it if he knows that the--time 
will run out. He declared that as the difference between 
obligation and al-näfila-(supererogatory). 
l 
Abi al-Husayn al-Basra appears to be putting more 
emphasis on the customary practice of ahl al-lugha by 
concentrating all his explanations and examples on the 
logical point of view, rather than taking other evidence, 
such as possible interpretation from the Qur'än or from 
the Tradition of the Prophet, or what ahl al-hadith 
term as al-maslah- (benefit) . In fact none of his examples 
has come within that scope. That is the attitude of the' 
Shäfi'ites in general; they put more emphasis on the; 
logical point of view and pay less attention to sources 
other than that. This different approach has-been one 
of the reasons for the sharp differences between ahl al- 
had1th and ahl al-kaläm, not only on the issue of time 
but in almost every argument. 
AbU al-Husayn al-Basra's explanations find an echo 
in both al-Tabsirat fl Usül al-Figh of Abü Ishäq al-Shirazi2 
(d. 476 A. H. ) and al-Mustasf-a of al-Ghazäli: Abi Ishäq 
1. AbU al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
p. 121. 
2. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 121. 
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maintained that al-amr al-mutlaq did not require fawr. 
He says that it was the view of our colleagues-, (he 
meant Shäfi'ites). He said that since no particular 
time has been mentioned as being preferable to. another, 
it is appropriate to carry it out at any point of the 
time. 
1 In fact, it appears that Abü Ishäq did not 
recognize the division of time which both ahl al-had1th 
and Shäfi"ites had earlier agreed upon. Therefore he 
did not take account of the term used for the division 
of time., He seems to be treating al-muwwsa" and al- 
muddayaq alike by not making any difference between them. 
In his example he maintained that since amr did not 
require. a particular time, it only needs any time and 
any place, because the activities of human beings must 
take place at a certain, time_and certain place. He 
concluded that at any place in which the. mukallaf.. carried 
it out, he had fulfilled it; 
-the 
same thing is the case 
if he carried it out at any time, it is supposed to be 
enough. AbU Ishäq then compared the amr to the fulfilment 
of a promise backed by an oath,. like saying "by the, name 
of God I will do so. and so. " That is an oath of promise 
even if he delays the action from the. time of oath., He 
maintained that in the same way a man must be compliant 
in the case of amr even if he delays action from the 
2 time of amr. A very similar explanation later came 
1. Abi Ishäq al-Sh3razi, al-Tabsra, pp. 52-53. 
2. Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
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from al-Ghazäli. 
On the question of Q/3/133 and Q/23/61, it seems 
that Shafi"ites are united in interpreting the verses 
as' metaphorical in the sense that God mentioned forgive- 
ness, while He actually meant its requirements. According 
to them, there is nothing in the verses indicating ý---c 
bei n 
the requirement of forgiveness 
X5 
lved in_action on 
the basis of early' implementation (fawr). They are 
arguing that, even if the verses indicated early 
implementation, 'that`is not necessarily indicating 
obligatory fawr, because they do not consider it as 
a general term to the extent that it will include 
al-amr al-mutlaq on a special basis. 
1 The Shäfi'ites 
are also united in their insistence that there can be 
no comparison' between obligation and supererogatory 
action (al-näfila), because they consider the delay 
allowed in the case of obligation as a limited one. It 
is only from the first period till'the second or third 
period. Once the mukallaf has determined to carry it 
out later, it has been differentiated from the supererogatory 
action, 'because al-näfila could be'' abandoned forevever' 
without substitution. They justify their view again 
by the fact that there is no evidence that the mir wanted 
it to be carried out in the first time.;, At the same time 
they also ignore the fear expressed by their opponents 
1. Badkhashi, Sharh al-Badkhash3, `vol. 2, pp. 45-46; 
also see al-Shawkän3, Irshäd al-Fakhül, `p. 89. 
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that such substitution also amounts to the establishment 
of a hukm without evidence, as well as their opponents' 
claim that substitution of time could lead to the amr 
eventually being abandoned, particularly if the 
substitution was by delegating it to someone else (was3 a). 
Ibn Qudäma maintained that was! ya was invalid because if 
it was possible to entrust someone to carry the obligation 
out and the very person entrusted could also entrust 
someone else until the obligation eventually ended 
without being performed. 
1 
Perception among later scholars always takes a 
different tone from those of early scholars, even though 
they prefer not to go out of the main doctrine of their 
ancestors. Thus perception has led them to make'some 
modification which theythink is logically acceptable 
to the society'in which they live. Therefore the 
prevailing opinion among them is that amr, by its form, 
did not indicate either fawr or tarikh! thus delay was 
possible. They also insisted that if amr indicated fawr, 
it was because of other evidence which could be a direct 
or indirect inference. Apart from that they seem to be 
seeing a certain kind of connection between al-amr al- 
mutlaq requiring repetition (al-takrär) by the repetition 
of certain conditions or reasons, and al-amr al-mutlaq 
requiring fawr as if it depends on a certain reason of 
quality (sifa). Muhammad Abü Zahra suggested that it 
is possible, that an al-amr al-mutlaq which was required 
to be carried out within a certain period may be based 
upon the same argument as that of al-amr al-mutlaq which 
1. Ibn Qudäma, al-Rawda, p. 106. 
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depended upon a certain quality or reason. Therefore 
he held the view that the nature of amr-also could be 
used to identify or recognize what kind of amr should 
be carried out on the basis of immediate implementation. 
He cited Q/2/185: "Who is-present-(at his home) during 
that month-should spend it in fasting. " He interpreted- 
this verse as a typical example, 
1 
but the problem 
remains that the example he gave here is''regarded by 
all Muslim scholars as restricted in the'sense of time. 
Also, if his idea is going to be adopted as the only 
means to identify'the time of amr, there are bound to 
be many amr which did not obviously depend upon any- 
certain condition. ýor quality, -'such as expiations and so 
on. Yet the mukallaf has to know what time he should 
carry it out. This idea has failed to give any clue to 
that kind of amr. I1 1 
In another attempt, Muhammad al-Khudari (d. 1345 
A. H. ) holds the same view that the word amr as an 
imperative did not require the amr to be carried out 
either in the early period or in*the late period, there- 
forea limited delay is possible. He goes on to say 
that if amr is required to be carried out on the basis 
of immediate implementation, it is because of external 
contexts. According to him Q/3/133 and Q/23/61 both 
indicate the obligation of fawr, but it appears that he 
interpreted the contexts here'as being a divine command, 
1. Abü Zahra, Usül al-Fiqh, p. 141. 
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not merely because of the form as early scholars had 
maintained. Thus he automatically excludes what is 
not a divine command. 
1 
This kind of modification seems 
to be an attempt by later scholars to present the case 
in a new way by maintaining that amr should be interpreted 
as the command of God, rather than customary usage. 
2 
By 
doing so, they appear to find some kind of compromise 
ground which at the same time will not harm their 
position as belonging to the same old schools. They 
themselves seem to have realised that the question of 
the time of amr is a particular issue, for which the 
discretion of finding a solution could only be made on 
an individual case, and all effort to generalise has not 
been successful. 
This even-handed approach seems to be the most 
attractive to most of the later scholars. Among other 
later writers who have expressed a similar view, are 




and Murtadä al-Husayn 
al-Fayrabädl .5 
These are the opinions of the scholars in favour 
and against the obligatory nature of fawr and both 
contesting groups appear to have identified the reason 
1. Al-Khudari, Usul al-Figh, p. 200. 
2. Ibid., p. 200. 
3. Hasab Allah, Usül al-Tashri4 al-Islam!, pp. 255-256. 
4. Salabl, Usfl al-Figh al-Islam!, vol. 1, pp. 387-388. 
5. Al-Fayrabädl, "Inäyat al-Usül. 
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why they follow what they advocate on the issue. As for 
the Shäfi"ites, their message is simple and it is that 
every interpretation. of amr has to come within logic 
to make it acceptable. They seem to feel that there 
is no need to impose any restriction which is'not 
obviously understandable from the Qur'än or the 
Tradition of the Prophet or specifically mentioned, 
as that would be unnecessary in their-view. 
As for ahl al-hadIth, their message-is not 
immediately clear, -however their rigorous attitude to 
fawr suggests a fundamentalist tendency and a desire 
to ensure the maintenance of religious practice which 
has come to be associated with their general rather 
literalist approach to religion. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A DISCUSSION OF SOME OF-THE 
PROBLEMS OF AMR WITHIN THE FURU' 
This chapter deals principally with the third aspect 
of amr, that is the commanded action which is termed 
al-ma'mür bihi. In the discussion particular concern 
will be given to analysing the role of amr in the furf', 
the theological implications of different interpretation 
of amr will also be analysed and discussed. This will 
inevitably require some contrasting analysis of the 
operation of amr in the different schools of law. Before 
that it will, first of all, consider the conditions put 
forward by some scholars which they required before 
al-ma'mür bihi could be accepted. 
The Conditions for the Acceptability of al-Ma'mur Bihi 
As it is possible that many forms of amr (sghat 
al-amr) may not indicate a genuine amr and that not 
everyone who appears as amir is in fact qualified to 
command, many commanded actions may not necessarily be 
acceptable. Therefore usülis try to put forward some 
guide-lines by which a genuine commanded action (al- 
ma'mur bihi) could be recognized. There are three 
conditions for this. There seems to be a consensus on 
two of them, while the other remains a matter of dis- 
agreement. The conditions are as follows: 
-228- 
1. The action ordered must be known to the person 
ordered to perform it (ma'mür). 
l That could 
mean educating him or providing him with all the 
necessary things which could helpý'him to perform 
it. Also the ma'mür should be made to realise 
that°he was commanded by God to do the action 
and that he will be rewarded'^t doing'it. The 
argument for this condition is that if the ämir 
commands the ma'mür to do something he did not 
know how to do or he tells him for example "do 
what is in my mind otherwise I will punish you" 
without letting him know what is in his mind that 
would be unacceptable because they consider it as 
an impossible action. 
2 (However, some of them 
accept that in some circumstance a person may be 
commanded to do something which is impossible as 
the third condition is going to indicate. ) 
2. They also agreed that the commanded action should 
not be available (an yakün ma' dttm )3 as required at 
the time of commanding when the ma'mür is commanded 
to provide it or make it available. They argued 
that there was no point in asking someone to 
provide what has already been provided. For 
1. Ibn Qudama, al-Rawda, p. 28; also see Shingiti, 
Mudhäkra, p. 34 
2.. AmidI, l-Ihkam, vol. 1, pp. 102-3. 
3. Ibn Qudäma al-Rawda, p. 28. 
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example, if someone is, asked to fetch water, that 
means that the water has not been made available 
and he is ordered to make it available. Similarly 
if someone has prayed a particular statutory 
prayer and he is commanded to perform that very 
prayer again, the second performance cannot be 
the performance of the statutory prayer since 
that has already been performed and can only be 
considered'as supererogatory1 (al-näfila). 
3. The third condition is the controversial one 
which the usülis differed upon. Those who put 
it forward maintained that commanded action 
(ma'mür bihi) should be a 
mumakkan). 
2 That was put 
Mu'tazila, 3 the Sh3"ites4 
among %NMovv were al-Ghazäl' 
possible one (an-yak-un 
forward by the 
and some mutakallimin 
i and others. 
5 
However, 
the vast majority of scholars are of the opinion 
that commanding someone to do impossible things 
is logically acceptable though they differ on 
1. Shinglt3, Mudhäkra, p. 35. 
2. Ibn Qudama, al-Rawda, p. 28. 
3. Amid!, al-Ihkäm, vol. 1, p. 103. 
4. Al-Murtadä., al-DharieQ ,, vol. 1, p. 165. 
5. Al-Ghazäli, al-Mustasf , vol. 1, pp. 86-7; 
also see Fakhar al-Din al-Räzi, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, 
p. 363. 
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whether or not it has ever happened in law. 
l 
Their argument over whether or not commanding 
someone to do an impossible thing is a very long 
one which involves theological views. 
2 
Reference 
to it illustrates the theological implications 
of their different interpretation on the furü". 
We have already pointed out on many occasions that 
the implications of axnr are the theoretical basis for 
the performance of the fur-U6, therefore they will 
necessarily involve some aspects of theology. What 
we are concerned with here is in fact part of the 
discussion concerning sighat al-amr and irädat al-amr 
in an earlier chapter where ahl al-sunna defined amr 
as an expression about specific forms. They, hold the 
view that by using any one of these forms together with 
other conditions associated with it such as 'uluw and 
ist'1l ', the form will have effect regardless of 
whether or not the ämir wanted the action to happen. 
3 
1. Al-Räz3, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 363; also see 
Ibn Qudäma, al-Rawda, pp. 28-9. 
2. More interesting comments on takl! f mä la yutäg 
could be found in Tafslr _ Gl-Baydäwi in his 
comment on Q/2/31 "Inform me about names of these. " 
See al-Baydäwi, Tafsir, vol. 1, p. 138. 
3. See above, pp. 62-6Z0 
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According to their view these forms°were originally 
created for commanding (amr) and using them in any 
other way would be considered a metaphorical use. 
1 
However, it seems that arguments of"ahl al-sunna 
are limited to their own consideration of the linguistic- 
aspects of the issue and they are avoiding the question 
of whether or not these are rational in terms of- 
theology. 
On the other hand, the Mu'tazila insist that amr 
is an expression about will (iräda) and maintained that 
the mere form of amr (i'. e. imperative) without iräda 
cannot be considered as amr. 
2 
They-argued their view 
in two ways: Rationally they believe it is not logical 
to base a command on a mere form without iräda because 
according to them these forms are not specially for amr 
because they-: could be used for another meaning such as 
ibAha or tahdid (permission and threat) and many other 
things. They also maintained that'God cannot command- 
something without actually wanting what He commanded 
to happen. 
3 
This latter*argument of the Mu'tazila is 
based on a theological view of God which is an essential 
1. See above, pp. 62-64. 
2. Abi al-Husayn al-Basra, Kitäb'al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
pp. k9-54; also see Bazdawi Abü al-Yusr, Kitäb al- 
UsUl al-Din, p. 53. 
3. Abi al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitäb al-Mu"tamad, vol. 1, 
pp. 49-54. 
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part of the Mu'tazila concept of God, i. e. God is a 
reasonable being who will always act in accord with 
rationality. 
The Mu"tazilite position defines speech (kaläm). 
as words and voice.. and does, not regard it asýan attribute 
of God. 
l Thus the mere verbal form without iräda, i. e. 
without. God's will that that form be amr is unacceptable 
to, them. 
2 This disagreement-has wider implications for 
the furü'. Among such implications is their disagreement 
. over whether or not it. is acceptable logically and 
legally to command someone to do an impossible thing 
which they termed as taklif ma lä yutq and also their 
disagreement over whether or not non-Muslims (kuffär) 
are requested or commanded to perform the requirement 
of the law such as payment of zakä. t, performances of 
prayer and Ramadan fasting: and so on. These two-aspects 
(i. e. commanding. =what is-impossible and-requiring non- 
Muslims to perform the requirements of Islamic law) are 
interrelated in the sense that both of them depend on 
the attitude of the-, two groups towards logical accept- 
ability. ,. 
Those who maintained that amr depends on forms-also 
were obliged to maintain that commanding someone to do- 
impossible things is a natural thing and therefore could 
i. Bazdawl Abü=Yusr, Kitäb Usül al-Din, pp. 53-4; 
also see above, pp. 54-56. 
2. Bazdawl Abü Yusr, Kitäb Usül al-D3n, p. 53. 
/ 
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be accepted. Consequently they maintained that the- 
käfir is required to perform the requirements of - 
Islamic law such as zakät and prayer though reward 
will only come to Muslims for such actions. 
l They 
supported their view that commanding one to do 
impossible things is acceptable with two evidences: 
The first is a rational one. They-maintained that the 
aim of doing so is only to-test the commanded person 
(ma'mür or mukallaf) whether or not he will show 
obedience. Then he will be regarded as obedient and 
compliant (mumaththil). 
2 The second evidence is Q/2/286, 
"Our Lord!, Lay not on us a burden greater than we have 
strength to bear. " They argued that if it is not 
possible for God to command the impossible there would 
not have been any need for asking God to prevent it 
happening. They also supported their view that the 
käfir is requested to perform the requirements of. the 
law by many verses from the Qur'ä. n such as Q/3/97, "God 
requires pilgrimage thereto for men who can afford the 
journey. " They maintained-that the word "men" is a 
general one which includes Muslims and non-Muslims. 
3 
Also they cited Q/74/42-49, "And (ask) ofýthe sinner 
what led-you into hell-fire. They will say we were not 
of those who pray. ' Nor were we of those who fed the 
1. Xmid3, al-Ihkäm, vol. 1, pp. 110-112. 
2. Shinglti, Mudhäkra, pp. 33-34. 
3. midi, al-Ihkam, vol. 1, p. -111. 
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indigent but we used to talk vanities with vain talkers. 
And-we used to deny the day of judgement until there 
came to us (the hour) that is certain. " This is the` 
view of the vast majority of ahl al-sunna according to 
al-Quräfl-who himself supported it and attributed it 
to Mälikites. 
1 
The Hanball scholar Ibn Quddma also 
supported it and attributed it to al-Sh7afi'3.2 
For their opponents, namely the Mu'tazila and the 
Shl'ites, -and their supporters among ahl al-sunna, these 
arguments are illogical and lack sufficient evidence to 
substantiate them. 
3 
As far as they are concerned they 
divided taklif mä lä yutäq into two categories: the 
first of these was what is not possible in itself, such 
as combining negative and positive things together at 
the same time or like asking someone to sit down and 
stand up at the same moment-. Imidi defined it as what 
is not imaginable in the mind (mä lä tasawwur lahu f3 
al-nafs). 
4 
They regarded commanding non-Muslims to 
observe the requirements of Islamic law as falling 
within this category and therefore they considered it 
as illogical because according to them if he prays or 
fasts or pays zakat, it will not earn him any reward. 
5 
1. Al-Quräf3 Sharh Tangih, p. 143. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, al-Rawda, pp. 27-8. 
3. Al-Murtada, al- .., vol. 1, pp. 164-168; 
also see al-Ghazäli, Nustasfa, vol. 1, p. 89. 
4. ý1mid3, al-Ihkam, vol. lt P. 03. 
5. Shing3t3, Mudh kra, p. 33. 
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The second category. was what they termed as 
"impossible because of God's former knowledge that it 
is not possible. " They give an example for this category 
as a käfir whom God has commanded to believe but he has 
not, God knew before commanding him that he would not 
believe. 1 It seems that most of those who were opposed 
to the general concept of taklif mä lä yutaq supported 
this particular form of taklif. 
On the question of whether or not non-Muslims were 
required to carry out the requirements of Islamic law, 
they argued that such requirements could only be 
acceptable by being Muslim and therefore it would be 
impossible for non-Muslims to comply with it because 
kufr was an obstacle to it. Even if the non-Muslim 
becomes a Muslim later he would not have had to perform 
those actions earlier because Islam always abrogates 
every misconduct committed prior to its acceptance. 
2 
Thus for them it was clearly quite unacceptable-to 
require these things from non-Muslims. According to 
their own view the passage of the Qur'än 74/42-49 is 
only information about what is going to be the condition 
of the kuffär on the day of judgement and therefore is 
not evidence with regard to whether or not the non- 
Muslim is required to carry out the requirements of 
Islamic law. 3 
1. Shing1ti, Mudhäkra, p. 37. ' 
2. Amid!, al-Ihkam, vol. 1, p. 110. 
3. Ibid., p. 111. 
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Disagreement Based on Theological Differences 
Another example of where disagreement on al-amr in 
terms of theology led to a disagreement on al-furü' is 
the Zähirites' rejection of any inner meaning of either 
the Qur'ä. n or the Tradition of the Prophet. They always 
rejected any interpretation which did not accord with 
the outward meaning of the Qur'än and the Tradition. 
They rejected i äs in particular. 
l On the other hand, 
they seemed to agree with the usülis on many points which 
were generally regarded as theoretical principles of the 
law but always seemed to abandon that agreement whenever 
it conflicted with their own theological doctrine. Ibn 
Hazm, a leading Zähirite scholar, maintained that al-amr 
al-mutlaq does not require repetition and wrote at great 
length defending it. 
2 
He refused to agree with other 
schools in maintaining that al-tayammum should be 
repeated for every obligatory prayer (al-salat al-muktUba) 
on the grounds that al-amr al-mutlaq did not require 
repetition. His primary evidence wasn't on the basis 
of al-giyäs drawn by most opponents of repetition of 
the tayammum, namely the Ilanafites, but on the grounds 
that the outward meaning of the Qur'änic injunction on 
3 
al-tayammum did not imply that. This seems to indicate 
-at- 1. Ibn Nadim, Kitä. b al-Fihrist, pp. 216-217; also 
ti 
see Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, p. 63. 
2. See above, pp. 135-138. 
30 Ibn Iiazm, al-Muhalla, vol. 2, pp. 129-130. 
-237- 
that he rejected the usülis principle on amr (after 
having defended them) in favour of his own theological 
doctrine. 
It seems that theology produces a position with 
regard to some Islamic laws which will. not be. compromised. 
Such theological principles are an important feature of 
the Islamic. legal system. - The above mentioned examples 
are clear evidence of that. Another matter which always 
generates differences-among usflls is that-of differences 
in interpreting particular injunctions in the. Qur'än or 
the Tradition of the Prophet. Usfll s have always regarded 
this matter as fundamental and have therefore described 
it as usüli in the sense of particularly referring to 
their science.. Differences on this matter are common 
and one of the results arising out of that may have 
influenced the establish rnev, \-" t the schools of law. 
Yet the differences in the schools of law are subject 
to compromise of a temporary or even permanent nature. 
For example, it is possible for a Mälik3 to pray behind 
a Hanafite Immen who does-not believe in al-fawr in 
ablution. On the other hand, at the level of basic- 
belief the denial of one quality with regard to. God 
according to ahl al-sunna could mean al-kufr and it is 
not compromisable. 
Examples of these kinds of differences are 
innumerable. However, it is-necessary to give some 
specific examples in order to show how deeply amr is 
involved. The two-'examples given here show the 
operation of amr in the furü'. Both examples come 
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from unrestricted amr (i. e. al-amr al-mutlaq) which 
we have discussed earlier. 
One of these examples is the question of the 
validity of performing two compulsory prayers (al-salat 
al-maktüba) with one tayammum (the use of sand for-- 
ablution when water is not available). This is, based 
on the difference among-the usitlis on whether or not 
al-amr al-mutlaq requires repetition which was also 
inferred from the Qur'änic injunction "0 you who - 
-believe! When you prepare for prayer wash your faces, 
and rub your heads (with water) and wash your feet to 
the ankles, if you are, in a state of ritual impurity- 
bathe your whole body but if you are ill. or on a 
journey or one of you,, cometh from offices of nature 
or you have been. in contact with a woman and you find 
no water then take for yourselves clean sand or earth 
and rub there with your faces and hands" Q/5/6. The 
command to perform al-tayammum instead of normal 
ablution in this verse is an unrestricted command 
according to the usUlls1 because there is no mention 
of any number of times it should beýperformed nor does 
it state how long-the effect of"tayammum will remain 
valid. 
j-'Those who maintained that al-amr al-mutlaq 
requires repetition like-the Mälikis and some Shäfi'ites 
maintained that two separate compulsory prayers (al- 
1. A1-Zanjäni, Takharij al-Furu' 'alä al-Usül, pp. 22-24. 
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salät al-maktüba) should not be carried out with a 
single tayammuml because according to them, this was 
the implication of al-amr al-mutlaq. Shäfi"i who 
according to the usülis maintained that al-amr al- 
mutlaq may contain some probability of repetition also 
forbids two compulsory prayers (al-salät al-maktüba) 
with one tayammum. He maintained that if one had to 
make two prayers using tayammum, he would have to 
2 
repeat the second prayer with. a fresh tayammum. He 
did not differentiate whether or not this second prayer 
was prayed at its proper time (adä') or later as a 
compensatory prayer (gadä'). But neither Mälikis nor 
Sh'Afi'ites opposed the combination of one compulsory 
prayer with a supererogatory prayer (al-näfila) or many 
other kinds of prayers such as funeral prayer and so on 
with one tayammum. Although the explanation of these 
3 
details can be found in the works of Malik and Shäfi'3, 
neither of them has specified that the reason for 
repetition of al-tayammum is a result of al-amr al-mutlaq 
requiring repetition. They only maintained that the 
normal thing is that one should attempt to get water 
after every'prayer and if one failed one should perform 
1. Malik, Muwatta, p. 47; Shäfi63, al-Umm, vol. 1, 
p. 47; also Ibn Qudama, al-Mughn3, vol. 1, pp. 262- 
267. 
2. Sh7afi'3, al-Umm, vol. 1, p. 47. 
3. Mälik, Mudawwana, vol. 1, pp. 42-4+5; Shäfi63, 
al-Umm, vol. 1, p. 47. 
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fresh tayammum for the second prayer. This explanation 
from them was later interpreted to mean their indication 
of al-amr al-mutlaq requiring repetition' on the grounds 
that both ablution and tayammum commanded for in the 
same verse are amr mutlaq and ablution has been specified 
by the practice of the Prophet but tayammum remained 
unrestricted. However, theHanbalites also support'the 
view that one tayammum should not be used for two 
compulsory prayers (al-salät al-maktüba) except if the 
prayers are compensatory ones (al-gadal). That is the 
view of Ibn Qudäma which he attributed to Ahmad b. 
Hanbal himself. 2 
The Hanafites and the Zähirites are agreed in 
opposing the idea of repetition of tayammum for every 
obligatory prayer. However they differ on the reasons 
for their opposition. The Hanafites have consistently 
rejected that al-amr al-mutlaq requires repetition and 
therefore they are in favour of using one tayammum for 
more than one compulsory prayer3 (al-salat al-maktüba). 
Although not openly stated their view seems to be based 
on the i äs that al-tayammum brings about full ritual 
purity (al-tahära al-tämma) and could clear every ritual 
1. Ibn Taymiyya, Ma mu", vol. 21, pp. 379-381; 
also see al-Zanjäni, Takharij al-Furu4 "ala al-Usfl, 
pp. 22-24. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mugbni, vol. 1, pp. 262-263. 
3. Al-Bukhärl, Käshf al-Asrär, vol. 1, pp. 122-3. 
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impurity in the same way as water. Therefore tayammum 
was adequate in their view for more than one compulsory 
prayer (al-salat al-maktüba). 
l This could also be 
connected with their view that al-amr al-mutlaq did 
not require repetition. One early evidence in this 
connection which could be the source in which us-Ulis 
might have deduc-ed the Hanafites' view is the remark 
made by Muhammad b. Hasan al-Shaybän3'(d. 189 A. H. ) in 
his book Kitäb al-Asl. He maintained that if a'man had 
prayed a compulsory prayer (al-salät al-maktüba) with 
tayammum and then the time for another (compulsory) 
prayer came and he wished to pray it but doubted about 
whether or not he has passed by water, he could perform 
that new prayer with the same tayammum which he had 
used for the first prayer until he was certain about 
the availability of water. This confirms the view that 
2 
the Hanafites'allo'w more than one compulsory prayer with 
one tayammum. At least it shows that they do not consider 
the long period between the two prayers and the attempt 
to find water as breaking al-tayammum'as other schools 
other than the Zähirites do. This remark of al-Shaybän3 
seems to have the authority of Abü Hanifa as well as 
Abü Yüsuf because al-Shaybän3 said in the beginning of 
the book, "I have explained to you the view of Abü Hanifa, 
Abi Yüsuf and indeed my own and anything with no mention 
r 
1. See al-Jaz1rl, Kitäb al-Figh, vol. 1, p. 158. 
2. A1-Shayban3, Kitäb al-Asl, vol, 1, p. 121. 
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of disagreement can be regarded as ýour agreement. "1 
On the question of whether or'not al-tayammum 
represents ritual purity-which also have influence on 
the idea of repetition, al-Shaybän3 allows an able man 
who is not on the journey but has 'committed an act of 
ritual impurity to pray with'tayammum if he fears danger 
to health by using cold water. He also attributed'this 
view to Abü Hanifa as well, while he reported that Abü 
Yfsuf had opposed it. 
2 This also could be taken as 
further evidence that Abü Hanlfa regards the tayammum 
as sufficient bring" about full ritual purity. 7 
However, the other schools who have maintained that 
tayammum must be repeated for each prayer are of the 
opinion that al-tayammum'brings''about only a temporary 
state of purity and only for emergency reasons. Therefore 
it could not remove al-hadath al-akbar which brings about 
a major state of ritual impurity. 
3 So, according, to them 
la. Ibid., p. "1'. 
b. "I"have explained to you"-here refers to one of 
his scholars (Abü Suleman al-Jawzjän3 Musa b. 
Suleman) who recorded Kitäb al-As l. Ibn1Nadim 
-mentioned him without date of his death which 
is 
a few years later than that of al-Shaybän3. See 
Kitä: b al-Asl, vol. 1, p. 1 and Ibn Nad! m, al-Fihrist, 
pp. 205-206. 
2. Al-Shaybä. n3, Kitäb al-Asl, vol. 1, p. 124. 
31. Shafi'3, al-Umm, vol. 2, p. 47; also see al-Jazir3, 
, 
Kitäb al-Figh, vol. 1, pp. 157-159. 
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although one can perform the prayer, after the tayammum 
has temporarily purified a state affected by major 
ritual impurity, when one finds water, one must purify 
oneself from major ritual impurity1 whereas the 
Hanafites maintained that this was unnecessary because 
they considered al-tayammum as sufficient to bring 
about a state of absolute ritual purity from the effect 
of every major ritual impurity. 
2 
Furthermore, the Hanafites support their stand 
with analogy. Having made tayammum synonymous, with 
full ablution they. made the analogy that only one 
tayammum was necessary for several prayers on the basis 
of a Tradition that the Prophet used to carry out many 
compulsory prayers (al-salät al-maktüba) with a single 
ritual3 ablution. 
As for theZähirites they agreed in principle with 
the Hanafites that al-amr al-mutlaq did not require 
repetition and this particular issue of al-tayammum is 
extremely important for them because to accept that 
one tayammum is not valid for more than one compulsory 
prayer will automatically mean repetition of al-amr al- 
mutlaq and here it will certainly contradict the main 
foundation upon which their doctrine is built (following 
1. Malik, al-Mudawwanä, vol. 1, p. 44; also see 
Shafi"i, - al-Umm, vol. 1, p. 47. 
2. Al-Shayb A-I, Kitäb al-Asl, vol. 1, p. 124. 
3. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughni, vol. 1, p. 263. 
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the outward meaning. - Since they did not accept al-giyäs 
they further disagree with the Hanafites on the analogy 
applied by the Hanafites. Instead they keep insisting 
that outward meaning of the Qur'an did not indicate 
what the Mälikites maintained. At the same time they 
supported the Hanafite view that one tayammum is sufficient 
for more than one compulsory prayer but their own point 
of evidence is that the Qur'änic injunction on the 
tayammum has indicated that by not specifying that one 
tayammum is not sufficient. 
l They also produced 
Traditions of their own which give them evidence which 
they maintained was not based on i äs though all the 
Traditions are äthär (Tradition which originated only 
All from the Täbi'fn). 
The first one originated from al-Hasan al-Basra 
(d. 110 A. H. ) through 'Unays b. 'Ubayd and Hammäd'b. 
Abi Salama (110 A. H. ) that al-Hasan al-Basra said that 
one can perform every prayer (of the day) with one 
tayammum like ablution as long as one did not commit any 
act of impurity. 
2 
The second one came from Muhammad b. Muhsin al- 
Zuhr! (d. 124 A. H. ). He said, "One tayammum is in the 
same position water, one can pray with it (as many 
prayers as one wants) as long as one has not`committed 
any act of'impurity. 3 -< 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla, vol. 2, pp. 132-3. 
2. Ibid., vol. 2, p.. 128. 
3. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 128. 
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The third one came from Said b. al-Musayyib 
through Qatäda"b. Di'äma (d. 117 or 118 A. H. ). Ibn 
Musayyib said, "Perform every prayer (of the day) with 
one tayammum as long as you did not commit any act of 
impurity. Tayammum is equal to water. " This view was 
also attributed to Yazid b. Harlin and AbU Ja"far al- 
Bagir Muhammad b.. "Alt b. al-Husayn b. "A13 (d. 114 
A. H. ). 
It is worth mentioning that none of these people 
mention or give, the impression that their statement is 
based on certain interpretation or on the authority of 
the Prophet and that that silence, in addition to the 
actual statement, indicates that their view is only 
based on their personal reasoning which includes al- 
giy" 
Ibn Hazm the leading Zähirite lawyer who gave the 
most detailed account about the ZRhirites view-on--the 
question of using one tayammum for"more than one 
compulsory prayer maintained that the mutayammin can 
perform compulsory and supererogatory prayers with one 
tayammum for as long as he wanted and as long as his 
tayammum has not been broken by any act of impurity or 
the availability of water. As for a sick person he also 
maintained that his tayammum will be broken only by the 
act of impurity not by availability of water. 
2 
This is0º 
1. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 128-9. 
2. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 128. 
-246- 
distinction between an able and ' unable' man` and it is 
designed to render invalid the argument of those who 
maintained that al-tayammum is a temporary purity as a 
result of repetition implied by al-amr al-mutlaq. 
Ibn Hazm attributed his view to Abi HanTfa, Sufyän 
al-Thawrl (d. 161 A. H. ) Layth b. Said (d., 175 A. H. ) 
and Dawud b. Khalaf1 who is better known as Dawud al- 
Zähiri (d. 270/884) the founder of the Zähiri school of 
law. 
Ibn Hazm then tried to dismiss the view that 
tayammum is not ritual purity though it is permitted 
for prayer. He said that that view is invalid for many 
reasons: 
11 Because there is'no evidence to support it"and any 
claim of that kind is invalid. 
2. Qur'än 5/6 which is the injunction on this issue 
has dismissed it because it has specified that 
al-tayammum is absolute purity (al-taharah al-tä=a). 
3. Because those who maintained otherwise contradict 
themselves by maintaining that though it is not 
absolute purity (al-tahärah al-tä=a) it was 
permitted-for one prayer. He argued that that is 
a statement whose conclusion contradicts its opening. 
la. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 128. 
b. The, attribution was later confirmed by Ibn Qudäma 
though he did not mention exactly the statements 
they made. See Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 1, p. 263. 
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4. When they maintained that'it was permitted for 
one compulsory-prayer only, where is there evidence 
that it was not permitted for the second - prayer. 
l 
Ibn Hazm seems to be particularly concerned about 
the Mälikite and the Shafi'ite insistence that one must 
attempt to find water after finishing the first prayer 
and by doing so his tayammum has automatically been 
broken. He said that the claim is untrue and there is 
no evidence to support it. He argues that since he 
has tried to obtain water on the first occasion and was 
sure that there was no water that is enough for him to 
proceed with the second prayer. He further argued that 
if that claim is true, what kind of water is a sick 
person (who cannot use water) going to find because 
such a man was permitted to pray without using water 
even with the availability of water? He concluded that 
that showed invalidity of the view. 
2 
This is one area of difference between the Hanafites 
and the Zähirites. The Hanafites, though recognizing 
that a sick person could use tayammum with the availability 
of water, seem to allow it only extremely dangerous 
situations when he could not possibly use water, not 
just mere sickness, 
3 
whereas the Zähirites appear to 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla, vol. 2, p. 130. 
2. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 130, 
3. Al-Shaybän3, Kitäb al-Asl, vol. 1, p. 124; 
also see Ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla, vol. 2, p. 130. 
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have interpreted it as just sickness. One evidence for 
that is that they do not regard the availability of 
water as affecting the tayammum of a sick person as 
other schools do, including the Hanafites. 
Ibn Hazen avoided criticising the main point which 
those who advocate repetition, namely the Mälikites and 
the Shäfi"ites, have put forward which he himself 
mentioned, that ablution and tayammum were both 
obligatory for everybody going to pray and he must 
make one at every prayer because both of them were 
unrestricted commands. But when the Prophet himself 
used one ablution for more than one prayer the ablution 
was excluded from being unrestricted while al-tayammum 
remained because there is no reliable evidence that the 
Prophet did use it, for more than one. compulsory prayer. 
l 
If Ibn Hazm had agreed with this point it would have 
contradicted his own evidence which is based on 
opposition to the repetition of al-amr al-mutlaq. 
Instead he. described it as untrue and failed to give; 
his own interpretation of the argument. He then 
proceeded to argue that the claim that one must make 
tayammum for every prayer even. supererogatory are not 
true and maintained that the Qur'anic injunction did 
not oblige any., of the things which they claim. If it 
had obliged it, it would have-obliged ritual bathing 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla, vol. 2, p. 132. 
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for everyone who wished to go to pray. But the verse 
according to him is only an injunction which indicates 
God's obligation of ablution and tayammum and ritual 
bathing remain obligatory only upon those who committed 
an act of major ritual impurity. 
1 
Although this example is meant only toindicate the 
operation of amr in the'fur ' it could also be taken as 
an opportunity to point out that though the Zähirites 
categorically claim to be opposing giyäs, their arguments 
here are in one way or the other based on i as because 
most of those upon whom they based their' practice and 
statements they use as evidence, undoubtedly based their 
practice on i äs2 otherwise there is no other evidence 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla, vol. 2, p. 132. 
2. Contrary to the Hanafites' and"the Zähirites' view, 
the advocators of repetition also have their own 
Tradition which also originated from the prominent 
Companions like 'All, Ibn 'Umar, Ibn 'Abb s and 
some Täbi'3ns like Sha'b3 (d. around-100 A. H. ), 
Nakha'3 (d. 95 A. H. ), Qatäda b. Di'äma (d. 117-or- 
118 A. H. ) and Yahya b. Said (d. 103 or. 104 A. H. ). 
They all maintained that tayammum becomes invalid 
after one compulsory prayer. Ahmad b. Hanbal who 
himself practised repetition, transmitted a 
Tradition in which the-Prophet told Abü Dharr 
(d. 32 A. H. ) that "clean soil is Muslim detergent 
even, if he did not get water for ten years. " This 
ContId.... 
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for them to regard al-tayammum as equal to the ablution 
other than by comparing them and that is what they do 
themselves., So their dependence on those who depend, 
on giyAs is nothing more than dependence on giyäs itself. 
Despite their insistence that they work on the 
basis of the outward meaning of the verse there is no 
indication whatsoever in the Qur' nic injunction that 
could be taken as evidence either in favour of their 
claim that tayammum is equal to the ablution because 
tayammum becomes an. 
yoption 
only in the absence of water 
or ability to use it. On top of that nobody has ever 
come forward to give a proper denial that the command 
to perform ablution and tayammum, both of which were 
mentioned in the verse, are not unrestricted., commands 
and that ablution was not only restricted by: the practice 
of the Prophet, since there is not enough and acceptable, 
Footnote continued. 
Tradition is the only one which Abü Iianlfa and 
others who regard tayammum as sufficient can regard 
as specification of the verse of tayämmum. But the 
Tradition did not enjoy wide recognition among the 
majority of scholars. Ahmad b. Hanbal who trans- 
mitted it described it as giyäs yet he did not 
follow it according to most of his scholars except 
in, the, making up of prayer al-gadä'. See Ibn 
Qudama, al-Mughn3, vol. 1, p. 263; also Ibn 
Taymiyya, Ma mu" , vol. 21, p. 437. 
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evidence to prove that the Prophet has used one tayammum 
for more than one compulsory prayer. Then it seems that 
the only way out is either to keep al-tayammum on its 
unrestricted form and practise it on the basis of. 
repetition. That is confirmation of'it being al-amr 
al-mutlaq or keeping it on that form and'-apply giyäs to 
bring it in line with the ablution as the Hanafites do. 
After that, it will be very difficult to claim any other 
thing here without involving i äs. Of course that does 
not mean that Ibn Hazm has no logic on his side by 
criticising validity, of tayammum when they say that it 
is not purity and at the same time allow it for prayer. 
However, it seems that'those who advocate repetition 
based on al-amr al-mutlaq do not disagree that tayammum 
represents some kind of purity in one way or another but 
see it as a temporary one which cannot sustain al-hadath 
al-akbar when water eventually becomes available. 
Ibn Hazm"appears to have'seen"absolutely no validity 
in the regulation of repetition of al-amr al-mutlaq 
and has ignored every interpretation in favour of-his 
own view based on the outward meaning (zähir) of the 
Qur' In. 
Suspension of judgement, (a1-tawagguf)-is a position 
taken as a result of lack of-sufficient information. 
' 
In fact such, _a position 
is only possible in the theory 
1. A1-Badkhashit-Sharh al-Badkhashl, vol. 2, p. 36. 
Also see above, p. 7q - $i 
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of Islamic law rather than the practice of Islamic law 
(al-furU6). There is no case of tawagquf in the furu" 
and those who maintained that they did not have sufficient 
evidence to support either side of the argument on 
whether or not al-amr al-mutlaq required repetition 
are bound to take some kind of action. They would 
either form their practice according to their own 
understanding of the injunction concerned or follow 
any existing one they found appropriate enough to 
their own feeling. For example, the Shiites ` 
have consistently maintained that their position on 
al-amr al-mutlaq is that of al-tawaqquf because both 
arguments contained probability and therefore they would 
prefer to wait until they found clear evidence. 
1 They 
have no-way of transforming that tawagquf into-a 
separate doctrine in the case of tayammum, therefore 
they joined the Hanafites to declare that one single 
tayammum is sufficient for more than one compulsory 
prayer2 (al-salät al-maktüba) and that means that 
al-amr al-mutlaq does not require repetition (at least 
in this case of tayammum) upon which other schools"based 
their doctrine of one tayammum for every compulsory 
prayer. They also opposed the Hanafites and supported 
other major schools in maintaining that the one who has 
1. A1-Murtadä, al-Dhari,, vol. 1, p. 100; 
also see al-Mughniyya, al-Figh, p. 72. 
2. Ibid., p. 72. 
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performed tayammum and started the prayer does not need 
to break his prayer if water comes after he has started 
the prayer. 
' 
This is always the case whenever tawagquf 
is adopted toward a theory because it will be necessary 
to take same action in the furu4. 
Disagreement Based on Linguistic Interpretation 
Another idea which has turned out as a separate 
opinion in many occasions in the usül and indeed in 
the furü_ is the use of the term ishträk (dual operation 
of a certain word or term). The idea was inspired by 
the linguistic influence and it is not restricted to 
any particular school in the furia' because every school 
has on many occasions sought in one way or the other to 
use a linguistic interpretation as a means of under- 
standing or determining a certain word. This practice 
is dated back to the Companions' era, but nobody has 
ever taken it as doctrine. However, in theory ahl al- 
kaläm regardless of their school of law seem to have 
taken it as a particular view on many occasions in the 
usül. An example of that is the declaration of Abü 
al-Husayn al-Basra a leading Mu'tazila and a Shiite 
scholar'al-Murtadä that the word "amr" is common (mushtarak) 
between *ifa (quality) and shay (affair) and between gawl4 LSIr 
and action respectively. They mean that it is commonly 
1. Al-Mughniyya, al-Figh, p. 72. 
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used for both meanings. 
l 
Another example of that kind is the view of Fakhar 
al-Din al-Räz that al-amr al-mutlaq does not indicate 
repetition nor one performance but it is'common (mushtärak) 
between both repetition and one performance equally as a 
matter of origin. 
2 
These theories also have their own 
implications in the furu' because according to'their'view 
not every amr mutlaq should be considered as indicating 
either side, it is the context that can determine what 
is what. An example of this kind in usiil is Q/2/110. 
Ag3mü al-salät (plural) (say the prayer) that according 
to them requires repetition because obviously one is 
required to perform it every day. 
3 Another example of 
what does not require repetition is the hajj. 
4 
Those 
who maintained that al-amr al-mutlaq required repetition 
outright also agree that hajj is obligatory only once 
but regard it as being excluded from the general rule 
I, Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, Kitab al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, 
pp. 45-6; also see al-Murtadä, al-DharicQv , vol. 1, 
pp. 27-8. 
2. Al-Räz3, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 165; also see 
al-Badkhashl, Sharh al-Badkhash3, vol. 2, p. 36, 
a commentary work on Minhaj al-Usül of al-Baydawl. 
Both were printed together in the Egyptian edition 
196-3. 
3. Al-Räz3, al-Mahsül, vol. 1, p. 164. 
4. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 164. 
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by specification from the Prophet that hajj is obligatory 
only once. 
l 
However, the use of ishtiräk is not confined to 
ahl al-kaläm alone in the furu'., In fact it is a major 
problem among jurists in the early period. There are 
many examples of that in the furü' where the word 
ishtiräk was regarded as the main reason of their dis- 
agreement. One example of that. kind also happened in 
ablution, though it does not directly involve amr it 
has some element of amr in the sense that it is the 
word-stipulated by ämir, - 
QJ / 6, "And wash your hands to the elbows. "" They 
disagree on how to define the limit of hand in this 
verse because the word "ill" has been used commonly 
(mushtarak) for limitation-like "till" and also for 
conjunction like "with" ("ma'"). The same thing is 
involved in the word-"Yad" (hand). -According to Ibn 
Rushd, -the Arabs use it at times for "palm", at times 
for both "palm and arm" together and at other times 
2 they use it for "palm, arm and upper arm". For those 
who regard "ill" here as conjunction meaning "ma'll or 
"or" ('law" ) they consider "yad" as including all three 
meanings (palm, arm and upper arm) and regard washing 
them all together as obligation. And for those who 
1. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 164. 
2. Ibn Rushid, al-Bidäya, vol. 1, p. 11. also see 
Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughni, vol. 1, p. 128. 
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understand "i1ä" as meaning limitation and that "yad" 
does not include elbows because the end of'the limit 
is not included then they did not exceed elbows, because 
that is the end of the requirement. They give the 
reason for their differences here as the different 
meanings equally understandable (mushtarak) from both 
words "ilä" and "yad". 
l Examples of this kind are 
innumerable in the books of law. 
Disagreement Based on Different Usü13 Principles 
Another example which involved amr in the furü' 
which is based on principle of the usUl3s is the case 
of a man who fails to deduct his zakät immediately 
after one bawl (one year based on the lunar calendar) 
has been completed and later when he deducted it, the 
property gets lost or damaged before he can pay it to 
the Imäm. They are divided on that issue according to 
r 
their view of whether or not al-amr al-mutlaq required 
al-fawr into three main groups. Those who advocated 
al-fawr, those who opposed al-fawr and those. who reserved 
their judgement. 
There are conflicting reports about exactly what is 
the position of the Hanafites on whether or not al-amr 
al-mutlaq required al-fawr. One report maintained that 
1. Ibn Ruslid, al-Bidäya, vol. 1, pp. 11-12. 
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they were in favour of"al-fawrl while another one 
considered them as opposing it. 
2 
Both reports are 
very strong to the extent that whichever one of the 
two you assign them you could be proved correct because 
of enormous evidence you can find in support of that. 
Their stand on the issue of when zakät should be paid 
has done nothing to give a clue to that because it 
contradicts another practice. 
3 
According to Ibn Qudäma, 
Abü Hanifa said that one can delay payment'of his zakät 
as long as payment was not demanded. Abü Han3fa also 
explained that because the command to pay it isNun- 
restricted (al-amr al-mutlaq) there is no difference 
in paying it at the first time (al-wagt al-awwal), 
the second time or the third time and that there is no 
specification to that in the command. 
4 
This-is confirmed 
by the Hanafite scholar 'Al' al-D3n Samaragand3 who 
started by taking the problem of division among the 
Hanafites on whether or not al-amr al-mutlaq requires 
al-fawr. He' said that our leaders differ on the 
obligatory nature of the early payment of zakät and 
Muhammad b. Shujä' al-Thalj3 (d. 257 A. H. ) among our 
colleagues has maintained that delay (al-taräkh3) is 
1. Ibn al-Malak, Sharh al-Manär, p. 22; also see 
Samaragand3, Tuhfat al-Fugahä', 
2. Samaragandä., Tuhfat al-Fugahä' , 
3. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 3, 
4. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 684. 
vol. 1, pp. 558-9. 
vol. 1, pp. 558-9. 
p. 241. 
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possible and his view was supported by Abü Bakr al-. 
Jässäs. He cited the case of the zakät which the owner 
failed to deduct after bawl until the property was 
destroyed. In that case he said that the owner was 
not responsible for further payment. Al-Samaragand3 
argued that if al-fawr had been obligatory he would 
have been responsible just like a person who delays 
his Ramadan fasting till after the month of Ramadan. 
He then went on that al-Karäkh3 (d. 340 A. H. ) (another_ 
Ijanafite scholar) had mentioned that in this case of 
zakat-that it should be based on al-fawr. 
1 However, 
al -Samaragandi himself was not sure of exactly which 
argument should be considered as authentic, which could 
be attributed to Abi Han3fa. 
MAlikites, 
2 
Shäfi"ites3 and Hanbalites4 are united 
in maintaining that zakät should be deducted immediately 
after the hawl has been completed and that failure to do 
.: a 
that would mean it was a responsibility on the ma'mur to 
make good the money if money got lost before he paid it 
11 Samaragand3, Tuhfat al-Fugahal, vol. 1, pp. 558-9 
2. Malik, Mudawwana, vol. 1, p. 245; 
also see Ibn Rusb d, al-Bidäya, vol. 1, p. 248. 
3. Al-Shä. fi"I, al-Umm, vol. 2, p. 52; 
also see Ibn Qudäina, al-Mughn3, vol. 2, p. 684. 
4. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 2, p. 684. 
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to the Imäm or to the poor people. But they disagreed 
on the methods by which they carried out this. decision 
as well as some of the ways of implementing-it. - The 
Malikites and the Hanbalites are the main schools which 
have originally advocated al-fawr and therefore lead 
other schools in applying it to zakät, though they seem 
to be slightly divided on how to apply it. 
1 
As for the 
Sh'Afi'ites, they do not regard al-amr al-mutlaq-as 
requiring al-fawr. Therefore whenever they based al-amr 
on al-fawr it was as a result of additional evidence or 
the context. 
2 
The Mälikites maintained that if an owner deducted 
his zakät many days after the exact date of the 
completion of the bawl and the property-was lost or 
damaged, 'he was responsible for making good the loss.. 
3- 
However, if he had deducted it on the first day, they 
did not consider him as negligent and he would not 
have to refund the lost money. 
4 
This meant that he-had 
escaped payment of the zakät for that year - though 
of course he did not gain anything extra for himself. 
As for the Shäfi'ites, they have consistently 
1. Al-Quräfi, - Shari al-Tangmh, p. 128; Ibn Qudäma, 
al-Rawda, p. 105; al-Mughni, vol. 2, pp. 558-9* 
2. Al-Shiraz3, al-Tabsra, p. 52. 
3. Malik, Mudawwanä, vol. 1, p. 245; also see 
Ibn Rushid, al-Bidäya, vol. 2, p. 248. 
4. Ibid., p. 248. 
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declared their opposition to al-fawr on'the basis-of 
al-amr al-mutlaq. However, they supported the M'likites 
on the particular issue-of the man who failed to deduct 
his zakät at the correct time. 
1 Perhaps they thought 
that prolonging the delay could cause suffering to-the 
poor people as the Hanbalites have maintained2 and 
therefore they consider that as context-which could 
warrant al-fawr in this circumstance. Nonetheless, 
whatever their reasoning for this, they supported the 
Mälikites. According. to al-Shäfi'i, if the property 
had been destroyed without negligence on the part of 
the owner (negligence here means undue delay) he-would 
not have to refund that money as the Mälikites argue-but 
that does not mean that he has escaped zakät of that 
year. Instead he would go back to the rest of the money 
(the main capital) if it is up to another nisäb 
(the 
la. Al-Sh1räzi, al-Tabsra, p. 53. Also see al-Ghazäll 
al-Mustasfä, vol. 2, pp. 9-10. 
b. As far as practice is concerned we have mentioned 
on several occasions, that the expansion of the 
theory has not yet reached the stage of amr during 
the Shäfi'1' s time therefore there was not any 
direct statement from him in that connection. His 
principle on al-amr al-mutlaq was later deduc, ed 
from his practice in the furü" . -. See Shäfi'i, 
al-Umm, vol. 2, pp. 52-3. 
2. Ibri Qudama, al-Mughn3; vol. 2, p. 285. 
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minimum amount liable for zakät) he would pay another 
zakät, on the basis of the new amount (new nisäb). But 
if the rest did not amount to nisäb he did not have to 
pay anything at all. If he was responsible for the 
loss of the original zakät then he had to pay the same 
amount as that which was lost. 
1 
Both the Hanbalites and the Z hirites hold a 
similar view to this2 but they seem to be more restrictive 
in their emphasis on al-amr al-mutlaq. The Hanbalites, 
according to Ibn Qudäma, do not differentiate between 
1. Shafi'1 has given an example of the remaining money 
which might require another deduction of zakät as 
follows; If a man had twenty dTnär at the end of 
hawl and deducted half of a dinär to pay it to the 
Imäm but it got lost before he could do that,, then 
he would not pay another zakät out of the remaining 
nineteen and a half dinar because the minimum 
taxable money according to him is twenty dinar. 
But if he had twenty one and a half dinar in the 
first place and deducted half a d'när for the 
first twenty d! när and from the rest one quarter 
then if that deduction gets lost he will still 
have more than twenty dTnär left as the main 
capital. He will go back to that and deduct 
another zakat on the basis of one quarter of ten 
per cent. See Shäfi'i, al-Umm, vol. 2, pp. 52-3. 
2. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 2, pp. 685-6; 
also see Ibn Hazm, al-Mühalla, vol. 5, p. 263. 
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whether or not the money was lost as a result of 
negligence (al-tafrit). They compare it to debt owed 
to a human being which he can only clear by payment. 
He quoted Atmad b. Hanbal as saying thät even if a man 
attempts to pay his zak: t to either the Iman or somebody 
else and before that Imam accepts it he asked the owner 
of the zakät to buy him something out of the money and 
the money gets lost within that period, the owner is 
responsible because the Imäm has not yet accepted it 
and therefore he must replace it. But if the Imäm had 
accepted it then the owner of the money has no 
responsibility) Ibn Qudäma also attributed this view 
to Zuhri (d. 124/742), Hakam (154 A. H. ), Hamm Ad b. Abi 
Salama (165 A. H. ), al-Thawrl (161 A. M. )2 and ShIfi4i 
and he acknowledged that Shäfi'i did not hold him 
responsible if he was not'negligent about deducting 
it at the correct time and therefore did not have to 
pay anything if the main capital fell short of the* 
nisäb after he had lost the deducted zakät. 
3 
Defending the view in general Ibn Qudäma maintained 
that zakät is an obligation based on fawr and it is 
not allowed to be delayed when one has the ability to 
1. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughni, vol. 2, p. 685. 
2. His full name is Sufuyän b. Said b. Masriq al-Thawrl, 
one of the early Traditionists. See Ibn Nadlm, 
Fi hrist, p. 225. 
3. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughnl, vol. 2, p. 685. 
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pay it unless one fears any danger. He also emphasised 
that al-amr al-mutlaq required fawr as he had done 
earlier. He said that that is why whoever delays it 
is liable to be punished. In support of that he cites 
the belief that God expelled Iblis from Heaven because 
He was displeased with him and rebuked him for not 
bowing. Ibn Qud na cited the familiar example that 
if a man commands his servant to bring water for him 
to drink and the servant delays the implementation of 
that command he deserved punishment and he also argued 
that delaying al-amr al-mutlaq contradicted the spirit 
of the obligation (al-wujüb) because to abandon the 
implementation of an obligation (al-wäjib) was a 
punishable offence. He went on that if delay had been 
possible it would have to be for unlimited time. He 
then stresses that that unlimited delay is tantamount 
to abandoning the wu üb, which is a punishable offence. 
He argued that even if we presume that al-amr al-mutlaq 
did not require fawr at all it would have required it' 
in the case'of zakät because if delay had been possible 
the ma'm3r would have delayed it on his natural feeling 
and confidence that he would not become a sinner'by 
delaying it and if he died or his property was destroyed 
the obligation of payment of zakät would be removed. 
l 
Ibn Qud7ma said that as a result of that the poor 
people who needed the zakät would suffer. He further 
1. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 2, p. 684. 
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suggested that there is a context here which made the 
amr require fawr and that was that zakät becomes 
obligation because of the poor people who need it. 
He further stressed that since the payment of zakät 
was urgently needed, it was necessary that obligation 
should be performed in that spirit. 
1 Ibn Qudäma quoted 
al-Athram, 
2 
a Hanbalite scholar, who reported that he 
had heard Abü 'Abd Allah (he meant Ahmad b. Hanbal), 
when he was asked about a man who delayed deducting 
his zakat after the completion of a hawl. Ibn Hanbal 
asked why he had delayed deducting it. They replied 
that in fact he had started at due time but he was 
deducting it gradually. Ibn Hanbal replied that he 
should deduct it once immediately after the hawl. 
3 
"It appears that Ibn Qudima is trying to use maslaha 
as further justification for the obligatory-nature of 
fawr and this maslaha is a completely different argument 
outside usüll! s principle on al-amr al-mutlaq because 
zakät which is going to the poor people is not different 
from obligation which has no obvious rational meaning 
such as hajj, salät and Ramadan fasting which all involve 
a duty to God which He has imposed upon His creatures. 
1. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughni, vol. 2, p. 685. 
2. Al-Athram's full name is Ahmad b.. Muhammad b. Hani. 
He was, one of Ahmad b. Hanbal's scholars. His date 
_Cd - 
of death is not known. See Ibnt- Nadim, Fihrist, p. 229. 
3. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughni, vol. 2, p. 685. 
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Thus, whether it is hajj, Ramadan fasting or the 
payment of zakät, the idea of maslaha should not be 
involved. However, he seems to be saying that the 
obligation of zakät is different from those others 
because it has added reason which could be taken as 
obvious evidence to justify fawr and that is the need 
of the poor people to it. Yet, his real argument is 
based on the Hanbalite uncompromising attitude to the. 
principle of fawr and a similar attitude comes from 
the Zähirites. 
1 
One other point which also had some influence on 
their'disagreement because of its connection with time 
was whether or not the obligation of the payment of 
zakät rested'on the ma'mur's or on a specific taxable 
amount. The Hanafites and Mälikites (despite the 
latter's-support of fawr) seem to have placed obligation 
for payment of zakät on the owner possessing taxable 
wealth (lain al-mäl). 
2 That means that responsibility 
of making up the payment would become the ma'mür's 
responsibility only by reason of his negligence if 
he had not deducted it the day it was due. Thus if 
there is no negligence and the amount deducted got lost 
he would not be responsible for making it up according 
to the Mälikites. 
3 
That seems to be the reason why the 
1. Ibn Hazm, 40 al-Muhalla, vol. 0 5, p. 263. 
2. Ibn 'Abd al-Barri, Kitab, vol. 1, p. 303. 
3. Malik, Mudawwanä, vol. 1, p. 24+5. 
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Mälikites did not demand him to pay the money back or -- 
deduct another zakät on the basis of the remaining 
capital if the money gets lost without it being his 
fault. The Sh36ites (al-Imämiyya) are also reported 
to be in favour of this view. 
I 
It is worth mentioning here that the Shiites are 
among many other schools which advocated al-tawagquf 
(suspension of judgement) on whether or not al-amr al- 
mutlaq required fawr. Their support for the Hanafitesº 
idea here could be taken as identification of their 
position in the furl' of law. Yet, it cannot be assumed 
that they opposed fawr absolutely because they may have 
different interpretation for other cases on this subject. 
This confirms the early remark that the doctrine of 
al-tawagquf exists only in theory. 
On the other hand, the Shäfi'ites, 
2 
the Hanbalites3 
and the Zähirites' appear to have placed the responsibility 
solely on the ma'mür and therefore he would have to pay 
the lost money back because the moment the money had 
completed bawl it had become his responsibility to pay 
the appropriate zakät just like in the case of someone 
who borrows money, it becomes his responsibility from 
the moment he receives it whether or not he spent it 
1. Al-Maghniyya, Kitäb al-Pi h, p. 175- 
2, Shäfill, al`Umm, vol. 2, p. 52. 
3. Ibn Qudäma, al-Mughn3, vol. 2, pp. 682-3. 
4. Ibn Hazm, al-Nuhalla, vol. 5, p. 263. 
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i 
immediately and no matter whether or not the money gets 
lost as a result of his own fault or not. 
l Their 
agreement with the Mälikites in terms of them conceding 
some modifications if the zakät got lost without any 
negligence appears to mean provided that had not 
acted sinfully. Thus in this case they, allowed him 
time to refund the money at his convenience. This is 
understandable from Shäfi'3's comment on that point. 
He said, "If he deducted zakät immediately after the 
bawl had been completed and it was destroyed before he 
could pay it to those who needed it, if he had not 
been negligent (by delaying its payment to the poor 
or the will! while being capable of paying it on time) 
he would not have to make good the amount which got 
lost. However, that did not exempt him from paying 
zakät because once something becomes an obligation 
upon somebody he can never do anything other than 
perform the obligation. "2 Ibn Hazm explains it further. 
He maintained that no one has the right to delay 
deducting his zakät when it is due until he could sell 
some part of the property such as a camel and so on 
because God has said, "Be quick in the race for 
forgiveness from your Lord" Q/3/133, and if he deducted 
it to pay it to the tax official or the poor people 
and all the money gets lost or some of it before he 
1. Al-Shäfi'3, al-Umm, vol. 2, p. 52. 
2. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 52, 
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could do that, he must refund it all as a matter of 
obligation because it has become a responsibility upon 
him until he pays it in full to those whom God had 
commanded him to give it to. 
1 
1. Ibn Hazm, al-Muhalla, vol. 5, p. 263. 0 41 
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CONCLUSION 
The most important element in a religious law 
like Islam - or for that matter any other legal 
system - is the requirements that a man is commanded 
to perform and the actions which he has been forbidden. 
This thesis has mainly been concerned with the first 
of these, that is the role of amr in Islamic law. At 
first sight this seems a simple matter of obeying what 
the-law has commanded. However, from the very beginning 
there were different interpretations of the nature and 
requirement of specific types of amr. The meaning of 
amr itself required that those who wanted to understand 
its role in the law had to investigate its linguistic 
connotations. 
In the attempt to define amr in its legal aspect, 
a considerable number of interpretations were given and 
a large number of technical terms were used which in 
the end led to completely different practices. In our 
investigation of their arguments on amr a number of 
conclusions emerged. In order to make them clear, we 
are dividing those conclusions into three parts. The 
first one will undoubtedly be on the linguistic problem 
which arose from their different definitions of amr and 
the second will be on the technical terms while the last 
one, will come from the outcome of their argument ' (impli- 
cation `of amr in the fur i' ). 
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It-is clear from the investigation that the 
mutakallimin, regardless of their school of law, have 
a profound belief in linguistic interpretation and 
therefore their arguments always reflect it more than 
any other school. This could be noticed from arguments 
of the leading mutakallimin like al-Bä. gilä. n3, al-Murtada, 
Abü al-Husayn al-Basra, al-Ghazäll, al-Räzi and others. 
This linguistic approach represents one of the major 
reasons behind their different interpretations of the 
theory which eventually led to different practice. 
Some-scholars tended to ignore it or put less emphasis 
on it, while others regarded it as an important factor 
which could not be ignored and therefore took it 
seriously into their consideration of every issue. 
This=has created a wide gap-which can hardly be bridged. 
That is why-we find some of them arguing mainly on the 
basis of the Qur'än-and the Tradition of the Prophet 
while others support their view with speculative thinking. 
Supporters of Tradition appear to be less concerned with 
whether or not their argument was logically acceptable 
as long as they were sure that the evidence which they 
depended upon was authentic. On the other hand, the 
mutakallimin were very sensitive to the logical aspect 
of their argument as well as the authenticity of the 
available evidence. Therefore the work was much influenced 
by linguistic and logical arguments which were particularly 
encouraged by their speculative thinking which sometimes 
led them to argue or defend their legal point of view 
with mere speculative evidences without any reference 
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to either the Qur'an or the sunna of the Prophet. 
In any examination of the doctrine of al-tawagquf 
in Islamic law we find that it is practically impossible 
though theoretically plausible. In fact, when it comes 
to the question of practice they always return to their 
original school of law and accept the practice there. 
For this reason we are able to conclude that their- 
different opinion in usül al-fiqh has more to do with 
the theology than the law. 
Turning to the technical terms used in the 
explanation of amr,. "+he development of usül al-fiqh 
itself was not complete at one period but developed 
stage by stage as the area of the Islamic world expanded 
and various sciences developed so that more of the 
linguistic and speculative elements were introduced. 
Therefore we observe that most of the terms which are 
peculiar to amr were even later than the period of 
Abü Hanifa, Malik and Shafi"i and that any attribution 
of these terms to them appears to be based only on the 
understanding of their doctrine and their regular 
practice. For example, the use of terms like al-mutlaq, 
al-takrär, al-taräkh3 and so on for amr can hardly be 
found in any early works of those people. Those who 
attributed these terms to them seem to have based their 
arguments on the fact that in the furü' of the law, they 
always adopted solutions which seemed compatible with 
that kind-of terminology and therefore, if they had 
known of it, they would have used it. The remark made 
by both al-Quraf3 and al-Shawkäni on the obligatory 
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nature of al-fawr could be added to this evidence. 
In our examination of amr, we found that al-amr 
al-wäjib is the most important of all because it is the 
only one which involved the threat of punishment for 
whoever abandoned it as a result of it being the real 
amr. Also we found that amr has its special form which 
identifies it from other kinds of speech even though 
that form may still need to be supported by iräda. 
The arguments about the nature of al-amr al-mugayyad 
threw up interesting differences in the practicalities 
of law. The case of the number of limbs to be cut off 
for theft was a useful illustration of this. In this 
some appear to have based their interpretations on their 
understanding of the Qur'änic injunction and its 
explanatory Traditions of the Prophet while others 
based their own practice on mere personal judgement. 
The case of 'Ali b. Abi Tälib which is widely reported 
provides a satisfactory evidence to that. It also shows 
that one can exercise one's personal judgement to give 
mercy in the law to a convicted criminal if one finds 
it appropriate. Thus, if one is sure that one is on the 
right path, one could defy public opinion to exercise 
what-one found to be appropriate. That was exactly what 
'All did in order to give mercy to the thief who already 
had two of his limbs cut off, despite strong opposition 
from his companions. 
Every obligation as far as Islamic law is concerned 
has been designated with a certain period for its 
performance which the mukallaf is allowed to carry out 
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within that period. ''And the period given to each of 
these obligations is made to accommodate various 
conditions for the mukallaf without necessarily 
confining it to a specific moment. The attempt by 
some usülis to pin down a specific time appears to 
be based on their personal discretion to encourage 
people to give priority to religious commandments. 
This study has also revealed that as long as 
the argument involved in any of their disagreements 
did not affect any fundamental issue which relates 
to the belief (al-'itigäd), it could be compromised 
or abandoned altogether. The evidence for that is 
clear on many occasions where many scholars have 
compromised or abandoned a certain theory which they 
had previously adopted. Shäfi'x, for example, is 
known to have been opposed to the obligatory nature 
of al-fawr with regard to al-amr al-mutlaq. This is 
supported by his own statement on the hajj which he 
maintained should be based on al-taräkhl. But on the 
question of early payment of zakät he appears to have 
abandoned that theory and supported N. lik and others 
in maintaining that zakät must be deducted on the basis 
of al-fawr. This amounts to a compromise of his 
original theory which he has remained faithful to on 
many other occasions. 
This kind of inconsistency is found in the furü". 
In their discussions of amr, the usülis attempted to 
to create a consistent programme, which appears to 
have been more possible on a theoretical level than 
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